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ABSTRACT 
There is a consensus in the law and development field and international policy 
circles that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is necessary to attract foreign 
investment into an emerging economy. This research study analyses and attempts to 
build on this 'Dominant Theory' in the context of Russia. 
The Dominant Theory has little direct empirical support: the methods that are most 
often used to assert that law as a determinant of foreign investment are inappropriate 
to the task, and the findings of such studies are inconsistent and unconvincing. 
Further, the studies that purport to assert the importance of a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate to foreign investors leave three important questions unanswered: 
- How do foreign investors perceive the host legal climate before investing? 
- Why do they invest in countries that lack a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate? 
- What factors affect the importance that foreign investors attach to host legal 
climates? 
A range of existing research provides preliminary answers to these questions, 
suggesting that the Dominant Theory is not entirely accurate. They form the basis of 
two hypotheses. Interviews of foreign investors and their advisors in London and 
Moscow are carried out to address the research agenda. 
The evidence verify the hypotheses. While foreign investors would prefer a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, and welcome improvements in the quality of the 
Russian legal climate, it is clear that a notable faction of them do not conform to the 
Dominant Theory. First, according to the interviewees, the quality of Russia's legal 
climate does determine whether investors choose to invest there or not. Second, 
foreign investors can operate successfully in the absence of a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate. Finally, the impact of the Russia's legal climate depends significantly 
on the characteristics of the investor and nature of the investment. 
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1 The Ideal Legal Climate for Foreign Investment 
1.1 Overview 
This work is an assessment of the importance of a 'theoretically ideal' legal climate 
for the attraction and support of foreign investors into Russia. It will be 
demonstrated shortly that there is a widely held view in the development field, as 
well as in international policy circles, that a theoretically ideal legal climate is 
necessary for the creation of an environment that is attractive to foreign investors. 
This belief, following the work for Perry-Kessaris shall be referred to here as the 
'Dominant Theory'. ' It is apparent, however, that this Theory lacks a robust empirical 
base, and has various limitations? Using the Dominant Theory and its limitations as 
a starting point, the main aim of this study is the following: first, to assess the 
importance of the overall quality of Russia's legal climate to the attraction and 
support of foreign investors around 2004; second, to develop a more accurate 
understanding and explanation of the relationship between foreign investors and 
host legal climates. 
The notion of a 'theoretically ideal legal climate' has its roots in the rule of law. 
However, the 'rule of law' is a term which carries great intellectual 'baggage, and is 
prone to misunderstanding. Brian Tamanaha has recently devoted a book to 
examining the emergence and meaning of the concept .3 According to Tamanaha, the 
rule of law is an "exceedingly elusive notion. "4 Even among political and legal 
theorists there is no accord as to its meaning, leading one to remark that "there are 
almost as many concepts of the rule of law as there are people defending it. "5 Within 
the law and development field, scholars such as Carothers and Upham are critical of 
I See Perry 2001. 
2 Chapters Three and Four review evidence available. 
3 Tamanaha 2004. 
4 Tamanaha 2004,3. 
5 Taiwo 1999 cited in Tamanaha 2004,3. 
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the use of the term. ' Acknowledging the criticism, one the arch-proponents of the 
rule of law, the World Bank has conceded that ambiguous rhetoric should be set 
aside. ' Fortunately, this is not a debate we need to be drawn into, for in this field of 
study, the concept under examination is sufficiently clear. 
The present study is not concerned with examining the rule of law in the familiar 
sense, as a political ideal whose history is ancient, but whose substance is still 
contested. Instead, this thesis is concerned with a concept that is inspired by it, but 
which is in principle apolitical and, further, whose application is much more specific. 
The concept we are concerned with is a notion tailored to the goal of economic 
development, and in particular, the attraction of foreign investment. To avoid 
confusion, from this point forward, a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate to support 
foreign investors, or, for brevity, a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, shall be used to 
refer to the model under examination in this thesis .8 The term the 'rule of law' will 
be used to refer to the broader, political ideal, where the subject arises. 
1.2 The 'Dominant Theory': Claims about the Importance of a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate for Foreign Investors 
The Dominant Theory is an argument that asserts that the quality of the legal climate 
is an important determinant of foreign investment, and therefore that a Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate is required to attract foreign investment into countries with weak 
legal climates, like Russia. At the heart of the Dominant Theory is the concept of a 
legal climate that is best suited to economic development by serving the needs of 
6 See for example, Carothers 1998, Upham 2002. 
7 World Bank "A Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate as a Goal of Development Policy" 
internet site, visited on 14/8/05. 
8 Perry-Kessaris develops the concept of an "Ideal Legal Paradigm" for foreign 
investment, against which she assesses Sri Lanka's legal climate. The "Ideal Paradigm" 
is substantially the same concept as the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. However, I 
have not borrowed the term as it reflects a slightly out-dated and narrow World Bank 
definition of the procedural attributes of an ideal legal climate. See Perry 2001. 
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domestic and foreign investors. While there is no single written definition of a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, its advocates have a common, shared idea of the 
attributes of such a legal climate. As the extracts below show, a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate is one which provides an unspecified yet satisfactory degree of 
certainty and efficiency in the enforcement of investors' rights. A full analysis of the 
theoretical basis and features of the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is undertaken 
in Chapter Two. 
This study is not questioning the general desirability of a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate, for instance whether it is beneficial to foreign investment, or whether 
foreign investors tend to prefer such climates. Instead, using the Dominant Theory as 
a starting point this work aims to examine the impact of the quality of Russia's legal 
climate on foreign investors at two stages: during the decision to invest, and during 
operations in Russia. 
This subsection establishes the existence of a widely held and frequently repeated 
belief in the importance of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate to foreign investors, 
with a particular focus on Russia. To start off, the conviction about the need for legal 
reform to establish a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, which in turn is expected to 
attract investment into transition economies, is summarised clearly in the following 
extract from a World Bank publication: 
"The massive move by developing and transition countries toward market economies 
necessitated the adoption of strategies for the encouragement of private investment, 
domestic and foreign. Naturally, there was a general realization that such an 
objective could not be achieved without modifying and, sometimes, completely 
overhauling the legal and institutional framework and firmly establishing the rule of 
law, thereby creating the necessary climate of stability and predictability. "9 
9 World Bank 1999,1-2. 
13 
It is also important to make it explicit that the Dominant Theory is believed to reflect 
the role of law in the decision to invest in a foreign country: 
"some of the most important factors considered by investors as they decide on investment 
location are a predictable and non-discriminatory regulatory environment and an 
absence of undue administrative impediments to business more generally... The most 
effective action by host country authorities to meet investors' expectations is: 
safeguarding public sector transparency, including an impartial system of courts and 
law enforcement ... "10 [Emphasis added] 
Since a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is considered important to foreign 
investors, it is assumed that failure to establish a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
will deter foreign investment. In 2002, the OECD held an investment conference on 
attracting FDI into Russia. In one of the related publications, the organization argues 
that failure to develop a level playing field and the rule of law will "certainly 
discourage" FDI. 11 An earlier review of the Russian investment climate by the same 
organization provides more detail. In the review, the OECD sought to identify 
factors impeding foreign and domestic investment. Declaring that the legal climate 
was among the obstacles, its position on the legal environment is summarised as 
follows: 
"Much has been said above, both in general and specific terms regarding the need to 
deal with crime, corruption, lack of security of property rights and of enforcement of 
contracts and judgments in dispute resolution so as to improve the business climate 
for foreign and domestic investors. "12 
Since it is held that countries like Russia currently lack a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate and that one needs to be established, advocates of the Dominant Theory call 
for legal reforms, as the first extract showed. The World Bank therefore prescribes 
10 OECD 2003,7. 
11 OECD 2002a, 9. 
12 OECD 2001,31. 
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legal reform as a 'policy solution' to attracting FDI. For example, on its Private Sector 
Development website, the Bank advises that: 
"An uncertain and insecure regulatory environment is a major deterrent to 
investment and entrepreneurship ... Policymakers should ensure that laws and 
regulations are consistent with the needs of a free market, contracts and property 
rights are enforced, due process is efficient in correcting abuses, and legal 
requirements are transparent and accessible. "13 
The Foreign Investment Advisory Service is an affiliate of the World Bank Group 
which dispenses advice to developing country governments about how to attract 
foreign investment. In a 1997 publication, a transparent and non-discretionary legal 
climate is classified as an "indispensable precondition" for encouraging FDI. 14 The 
author goes on to suggest that establishing the rule of law is one of the ways in which 
Russia could become a much more attractive investment destination. 15 Finally, at a 
foreign investment conference in Massachusetts in 1999, the Deputy US Treasury 
Secretary declared that judicial reform should be Russia's top priority 16 
What is referred to in the present work as the Dominant Theory is an expression, in 
the context of foreign investment, of a widely held view in the law and development 
field of the role of law in development generally. For example, the former President 
of the World Bank asserts that: 
"Legal and judicial systems that work effectively, efficiently, and fairly are the 
backbone of national economic and social development. National and international 
investors need to know that the rules they operate under will be expeditiously and 
fairly enforced. "17 
13 World Bank, 'Private Sector Development' internet site, page on 'Making Laws and 
Regulations More Predictable', visited on 14/8/05. 
14 Michalet 1997,3. 
is Michalet 1997,26. 
16 Reported in Hendrix 2001,94. 
17 Quoted in Upham 2002,10. Original document no longer available. 
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The President of the EBRD, in a speech to the Foreign Investment Advisory Council 
of Russia, strikes a similar tone: 
"The sound implementation of the rule of law is crucial for the country's investment 
climate.. "18 
And finally, the General Counsel of the World Bank, on a speech on legal reform in 
transition countries: 
"Thus, investors need the rule of law. They need transparent and equitable laws, with 
access to justice and due process, and enforceable contracts. "19 
The extracts above are representative of the most common belief, amongst those 
concerned with the subject, about the impact of host legal climates on foreign 
investment; hence the term "The Dominant Theory". Moreover, the Theory counts 
among its advocates a near consensus of multinational institutions and policy 
makers, and as Chapter Three will show, further support from a range of academics, 
research organisations and foreign investment organisations. The Theory sounds 
convincing, logical and virtually self-evident; in fact, it seems so obvious that it is 
almost unchallenged, and rarely questioned. There would be little to scrutinise were 
the Theory based on research on the role of law in foreign investment decisions, or 
the legal practises of foreign investors in weak legal climates. But they are not based 
on such evidence. Instead, as the former President of the World Bank makes clear, 
the Dominant Theory stems from a belief in the role of law in economic development 
more generally. 
78 Lemierre 2003. 
19 Danino 2003. 
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2 Definition of Terms 
2.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
A foreign direct investment (FDI) has a number of distinguishing characteristics. It is 
an investment that moves from one state, the home state, to the another, the host 
state. As opposed to indirect investment (e. g. portfolio investment), the investment 
remains within the same economic entity20 FDI also implies a long-term interest in 
the investment. FDI further implies that the foreign investor exerts a "significant 
degree of influence" on the management of the firm resident in the host state. 21 
2.2 Legal Systems 
This study defines legal systems in the same way as Perry-Kessaris' 2001 work on the 
Sri Lankan legal system as a determinant of foreign investment there. In order to 
capture the entirety of the relationship between foreign investor and host legal 
system, she defines the legal system to encompass: the state institutions that govern 
the behaviour of economic actors; the laws and regulations according to which 
economic actors operate; and the manner in which these laws and regulations are 
applied. State institutions include judicial institutions, as well as the bureaucracy and 
politicians in their capacity as law-makers and law-enforcers. n The study considers 
only those laws and regulations that seek to regulate economic behaviour. 
In addition to the formal legal system, this study is also interested in the role of 
informal institutions. North defined institutions as "the rules of the game in a society 
or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. "23 
Informal institutions cannot, however, be defined as precisely as formal ones 24 The 
difference between them is "one of degree. Envision a continuum of taboos, customs 
20 Perry 2001,13. 
21 UNCTAD 2003,231. 
n Perry 2001,24. 
23 North 1990,3. 
24 North 1997,4. 
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and traditions at one end to written constitutions at the other. "25Informal institutions 
are relevant to the present study, above all, because they help to facilitate economic 
exchange, where formal - that is state institutions, do not function or are inefficient 26 
They therefore help to explain how economic actors might do business in the absence 
of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. 
It is not direct formal restrictions on foreign ownership that are thought to be the 
main deterrent to foreign investment in Russia today, in fact, the country has made 
great strides in opening its economy to foreign investment 27 During most of the 
Soviet period foreign investment was extremely limited as foreign investment was, in 
principle, prohibited. A number of developments opened the way for foreign 
investment in Russia. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late December 
1991, there was a swift succession of foreign investment legislation. Marking a 180 
degree change in policy, many formal obstacles to investment were promptly 
removed, and Russia embraced a fundamental freedom to invest, subject to certain 
limitations . 28 The development of market institutions were also essential in this 
process. The adoption of a new Constitution in 1993 protected property rights, 
including those of foreign investors. The Civil Code, introduced in 1995, established 
the principles of commercial relations. Russia's foreign investment laws and the 
policies that led up to them will be reviewed in detail in Chapter Six. 
Following the approach of the World Bank's investment climate surveys and the 
work of Amanda Perry-Kessaris, this study researches foreign investors' perceptions 
and experiences of the general features of the Russian legal climate and institutions, 
not aspects of particular Russian commercial legislation. First of all, there are a host 
of legal scholars and commentators who have already reviewed existing Russian 
commercial law, and as in many other jurisdictions, regularly report on legislative 
u North 1990,46. 
26 World Bank 2002b, 171-173. 
27 OECD 2004,12 
28 Hogan & Hartson LLP 2006 
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developments in the Federation29 This aside, the use of foreign investor perceptions 
is rooted in more fundamental methodological reasoning. The needs of investors are 
central to the World Bank's approach to governance; indeed, their assessments of 
investment environments, including legal climates, as well as those of many other 
organisations, are based on the perceptions of domestic and foreign businesses 30 
Also, the model of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate describes the general 
attributes of legal institutions and the characteristics of laws in broad terms - it does 
not prescribe any substantive content for laws. It is this broader perspective that is 
needed to assess the overall impact of the Russian legal climate. It will be left to 
future studies to undertake the important task of researching the impact of specific 
bodies of commercial law on foreign investors in Russia. 
2.3 What is a Determinant of Foreign Investment? 
The idea that a particular type of legal system is a 'requirement' for the attraction of 
foreign investors prompts us to consider how we define a determinant of FDI. The 
Dominant Theory implies that a determinant of FDI is not simply any factor that may 
indirectly contribute to foreign investment flows over the long term, but a factor that 
directly affects foreign investment decisions. This interpretation is supported by a 
wide range of studies which expressly view foreign investment determination in 
terms of foreign investors' decisions, though critically, they rarely present direct 
evidence about the decision process itself. 31 
The Dominant Theory takes a clear position about the impact of the law on the 
foreign investment decision. This view stems from the primacy that traditional law 
and economics bestows on formal legal systems for providing a suitable business 
29 The most comprehensive review of Russian legislation can be found in Butler 2003. 
Twice a year the EBRD publishes the journal, Law in Transition, which covers legislative 
development across the region. Private law firms also publish regular analysis of 
Russian legislative developments, for example, Ernst & Young's Russia Law Brief, and 
Baker & McKenzie's Doing Business in the Russian Federation. 
30 See Chapter Two, subsection 1.1 
31 Bevan and Estrin 2000,16; Brunetti et al. 1997,19; Fabry and Zeghni 2002; Hewko 2002, 
9; Lankes and Venables 1997,557; Perry 2001,14; Resmini 2001,678. 
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environment. The point to keep in mind is that the Dominant Theory's expectation of 
how foreign investors are expected to perceive and respond to the quality of host 
legal climates is derived from this general belief, rather than from dedicated research 
on how foreign investors actually make their investment decisions 32 
3 The Limitations of the Dominant Theory 
In Chapter Two, the theoretical foundations of the Dominant Theory are examined. It 
is shown that belief in the importance of law for foreign investors is rooted in 
traditional law and economics. To best support investors, legal climates should 
provide efficiency and predictability. The blueprint for the Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate, that can provide these features is then laid out. Chapter Three then assesses 
the evidence on law as a determinant of foreign investment. Research that might be 
considered to support the Dominant Theory suffers both from methodological 
limitations, as well as in the inconsistency of the findings themselves. Chapter Four 
moves on to consider a wide array of evidence that suggests that law is not so 
important to foreign investors. 
The assessments of existing theory and research in Chapters Three and Four 
demonstrate that the Dominant Theory has three main limitations, which are 
outlined briefly in the following subsection. These limitations show that the 
Dominant Theory does not accurately capture the impact of the law on foreign 
investors, neither at the pre-investment decision making stage, nor during 
operations. The fieldwork is designed primarily to address these limitations, which 
are brought to attention in Chapters Three and Four. These limitations serve as a 
starting point towards a more complete understanding of the impact of the Russian 
legal climate on foreign investors. 
Before moving on, it is important to be very clear about the aim of this research 
study. The Dominant Theory is emphatic about the necessity of a Theoretically Ideal 
32 Perry-Kessaris 2003,650. 
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Legal Climate for the attraction and support of foreign investors. It must be stressed 
that, in questioning the established view, this study does not intend to suggest that 
the quality of host legal climates are irrelevant to foreign investors; nor that legal 
climates such as Russia's are not in need of reform; nor that foreign investors would 
not welcome improvements in the country's legal climate; nor is it being suggested 
that the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is unattractive to foreign investors. It is 
hard to argue against the idea that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, or in the 
words of the World Bank - "an effective system of property, contracts.. . and other 
elements of a comprehensive legal system that are effectively, impartially, and 
cleanly administered by a well-functioning, impartial and honest judicial and legal 
system"33 - is good for foreign investment 34 This study does not question what 
investors might want under ideal circumstances, but concerns itself with 
contributing to our understanding of the relationship between foreign investors and 
host legal climates in real world legal climates. 
Rather than to suggest that the Dominant Theory is 'wrong', the approach of this 
study is to recognise the existence of a faction of investors who do not conform to the 
Dominant Theory, and who we can term as being 'less sensitive' to the quality of 
host legal climates. By addressing the limitations of the Dominant Theory, this study 
attempts to present a more accurate and complete picture of the relationship between 
Russia's legal climate and foreign investors circa 2004. Finally, the analysis of the 
Dominant Theory is rounded off with an examination the Theory's prescription of 
legal reform as a means to attracting foreign investment into Russia. 
3.1 Hypothesis One: The Alleged Necessity of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
The primary hypothesis questions the Dominant Theory directly: 
"A Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not always necessary to support 
foreign investors in Russia. " 
33 Wolfensohn 1999,10 
34 Upham 2002,10 
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There are two main reasons why this hypothesis has been drawn up. First, to assert 
that law is a determinant of foreign investment implies that potential investors refer 
to accurate information about the legal climates of potential hosts when they are 
choosing the investment destination. But as Chapter Four will show, there is 
evidence that suggests that some potential foreign investors may not have accurate 
information about host legal climates when choosing a host, especially in Russia's 
case. Remarkably, there is barely any research into this vital point" it is simply 
presumed that they are well informed. The role of foreign firms' perceptions of the 
Russian legal climate is therefore a natural starting point for the fieldwork in the 
present study. 
The second reason for Hypothesis One is that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
may simply not be as important to some foreign investors as the advocates of the 
Dominant Theory consider it to be. The literature presented in Chapter Four shows 
that there is good reason to question whether all foreign investors actually need 
polished legal climates in order to invest and operate successfully. First of all, foreign 
investors may overlook the quality of the legal climate if non-legal factors are more 
important, and take precedence in the decision to invest. Further, foreign investors 
may in fact be able to do business successfully in countries that lack a Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate, for example by using informal institutions or bribery when the 
official legal system does not meet their needs. The Dominant Theory and the work 
supporting it is limited because it does not give sufficient consideration to these 
possibilities. The present work intends therefore to address how foreign investors 
respond to the Russian legal climate both during the investment process and during 
their operations in the country. 
35 In fact, the only study to examine this issue is Perry 2001. Her findings are summarised 
in Chapter Three, Section 2. Her findings do not verify this presumption. 
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3.2 Hypothesis Two: The Alleged Homogeneity of Foreign Investors 
The third weakness of the Dominant Theory is that it does not take into account 
differences in the attitudes of foreign investors towards the legal climate. The 
Dominant Theory treats foreign investors as a uniform group. Challenging this, 
Hypothesis Two is that: 
"Foreign investors' perceptions of the Russian legal climate depend on their 
firm characteristics. " 
Hypothesis Two is supported by growing evidence that the relationship between 
firms and the law varies according to the firm's characteristics. Most of the evidence 
relates to domestic firms, but there is also a notable body of research on the effect of 
foreign investors' characteristics such as their size, export-orientation and 
ownership 36 
We are therefore prompted to examine whether the impact of the legal climate, both 
in the decision to invest and during operations, differs between foreign investors. 
Evidence of consistent differences in attitudes towards the legal climate shows that a 
certain faction of foreign investors do not conform to the Dominant Theory. This 
would suggest that the Theory oversimplifies the role of law. 
3.3 Summajy 
The Dominant Theory bases the model of the relationship between host legal 
climates and foreign investors on the alleged importance of a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate for economic development. Advocates of the Theory insist that the 
quality of the host legal climate is one of the foremost concerns of foreign investors, 
both in the decision to invest, and also during operations in Russia. While existing 
research in the field appears to support the Dominant Theory, both the research 
methods and findings have significant shortcomings. Also, there is a notable body of 
36 This evidence is presented in Chapter Four, Section 4. 
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evidence that suggests that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not of primary 
importance foreign investors. 
It is not the intention of this work to allege that there is no truth in the Dominant 
Theory. The overall argument of this thesis is that the Dominant Theory overstates 
the importance of the quality of the host legal climate, and in doing so fails to 
account for those investors who are less sensitive to the quality of host legal climates. 
Thus it provides a partial framework for understanding the impact of the legal 
climate on foreign investors in countries like Russia. The present work highlights and 
responds to the limitations of the Dominant Theory with the aim of contributing to a 
more complete understanding of the impact of the Russian legal climate on foreign 
investors around 2004. It does this specifically by looking at: 
1. The role of perceptions of the Russian legal climate in the decision to invest. 
2. The impact of the Russian legal climate on foreign investors in the country. 
3. The effect of firm characteristics on perceptions of the Russian legal climate 
Finally, there is a significant facet of the Dominant Theory which exists outside of the 
short-term context of foreign investment decisions and activities. As the quotations 
in earlier demonstrated, advocates of the Theory frequently prescribe legal reform as 
a solution to foreign investment attraction. Indeed, to do so is the logical 
consequence of arguing that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is essential to 
attracting foreign investment. This thesis considers the merits such a prescription, 
assessing the challenge of establishing the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate in 
Russia. We shall return to this issue shortly. 
To address the research agenda, the present work employs semi-structured 
interviews with foreign investors and their advisors, both in London and Moscow. 
Semi-structured interviews are preferred over other research methods because they 
provide the depth of insight and flexibility that is required to address the research 
agenda. Chapter Five first describes Russia's legal heritage and then moves on to 
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assess the present day legal climate using existing sources as well as an analysis, 
based on World Bank survey data, of foreign investors' perceptions on the Russian 
legal climate; the data analysis is original to this study. Chapter Seven presents the 
research methodology and interview questions. The interview findings themselves 
are presented in Chapter Eight. 
4 Why Research Foreign Investors in Russia? 
Examining a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate from the perspective of foreign 
investors in Russia is particularly appropriate. The collapse of Communism is said to 
have represented one of the most important economic transitions of all time 37 Legal 
reform has been an integral part of the transformation, and since 1989 transition 
countries have been the most active in legal reform projects 38 This Section shows that 
a vast amount of money has been spent on legal reform, an effort which has to a 
significant extent been driven by foreign investors and the desire to attract them. 
Further, the focus on Russia is warranted by the its failure to attract FDI and 
establish a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. In fact, the sheer difficulty of 
establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate raises doubt over the merits of 
prescribing it as a solution to foreign investment attraction. 
4.1 The Importance of Foreign Investors to the Legal Reform Agenda 
The World Bank, which is the foremost proponent of the Dominant Theory, 39 has for 
a long time been concerned with legal reform for the sake of attracting foreign 
investors. Enshrined in Article I of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement, is the 
37 Stiglitz 2002,133. 
38 Carothers 1998,4. 
39 Three of the extracts in support of the Dominant Theory in Section 1.2 were from the 
World Bank; two more were published by its partner agencies, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the Foreign Investment Advisory Service. Further 
evidence of its propagation of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate can be found in 
regular publications such as the World Development Report (for example 2002,2005). See 
also the 'Legal and Judicial Reform' pages on the Bank's website. 
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objective of promoting private foreign investment. 40 Three of its constituent 
organisations are dedicated in one way or another to the promotion and support of 
foreign investment: the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MICA), and the Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) of the International Financial Corporation. 
In the World Bank's view, foreign investors are the main clients for legal reforms 41 
The creation of an investment environment supportive to foreign investors has 
always been one of the aims of legal reform. With the demise of state socialism and 
ascendancy of market capitalism, private sector development (PSD) emerged as one 
of the World Bank's priorities. From early on, the legal and regulatory framework 
was considered vital to PSD, with the promotion of foreign investment integral to its 
aims. The aforementioned foreign investment agencies collaborated with the Bank in 
shaping the PSD agenda. 41 
Representatives of foreign investors have also been influential in shaping the 
substance of legal reforms. For example, according to the Bank, FIAS was involved in 
setting the agenda for legal and judicial reform in the transition region. 43 Between 
1994 and 2004, the organisation was involved in fifteen projects in Russia alone, 
relating inter alia to investment laws, foreign investment laws and policies, and 
administrative barriers. 44 The union of the foreign investment and legal reform 
agendas is best demonstrated by the EBRD's curious position as both a leading figure 
in legal reform efforts and its status as the region's largest single investor. In Russia, 
the Foreign Investment Advisory Council, a gathering of large multinational foreign 
investors chaired by the Russian Prime Minister, advises on legal and regulatory 
changes. 45 Other foreign investment associations, such as the American Chamber of 
40 World Bank Articles of Agreement, Article I (ii) 
41 McAuslan 2004,65. 
42 Shihata 1991,207 and 257-269. 
43 Gupta et al. 2002,7. 
44 FIAS Internet Site, Projects Page. 
45 FIAC Internet Site. 
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Commerce also lobby for reforms, for example in intellectual property rights. 46 It 
should be kept in mind that foreign investors' interests may not always coincide with 
that of other investors or society as a whole 47 
4.2 Legal Reform and World Bank Lending 
It is hard to overstate the importance attributed to legal reform within the orthodoxy 
of law and development. Most importantly, there is a widely held belief that 
sustainable economic development cannot occur in the absence of the rule of law 48 
Perhaps owing to this belief, by the late 1990's roughly 78% of loans made by the 
international financial institutions were conditioned on the implementation of legal 
reform projects . 49 In addition to these 
loans, an estimated $1 billion of bilateral and 
multilateral aid was spent on legal reform projects from the early 1980's to early 
1990's alone 50 
Early on in the transition, the World Bank identified that the effectiveness of its 
lending operations was being undermined by weak institutions, as well as inter alia, 
"lack of an adequate legal framework, damaging discretionary interventions, 
uncertain and variable policy frameworks. "51 Governance relates to the manner of 
conduct of authority, specifically: "the exercise of authority through formal and 
informal traditions and institutions for the common good. "52 This entails the need to 
constrain the state, 53and to hold it accountable, M this relies on strong institutions, 
including legal ones. Legal reform and the rule of law have therefore been subsumed 
into the global 'good governance' agenda. The Bank's lending for law-reform projects 
has proliferated under this mandate 55 
46 AMCHAM Internet Site, The Russian-American Business Dialogue. 
47 Hewko 2002,5. 
48 Tamanaha 2005,2. 
49 Klug 2000 cited in McAuslan 2004,63. 
so Upham 2002,8. 
51 World Bank 1992,4 
52 Kaufmann 2003,5 
53 World Bank 1996a, 88 
54 McAuslan 1997,27 
55 Tshuma 1999,79 
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As good governance requires transparency and accountability, corruption in client 
countries has "increasingly been at the heart" of this agenda. The World Bank places 
great emphasis on legal and judicial reform as a part of its anti-corruption strategy 56 
Renewed efforts in good governance and anti-corruption have been made under the 
leadership of the new President of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz who believes 
that corruption is "one of the biggest threats to development in many countries. "57 In 
2006 the Bank increased its lending for governance, anti-corruption, rule of law and 
public sector reform projects, with $4.5bn of assistance in the 2006 financial year. In 
summary, foreign investment promotion has been central to the movement for legal 
reform, one which is now part of the broader project of good governance. 
Despite these loans and projects, Russia is notable for its failure to bring about the 
rule of law, 58 as well as its poor track record in attracting foreign investment. Many 
commentators, in accordance with the Dominant Theory, attribute the shortfall in 
FDI to the woes of Russia's legal climate, in particular, bureaucracy, corruption and 
the poor enforcement of laws 59 The country is therefore an apt setting in which to 
test the Dominant Theory. A summary of the country's FDI record is presented 
below, while a full analysis of the country's legal climate is undertaken in Chapter 
Six. 
56 World Bank 2006 Governance Website 
http: //www. worldbank. org/html/extdr/gc/governance/governance. htm 
57 See World Bank Development Committee 2006. In April of 2006, the Development 
Committee of the World Bank and IMF, the body of Ministers from member states 
which sets the agenda for the institutions, asked the Bank to set out its strategy for 
enhancing governance and anti-corruption efforts. In September of 2006, the Bank 
published this strategy. 
58 Carothers 1998,4-6. See also Chapter Six. 
59 For example, A. T. Kearney 2003,21; Schaffer et al. 2004,8; OECD 2002,6; Bevan et al. 
2004,61. 
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4.3 Russia's Unsuccessful FDI Record 
Despite its vast natural resources, large consumer market and educated workforce, 60 
Russia has remarkably low levels of FDI, in fact, UNCTAD categorises it as a 
country, "below potential" in FDI terms 61 Using a variety of measures, over the 
period 2001-2003, the organisation ranks Russia 33rd in the world according to how 
much FDI, relative to the size of its economy, it ought to attract, but 119th in the 
world for how much it actually receives 62 On the basis of one FDI statistic - stock of 
FDI as a percentage of national wealth, Russia's FDI levels in 2003 were around half 
of the world average, half of the average in Central and Eastern Europe, and a 
quarter of the levels enjoyed by the Czech Republic and Hungary. 63 Out of nineteen 
transition countries, only Uzbekistan has a lower proportion of FDI M In a survey by 
MICA, 40% of firms interviewed were interested in investing in China in the next 
three years, 39% in Brazil, 20% in India and 19% in Russia 65 
A large share of foreign investment in Russia is in the form of loans and trade credits 
taken by Russian firms, rather than foreign direct investment. The country also has 
very low levels of portfolio investment. One positive aspect of Russia's investment 
statistics is that foreign direct investors have a high rate of reinvestment: 66% of 
foreign investment inflows are profits that are reinvested. This shows that foreign 
investors are looking to expand in the country. Finally, foreign investment is 
concentrated in two sectors: manufacturing, which accounts for 45% of inflows, and 
energy, which accounts for 32%; business services, trade services and financial 
services account for 7%, 6% and 5%, respectively" 
60 Schaffer et al. 2004,13 and A. T. Kearney 2003,4 and 20-21. 
61 UNCTAD 2004a, 17. 
62 UNCTAD 2004a, 283 and 290. The FDI 'performance' relates to how much FDI a 
country receives relative to the size of its economy. UNCTAD rates a country's FDI 
'potential' according to twelve 'structural' variables, for example, economic growth, 
communication infrastructure, tertiary education levels and country risk. See UNCTAD 
2004a, 12 and 36. 
63 UNCTAD 2004b. 
64 Kaitila 2003,5. 
65 MIGA 2002,21. 
66 OECD 2006,14-17 
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Foreign investment is considered to be essential to Russia's future development: it is 
estimated that the country's FDI levels need to increase by five to ten times to 
achieve its government's own growth targets 67 In general, it is widely accepted that 
foreign investment is a vital component of economic development, and is said to 
bring numerous benefits. For example, foreign investors bring financial capital and 
access to export markets. Foreign firms have been found to perform better than local 
ones, and this advantage 'spills over' to local firms, for example, by the transfer of 
management skills and technology. Foreign investors have also been said to bestow 
particular advantages in the transition, for example through their participation in 
privatisation, increasing competition and reducing supply shortages 68 
4.4 The Difficulty of Establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
As the quotations cited in subsection 1.2 point out, the Dominant Theory hinges on 
the ability to establish a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. However, the literature on 
the institutional determinants of foreign investment is notably divorced from that of 
legal reform. Advocates of the Dominant Theory seem to ignore the challenge of 
genuine legal change, and studies that investigate law as a factor in foreign 
investment, almost without exception, do not take into consideration the prospects 
for effective legal reform 69 In contrast, the present study takes this issue into 
consideration. 
In Chapter Six, the challenge of legal reform in transition, in particular, in Russia is 
analysed. If a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate was a cheap commodity that could be 
purchased and installed rapidly, then the question of the feasibility of legal reform 
would be redundant. The Chapter argues that the disappointments of transition 
reforms show that establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not a quick and 
67 The Moscow Times 2004a. 
68 For benefits at the national level, see UNCTAD 1999,17-44; for benefits at the firm level, 
see Bilsen & Maldegem 1999 and Yudaeva et al. 2000; for their contribution to transition, 
see Kalotay 2001. In Russia today, the Foreign Investment Advisory Council of Russia is 
active in proposing and lobbying for reforms; see the FIAC internet site. 
69 Hewko 2002 is the only exception. 
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straightforward task, but a complex and long term endeavour. This conclusion 
clearly affects the efficacy of prescribing a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate as a 
foreign investment solution. What happens to foreign investment in Russia if the 
country cannot establish a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate? 
The main aim of Chapter Eight is to show that establishing a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate in Russia is notably difficult, and to reconsider the merits of the 
Dominant Theory's prescription in the light of this point. There is no specific 
hypothesis associated with this issue, nor any dedicated fieldwork. None the less, the 
issue contributes to a more thorough analysis of the Dominant Theory. 
5 Thesis Outline 
Chapter Two is titled, "The Importance of the Legal Climate to Foreign Investors: 
Theoretical Foundations. " 
Chapter Three is titled, "The Importance of the Legal Climate to Foreign Investors: A 
Critical Review of the Evidence. "
Chapter Four is titled, "Why the Quality of Legal Climates may not be so important 
to Foreign Investors. " 
Chapter Five is titled, "Russia's Legal Climate: Past and Present" 
Chapter Six is titled, "The Challenge of Establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate. " 
Chapter Seven is titled: "Researching Foreign Investors in Russia. " 
Chapter Eight is titled, "The Impact of the Russian Legal Climate on Foreign 
Investors. " 
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Chapter Nine is titled, "Conclusions. " 
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Chapter Two 
The Importance of the 
Theoretical Foundations 
Legal Climate to Foreign Investors: 
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1 The Principles of Law, Economics and Development 
This Chapter explains the theoretical roots of the Dominant Theory, which lie in the 
concept of the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. It shall be argued that the 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate derives from prevailing views in the field of law 
and development, which itself has been influenced by traditional law and economics. 
The concept is also influenced by the western rule of law heritage. This analysis 
follows the efforts of Perry-Kessaris, to put the ideas and literature of law and 
economics, law and development and the determination of FDI into a coherent 
framework. 7° 
Section 1.1 first explains that the orthodox view within law and development is that 
the purpose of legal systems is to service the needs of the private sector. Section 1.2 
then shows that it is widely accepted that the private sector demands efficiency and 
certainty from the environment which it operates in, and the legal system forms a 
vital part of this institutional setting. The tools for analysing 'efficiency' and 
'certainty' are then introduced. Section 3 follows by examining the characteristics of 
legal systems deemed to be most friendly to the private sector, and therefore most 
supportive of foreign investment. 
1.1 The Needs of the Private Sector: Efficiency and Certainty 
Our analysis derives from the orthodox position about the role of law in 
development and legal reform, which is based around the perceived needs of the 
private sector. 71 Economic growth and poverty alleviation require investment and the 
creation of wealth. As firms are the main creators of wealth, the investment climate 
must respond to their needs. The right investment climate is considered to be the key 
to "unleashing growth and reducing poverty. " It encourages firms to invest 
productively, to create jobs and expand. 72 As we shall see, legal systems are an 
70 Perry 2001. 
71 Perry 2000a, 1629. 
f World Bank 2004,36. 
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integral component of the what the World Bank considers to be the right investment 
climate. 
The role of the private sector has a historical significance too. In the transition 
context, the focus on the private sector was inevitable as a private sector did not 
formally exist under Communism. The economic hallmarks of such systems -a large 
public sector, nationalised ownership and high levels of regulation had to be 
replaced by private ownership and a deregulated, market-friendly state? The 
demise of central planning happened at a time when the private sector orientated, 
market economics of the Washington Consensus was in the ascendancy. 74 This 
transition is very much still taking place. 
Since the private sector is the end-user of commercial legal systems, the quality of the 
legal climate is best judged from their perspective. This approach is considered 
preferable to assessing the legal climate according to the quality of the laws on the 
books, as, especially in transition countries, there is a difference between how the 
legal system is meant to function, and how it actually does. Further, an assessment of 
the quality of legislation does not account for significant factors in the operation of 
transition legal climates: such as the quality, honesty and efficiency of the courts, the 
ability to enforce judgements, and the impact of corruption in government. 75 
The extensive body of research on obstacles to business is a testament to the 
significance that the development establishment attaches to private sector needs. This 
form of research uses firm surveys and expert opinions to gauge private sector 
perceptions of a variety of aspects of the business climate, including the legal and 
regulatory environment. Studies assess the problems faced by economic actors and 
make appropriate policy recommendations. The World Bank is the leader in this 
field. For example, its most recent governance research uses 25 sources of data on 
73 Faundez 2000,3. 
74 Naim 2000,513. 
75 See Chapter 8, Section 3 
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private sector attitudes. 76 It also recently conducted a global private sector survey of 
over 10,000 firms, and a joint regional survey of over 4,000 firms in transition 
countries with the EBRD, both of which include foreign investors. T' Partner 
organisations such as Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) and other 
multilateral organisations such as the OECD also engage in studies on private sector 
attitudes to the investment climate, which result in policy recommendations with a 
view to improving conditions for business in the countries under examination. 78 
So what does the private sector demand from the business environment? Perry- 
Kessaris explains that foreign investors' requirements can be summarised in terms of 
"efficiency and certainty. "79 This decomposition of the legal climate into two 
measures - efficiency and certainty - is a simple and sharp tool for examining the 
impact of law. Efficiency is important as the general ambition of firms is to maximise 
profits; as investments are forward looking and require the outlay of capital, firms 
making them require a measure of certainty about the future. The following section 
explains these principles in more detail and Section 3 then demonstrates how they 
have been interpreted and applied to form the paradigm for a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate. 
1.2 The Role of Legal Institutions in Providing Efficiency and Certainty 
The principles of efficiency and certainty capture the perspective of the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE). One of the figureheads of NIE, Douglass North, 
teaches that the role of institutions in society is to provide a stable structure for 
human interaction 80 By determining the 'rules of the game' institutions shape 
incentives in human exchange, including economic exchange. B1 Thus, according to 
NIE, economic development can actually be equated with institutional 
76 Kaufmann et al. 2004. 
77 World Bank, Governance Data internet site. 
78 For example, OECD 2001, FIAS 2001. 
79 Perry 2000a, 1629. 
so North 1990,6. 
81 North 1990,3. 
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development 82 Economic development, and so private sector needs, depend upon 
institutions to provide low cost transacting, to allow risks to be priced, and to 
engender credible commitments. 13Hence, efficiency and certainty. 
The NIE position closely resembles the development orthodoxy. The World Bank 
states that both ambiguity in the content of laws and regulations, and expectations 
about how they will be implemented, are potential sources of uncertainty 84 Buscaglia 
argues that growth needs a system of rules to enhance risk management in 
increasingly complex economies; and, further, legal systems are "potential 
institutional improvements" to these ends . 115 On the question of efficiency, he argues 
that the very purpose of economic analyses of law in developing countries is to 
understand what changes would promote economic efficiency. 86 
That economic performance is determined by institutions is now a widely accepted 
point, supported by a large body of empirical work 87 The measurement of 
institutions, like that of legal systems, is a controversial matter, making it very 
difficult to identify precisely which institutions contribute to development. 88 
Nevertheless, it is argued that one of the main reasons for the disparity in progress 
among transition economies is due to disparities in the strength of their institutions, 
in particular their legal climates 89 
82 Klein 1999,461. 
83 North 1997,2; Klein 1999,461. 
84 World Bank 2004,46. 
85 Buscaglia 1999,563. 
86 Buscaglia 1999,565. 
87 North 1997,2; see Burki et al. 1998 for a survey of the empirical evidence on institutions 
and development, and also Shirley 2003, Aron 2000. 
88 Shirley 2003,17; see also Aron 2000 for an analysis of existing evidence on institutions 
and development. 
89 On the subject of institutions and the challenges of transition generally, see Black & 
Tarassova 2002,1; Kolodko 2000,272; World Bank 2002a, xxii; for a survey of the studies 
conducted, see World Bank 2002a, 16-20; for analysis of institutions and economic 
performance in the region see Havylyshyn & van Rooden 2003,19 & 21, Brunetti et a!. 
1997,26-28 and Moers 1999,17. 
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Among institutions, the legal system has received the most attention in the 
development discourse. 90 The World Bank's position is that fair, efficient, effective 
legal and judicial systems are the "backbone" of development 91 The normative view 
that institutions should provide efficiency and certainty for the private sector applies 
to legal systems. For example, the Bank holds that a legal climate best promotes 
national development by meeting the needs of the private sector, specifically, by 
enabling "resources to be efficiently allocated, business risks rationally assessed and 
transactional costs kept at low levels. " 
According to the foregoing analysis, legal systems might influence the decisions of 
foreign investors because they affect the efficiency and certainty with which firms 
operate. This principle is the foundation for the proposition that law is a determinant 
of foreign investment. To test this view we must be able to discern between features, 
from the perspective of traditional law and economics, of attractive and unattractive 
legal climates. To do this, the tools for analysising how legal systems affect efficiency 
and certainty are required. First, efficiency. 
1.2.1 Analysing Efficiency: Transaction Costs 
The work of Ronald Coase, the father of Transaction Costs Economics, stands out 
because it establishes the point that the costs of transacting are vital to the analysis of 
the economic system of firms, markets and the law. In his words, without the concept 
of transaction costs, it is "impossible to understand the working of the economic 
system, to analyse many of its problems in a useful way, or to have a basis for 
determining policy. "93 It has been said that law and economics and NIE are "sub- 
fields" that have evolved from Coase's ideas and the literature based upon them 94 
90 Klein 1999,459. 
91 Quoted in Upham 2002,10. 
92 World Bank 1995,15. 
93 Coase 1988,6. 
94 Allen 1999,893. 
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Though Coase's work does not refer to foreign investors specifically, Perry-Kessaris 
shows how his ideas can be applied in this context. 95 The identification of transaction 
costs and the preceding arguments about the importance of efficiency show that in 
the eyes of foreign investors, the attractiveness of a legal climate might be said to 
depend to a large degree upon the costs it imposes. Where the institutional 
framework is incomplete, as in transitional states, 96 incoming investors are likely to 
face higher transaction costs than they would in mature market economies 97 The 
concept of transaction costs can be used as a tool for assessing whether features of 
host legal climates are expected to be attractive or unattractive to foreign investors. 
Coase does not provide a definition of transaction costs. In various articles, he 
employs different phrases to capture the idea. The term 'transaction costs' is how 
other economists have summarised his ideas 98 Transaction costs refer to the cost of 
exchange, 9 of doing business. Coase identifies the existence of three categories of 
transaction costs: search and information costs; bargaining and decision costs; and 
policing and enforcement costs. 100 These stages are briefly examined below to 
highlight the ways in which legal climates might impose costs on foreign investors in 
Russia. 
The first stage of an exchange is the search stage, during which for example, a foreign 
investor needs to acquire information to identify the right business partner. There is 
a cost to acquiring reliable information, and in some climates such information may 
be particularly hard to obtain, forcing firms to go to greater lengths, and therefore 
undergo higher costs. One of the problems of business in Russia has been, and 
continues to be, the lack of public information about the ownership and 
creditworthiness of firms. For example, a recent study found that 50% of foreign 
investors in Russia felt that they lacked credible and necessary information about 
95 Perry 2001,33-34. 
% For example, Moers 1999,4; Roland 2001; Raiser et al. 2000,1. 
97 Bevan et al. 2004,46. 
98 Coase 1988,6. 
99 Cooter and Ulen 2000,87. 
100 Coase 1988,6. 
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Russian companies. 101 Consequently, foreigners have been advised to hire private 
investigators in order to gather reliable information before engaging in sizeable 
transactions. 102 Thus, TCE demonstrates the importance of accessible and reliable 
information. 
The second stage of an exchange is the bargaining phase. TCE demonstrates the 
importance of clear rights during negotiations. Parties are more likely to co-operate, 
and therefore costs will be lower, when their rights are clear103 For example, a 
foreign investor who wishes to purchase land to build a factory would prefer that the 
regulations governing such activities stated his rights in clear terms, because if his 
rights are initially unclear, or the manner of application is uncertain, it will take more 
time and greater effort and expense (for example, lawyers fees) to ascertain them 
satisfactorily. 
The final stage is known as the enforcement phase. Costs occur here because most 
business contracts are not fulfilled on the spot, and so performance of the other party 
must be monitored, and any violation remedied704 TCE therefore suggests that legal 
climates should provide low costs for monitoring contracts and remedying 
violations. Research has shown that Russian businesses prefer to rely on trust 
between the firms to enforce agreements and resolve disputes, but if these fail, they 
gradually take recourse to more formal and laborious, and therefore more costly 
procedures. "' 
In summary, the identification and significance of TCE has three main implications. 
The attractiveness of a legal climate can be gauged by the costs of transacting in it. 
The legal system should therefore serve to reduce transaction costs. 106 The private 
101 FIAC 2005,47. 
102 Brank 2003 and Dean 2002. 
103 Cooter & Ulen 2000,89 and Perry 2001,34. 
104 Perry 2001,34. 
105 Hendley et al. 2000. 
106 Perry 2001,36. 
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sector will prefer to use the legal system if doing so will reduce transaction costs, 107 
but we can expect that firms may opt to use other mechanisms, such as informal 
institutions, if these are cheaper than formal ones. 1°8 In order to minimise costs, 
according to Coase's framework, legal systems should offer clear and simple rights, 
low monitoring costs, and punishments that are cheap to administer. 109 
1.2.2 Uncertainty and Risk 
The second quality that the private sector expects from legal climates is certainty. 
Uncertainty differs from risk, in so far as risk can actually be measured, costed and 
taken into account 110 In law and economics, uncertainty not risk is the problem. The 
key characteristic of uncertainty is that the likelihood of change and therefore its 
impact are unknown or cannot be estimated adequately. "' 
Uncertainty increases transaction costs, 112 and so uncertainty in the institutional 
climate generally and legal system in particular is undesirable, while predictability is 
a virtue. Buscaglia explains that instability in the political climate and the 
defectiveness of public institutions make private contractual arrangements riskier 
and in doing so harms private investment. When firms are concerned about the 
application of laws and realisation of policies, they may respond by not investing at 
all, requiring higher rates of return in order to invest, or investing more gradually. 113 
According to a World Bank study, improvements in policy predictability can make a 
firm over 30% more likely to invest. Unclear and undefined rules and inconsistent 
interpretation and application of rules therefore stifle the conditions necessary for 
107 Perry 2001,35. 
108 For example, see Frye & Zhuravskaya 2000. 
109 Perry 2001,36. 
no Knight 1921 cited in Perry 2001,35 
»l Perry 2001,35. 
112 Buscaglia 1999,563; Perry 2001,34-35. 
113 World Bank 2004,46-48. 
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economic growth 114 And so the World Bank argues that "the worst damage a state 
can do to its prospects of investment is to cultivate an air of uncertainty. "115 
As with transaction costs, the identification of uncertainty has certain implications 
for this study. First, the legal system should serve to reduce uncertainty and 
therefore transaction costs. Second, this can be done by establishing clear rules that 
are interpreted consistently and adequately enforced. Finally, the private sector will 
opt to use the legal system if doing so will reduce uncertainty, but we expect that 
firms may opt to use other mechanisms, such as informal institutions, if these 
provide greater certainty. 
1.3 Summary 
The aim of Section 1 was to demonstrate the intellectual building blocks of the 
Dominant Theory. Section 1 established that the law and development orthodoxy 
places the needs of the private sector at the heart of its agenda. It was shown that the 
private sector sought efficiency and certainty from the business environment. It is the 
role of institutions, particularly legal systems, to provide these. The analysis of 
transactions costs economics and uncertainty in subsections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 showed in 
greater detail how legal institutions can affect efficiency and certainty. The issues of 
transaction costs and uncertainty highlight the broad features that legal climates 
should provide if they are to be efficient and certain: clear and simple rules and 
rights; consistent interpretation of these; and cheap and effective enforcement. 
2A Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
The principles of efficiency and certainty have been translated into a blueprint for a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate which the private sector is expected to find most 
attractive. It is this type of legal climate that advocates of the Dominant Theory claim 
to be necessary for the attraction and support of foreign investors. Such a legal 
174 Buscaglia 1999,564. 
115 Perry 2001,55 citing World Bank 1997,43. 
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climate is not supposed to be an end in itself, but rather a means of supporting 
economic development by meeting the perceived needs of the private sector. To 
reiterate, in this field then, private sector perceptions are the gauge by which the 
quality of legal climates are assessed. The purpose of this Section is to depict the 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate in detail, and explain why the characteristics of 
such a legal climate are thought to be attractive to firms. 
2.1 The Judiciary_ 
According to the World Bank and likeminded commentators, an appropriate 
judiciary is the cornerstone of an effective legal system. 116 In fact, it has been stated 
that the judiciary underpins the credibility of the overall business and political 
environment 117 In Russia, "drastic improvements" in the judicial system have been 
said to be required to provide long-term political and economic stability. '18 The main 
reasons lie in the role of the judiciary in holding the government accountable and in 
enforcing agreements. 
Government accountability is critical for a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. 119 
Accountability means that government officials are subject to the law, and that their 
behaviour should be based on, and limited by a specific legal authority. 120 As the 
World Bank's mandate does not allow it to be involved in political matters, 121 the 
courts have been seen as the primary accountability mechanism. 122 A judicial system 
that does not provide checks and balances against arbitrary state action is considered 
by the World Bank to be an ineffective one. 123 Government arbitrariness is the 
antithesis to the predictability and stability that characterise a Theoretically Ideal 
116 World Development Report 2002,129; Aron J. 2002; Krasnov 2002,93. 
117 World Bank 1997,100 cited in Messick 1999,120. 
118 Remmes 2002,2. 
119 World Bank 2002d, 42. 
120 World Bank 1992,34. 
121 World Bank Articles of Agreement, Article 111, Section 5(b). 
122 World Bank 2002d, 42. 
123 World Bank 2002b, 118. 
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Legal Climate. 124 One reason for this is that corruption is expected to result if the 
discretion of government officials is unaccountable. 125 Russia provides a prime 
example of this. The country faces a particularly acute challenge in preventing state 
interference in economic life and seeing that the state and its officials abide by the 
law. '26 
According to the World Bank, confidence in the enforceability of agreements is 
required for the proper functioning of an economy, in particular, for efficient private 
economic activities. 127 An effective judicial system is thought to be vital in supporting 
contract enforcement 128 Hence the role of the judiciary in clarifying and interpreting 
laws, resolving disputes and enforcing compliance is significant. 129 In order to 
contribute to investors' certainty concerning their rights and efficiency in protecting 
them, the courts should ideally resolve disputes in a fair and efficient manner, as 
"unreasonable delays, uncertainty and high costs in enforcing contracts all tax 
economic actors inequitably and damage economic efficiency. "130 This requires that 
the judiciary be independent, efficient and effective. 
Their independence is considered critical. 131 Independence means that judges should 
be shielded from unfair influence from politicians, government officials and parties 
to a dispute. The judiciary is undermined if the laws and courts are perceived as 
unfair. 132 The World Bank's concept of judicial efficiency combines the need for 
fairness with the need for accessibility. Accessibility means that disputes should be 
resolved quickly and affordably. 133 This assumes that the courts can actually enforce 
124 World Bank 1992,38. 
125 World Bank 2004,41. 
126 This issue is treated in the review of the Russian Legal Climate in Chapter Six. 
127 World Bank, 37. 
128 World Bank 1992,37. 
129 World Bank 2002d, 33. 
130 World Bank 1992,37. 
131 Krasnov 2002,93. 
132 World Development Report 2002; Krasnov 2002,94. 
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judgements, which should not be taken for granted in Russia. 1M Therefore, the term 
'effective' is required to denote that the courts can actually enforce judgements. The 
judiciary ought to be more effective than informal mechanisms as, ideally, it will 
have the coercive power of the state available to it to enforce its decisions. -35 
The Bank holds that the greater the confidence had in the judiciary, the lower the 
risks and costs of transacting 136 There is evidence of the economic impact of the 
courts from Russia and the wider region. Frye shows that in Russia, firms that 
believe that arbitration courts can protect their rights in disputes with the state 
planned to invest at higher rates than those that did not. 137 Johnson et al. show that 
when courts are perceived as effective, transactions costs are lower. In such cases, 
firms are also more likely to trust one another and to seek new partners, which 
improves competitiveness. 'Is 
2.2 Laws and Regulations 
In a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, the rules and laws themselves must be 
"consistent with the needs of a free market "139 This suggests a suite of commercial 
laws that create certainty for investors, allow markets to function efficiently and 
thereby encourage investment. Above all, hosts must have enacted laws permitting 
the incorporation of joint-stock and limited liability companies. Other bodies of 
commercial legislation that are can reduce the risks investors face include: 
shareholder protection laws, insolvency laws, securities laws and intellectual 
property laws. Legal reforms in post-Communist states involved, and continues to 
involve, the development and enactment of these and other commercial laws. 
134 Frye 2002,126; OECD 2001,5-6; Hendley et al. 2000,645-646. 
135 World Bank 1997,100. 
136 World Bank 2004,86. 
737 Frye 2002,128. 
138 Johnson et al. 1999. 
139 World Bank 'Private Sector Development' internet site, page on 'Making Laws and 
Regulations More Predictable', visited on 14/8/05. 
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The attributes of laws and regulations can have a significant impact on the certainty 
and efficiency that investors face. Rules that are stable, accessible and clear are 
preferable to those that are unstable, obscure, and subject to broad interpretation, as 
these characteristics can evidently be a source of uncertainty for firms. In particular, 
they invite arbitrary government behaviour and corruption 140 Firms also incur 
higher transaction costs when laws are inaccessible or ambiguous. 141 A confusing and 
burdensome legal framework, in accordance with transaction costs analysis, increase 
costs and is therefore said to dissuade investors 142 In fact, the instability of laws has 
been singled out as the "most pervasive legal risk" for a foreign investor. '43 
The content of regulations can also affect transaction costs. At the outset of an 
investment, regulations can determine the cost of starting a business, such as 
business registration, licensing or acquiring real estate. During the operating stages, 
further costs can be incurred by the need for compliance with regulations, such as 
installing particular equipment or closing a business down for a period; the time cost 
of compliance; or the cost of licensing fees. 1'4 All else equal, a firm is expected to 
prefer to invest in a state with fewer regulatory constraints, which is why disclosure 
requirements, antitrust controls and corporate liability have all been observed to 
influence the choice of host las This thesis, is focussing on the overall perceived 
impact of the Russian legal climate, rather than the role of a specific body of law. 
2.3 The Behaviour of Government Officials 
As the responsibility of applying laws and regulations lies with government officials, 
their behaviour is a critical aspect of the attractiveness of a legal climate. The 
discretionary authority of government officials is considered, in principle, to be 
140 Gray & Kaufmann 1998,9. 
141 Perry 2001,56-57. 
142 World Bank 2000,18. 
143 Pritchard 1999,2. 
144 For examples of the procedures related to starting a new business across the world, see: 
World Bank, "Doing Business" website and related publications by Djankov et al. 2001 
and 2003; for a colourful description of business registration in Russia, see Black and 
Tarassova 2002,34-35. 
145 Muchlinski 2002,44 
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desirable to a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate to the extent that it enables flexibility 
in the application of regulations. 146 However, probably because of the existing 
weaknesses in transition legal climates, the orthodox view, as seen in the Dominant 
Theory, stresses the importance of predictability and transparency. It is claimed that 
these features are best ensured if government officials have less discretion. 147 
Moreover, public choice theory dictates that public officials are self-serving 148 So, to 
foster greater certainty in the application of laws and regulations, the exercise of 
discretion by government officials should be limited by procedural rules on how 
their authority can be applied. 149 
As bureaucratic discretion can foster uncertainty'50 and increase transaction costs, 151 a 
non-discretionary 'transparent' legal framework is considered to be central to the 
vision of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, 152 and also indispensable for foreign 
investment X53 This can be seen particularly clearly when considered against the 
pervasiveness of arbitrary action in some transition legal climates. For example, the 
discretion of public officials has been labelled as a "systemic weakness" in transition 
economies, one that is "exacerbated by poorly defined, ever-changing, and poorly 
disseminated rules and regulations. "1TM Bureaucratic discretion has even been said by 
various commentators to have reduced investment in the region. 155 
Arguably the most important reason why discretion is unwelcome is that it can lead 
to the abuse of an official's position in the form of bribe taking. Corruption is likely 
to arise when discretion is coupled with 'monopoly' power and a lack of 
146 World Bank 1992,34. 
147 Perry 2001,63. 
148 Tshuma 1999,78. 
149 World Bank 1992,35. 
150 Berglof et al. 2004,99. 
151 Buscaglia 1999,563. 
152 Tshuma 1999,79 & 82. 
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accountability for the application of authority. ' In developing countries, and in 
particular in transition ones, the incentives for interference are high as the state 
retains significant regulatory power, but lacks a credible threat of sanction by which 
to restrain its officials. 157 Empirically, a linear relationship has been traced between 
increasing levels of both government discretion and corruption. 158 Further, too much 
discretion in a corrupt environment leads to bad lawmaking. 159 
Corruption is considered to be the arch-enemy of a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate. 160 But why, from a private sector perspective, is corruption undesirable? The 
argument that bribery merely gives firms a means of sidestepping burdensome and 
ineffective regulations is undermined by the following points. Politicians and 
bureaucrats, especially in corrupt societies, have enormous discretion in the creation, 
interpretation and enforcement of rules. So a corrupt environment can actually fuel 
the growth of excessive and discretionary regulations, and hence transaction costs 
and unpredictability. 161 Thus it creates a 'constituency' for unnecessary regulations. 162 
Corruption is also said to create an un-level playing field, which deters new investors 
and outsiders 161 In Russia, corruption is alleged to prejudice foreign firms more than 
domestic ones, for two reasons: first, corrupt government officials and judges have 
frequently been in league with or manipulated by local business partners or 
competitors against the interests of foreign investors; and second, foreigners are 
deemed to be less adept at bribing local officials. '64Corruption is therefore viewed by 
some as an extra 'tax' on foreign investors. 165 
1% World Bank 2004,41. 
157 World Bank 1996a, 95; also OECD 2001,18-19. 
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Typical instances of bureaucratic corruption can be seen in the issuing of licences and 
permits, and the speed with which they are granted; in inspections of business 
premises for compliance with health, environmental or fire codes; and in the 
clearance of goods in customs 166 Business surveys enquire about bureaucratic 
intervention and the pervasiveness and cost of corruption. 167 They show that the need 
to negotiate with regulators consumes managers' time, thereby increasing 
transaction costs, and possibly reducing firm growth. 168 
2.4 Summary 
Ideally, legal systems should provide foreign and domestic firms with security of 
rights, predictability of expectations, and efficiency in securing rights. The preceding 
subsections have shown how the characteristics of legal systems can provide an 
environment that would, all else equal, encourage foreign and domestic investment. 
A judiciary that holds government accountable, arbitrates disputes and enforces 
agreements is essential to providing a secure, transparent and predictable 
environment for foreign investment. Laws and regulations that are market- 
orientated, stable and clear are the next ingredient of the Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate for foreign investment. In order to provide stability of expectations and 
therefore to enable foreign investors to manage the risks of investing, the legal 
climate should be transparent, in particular, in the formulation, amendment, 
interpretation and enforcement of laws. The role of government officials in the 
judicial system, customs, taxation and business regulation, is critical in securing a 
predictable, transparent and non-discretionary legal climate. Therefore legal systems 
in which government officials are accountable and not corrupt are generally 
considered to be preferable and more attractive to foreign investors. 
166 Zhuravskaya & Zamulin 2003; World Bank 2002a, 59-62. 
167 For example, see World Bank 2002c. 
168 Beck et al. 2002,21. 
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3 The Rule of Law and a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
The concept under examination in this thesis, the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
for foreign investment, is derived from the much broader, well established, yet 
disputed concept of the rule of law. The aim of this final section is to highlight this 
connection and heritage, and to clarify that our concern is not with the general notion 
of the rule of law, but exclusively with the narrower concept of the Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate, and more specifically, with its application as a theory of the 
relationship between foreign investors and the Russian legal climate. 
In a recent book, Tamanaha comprehensively examines the history, politics and 
theory of the term, the 'rule of law'. Countless theorists, from Aristotle to Hayek, 
Hobbes to Weber, Locke to Dworkin, have dwelled on the importance and meaning 
of the rule of law, or concepts which fall under its umbrella, and gone on to develop 
formal and substantive theories relating to it. Analysing their works, Tamanaha 
identifies three "clusters of meaning" within the term, which he terms as follows: 
government limited by law; formal legality; the rule of law, not men. 169 The 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is derived from these traditions, most notably, from 
the first two clusters. 
According to Tamanaha, 'formal legality' is the dominant understanding of the rule 
of law for liberalism and capitalism. Formal legality was advocated by Hayek and 
Weber. Both argued that a formal rule-orientated system was required to provide 
security and predictability, although their emphases differed"° Formal legality is 
based on the attributes of laws, in particular, their generality, certainty, clarity and 
prospectivity, but not their actual substance. Similarly, the World Bank's classical 
169 Tamanaha 2005, Chapter 9. 
170 Tamanaha 2005,97. 
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'recipe' for an ideal legal climate is concerned with process of formulating and 
applying rules, rather than their actual substance: 
"(a) there is a set of rules known in advance, (b) the rules are actually in force, (c) there 
are mechanisms ensuring application of the rules, (d) conflicts are resolved through 
binding decisions of an independent judicial body, and (e) there are procedures for 
amending the rules when they no longer serve their purpose. "171 
Since laws are not self-enforcing, but are enforced by agents of the state, such as 
judges and bureaucrats, the regulation of government authority is a critical aspect of 
a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, as both the extract above and subsection 2.1 
made clear. To ensure that officials abide by the law, the judiciary must be 
independent, and thereby able to hold government officials to account. Thus, the 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate also draws on the understanding of the rule of law 
as 'government limited by law'. This understanding of the rule of law is the oldest 
and broadest, predating liberalism and capitalism, 171 in the classical tradition, it was 
advocated by Aristotle and Plato, and came to life in the Magna Carta. Liberal 
political thinkers such as Montesquieu, who stressed the independence of the 
judiciary, and lauded the freedom of the English to engage in private commerce, 
have shaped western political thought, and thereby, the notion of a Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate. Government limited by law has two meanings, both of which 
are elements of the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate: first, that government officials 
abide by current laws, and second, that their power to change the law is 
constrained 171 
The liberal heritage of the rule of law and its link with capitalism is also seen in the 
model of the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. According to Tamanaha, the "rule of 
law today is thoroughly understood in terms of liberalism. "174 The concept of the rule 
171 World Bank 1992, p. 30 
In Tamanaha 2005,115 
173 Tamanaha 2005,115-117 
174 Tamanaha 2005,32 
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of law that has been inherited in the West has been shaped by the ideas of liberal 
thinkers, such Montesquieu and Locke, who were active during the rise of capitalism 
in England. Liberalism is concerned with freedom, while capitalism depends upon 
economic freedom: economic liberty permits the freedom of contract, the protection 
of property rights, and the accumulation of capital. In practise, by protecting 
property rights and allowing commerce, liberalism tends to favour property 
holders 1Th For this reason, Marx dismissed the alleged neutrality of law, criticising 
liberalism for its bias towards the bourgeoisie, arguing that "your jurisprudence is 
but the will of your class made into a law for all. "176 
The Dominant Theory is also a product of more recent activity in the field of law and 
development. During the 1960's and 1970's the 'first' law and development 
movement attempted to use legal reform as a means of spurring economic 
development, mostly in Latin America and Africa. The movement was inspired by 
modernisation theory, which taught that development was a "process of 
convergence on the institutions of developed Western societies", and that therefore 
development could be hastened by borrowing western models. 177 Legal 
transplantation is a prime example of modernization theory at work. 
Among the theoretical beliefs behind this movement was the 'liberal legalism' 
paradigm of American legal scholars, David Trubek and Marc Galanter. Liberal 
legalism was both a model of the relationship between law and society, and an 
explanation of the relationship between law and development. The paradigm was 
politically, socially and economically ambitious. The role of the state in the creation 
and enforcement of laws was central to the liberal legalism paradigm. Rules were 
expected to be made in a pluralistic process which enabled all to secure their 
interests. Laws were also intended to achieve social purposes. Finally, and most 
175 See Tamanaha 2005, Chapter Three. 
176 Quoted in Tamanaha 2005,51. 
177 Davis & Trebilcock 2001,22 
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importantly, "'law' was seen as a necessary element in 'development' and a useful 
instrument to achieve it "178 
The revival of law and development started in the 1980's and accelerated in the 
1990's after the collapse of Communism. 17 Today, the Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate is part of the World Bank's governance agenda. 110 The liberal legalism model 
is broader and more ambitious than the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, 
nevertheless, at the heart of both models is the same belief in the role of law in 
economic development, coupled with the attributes of legal systems that are 
expected to support development. 
While the rule of law as a political concept has a deep and rich history, the purported 
role of legal reform as a catalyst for economic development, is not so firmly 
established. The alleged successes and failures of the law and development 
movement are not of direct relevance to this study, though discussion of the efficacy 
of legal reform in the context of Russian legal reform is the main topic of Chapter 
Eight. At this point it is sufficient to note that even advocates of the relationship 
between Theoretically Ideal Legal Climates and economic development have 
questioned both the necessity of legal reform for development, as well as the 
effectiveness of legal reform. For example, Posner says that economic development 
may in some circumstances be preferable without legal reform, and that "wide 
deviations" from the Theoretically Ideal model may not harm economic efficiency. 181 
A senior figure at the World Bank has also expressed scepticism about whether legal 
and judicial reforms are an effective means of improving governance in transition 
countries. 182 
178 Galanter & Trubek 1972,1073 
179 Perry 2001,50 
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The Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate therefore has a deep heritage in what is often 
referred to as the rule of law. This study is by no means seeking to question the 
validity of the rule of law as a political ideal, nor criticise the value of rule of law 
goals, such as limitations on government power, predictable and efficient justice, or 
equality before the law. '13 Instead, this thesis is questioning the alleged importance 
placed by foreign investors in Russia circa 2004, on a particular narrow derivative of 
the rule of law ideal, the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. 
4 Summary 
The following extract, cited in Chapter One, exemplifies the Dominant Theory: 
"The most effective action by host country authorities to meet investors' 
expectations is: safeguarding public sector transparency, including an 
impartial system of courts and law enforcement ... "184 
This Chapter aimed to explain the theoretical basis of the Dominant Theory. At the 
outset it was established that the development orthodoxy places the needs of the 
private sector at the heart of the development agenda. It was then shown that the 
legal climate most supportive of the private sector was one that provided 
predictability and efficiency for the investor. These two overarching goals have been 
translated into the blueprint for a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, one which is 
considered to be most attractive to domestic and foreign investors alike. 
The theory behind the Dominant Theory holds that the costs of transacting in a host 
state affect its attractiveness. According to this body of theory, the efficiency, 
predictability and low transaction costs that investors are supposed seek from the 
legal system is best ensured by an effective, efficient and fair judiciary and 
183 Belton 2005,8-14. 
184 OECD 2003,7, quoted in Perry-Kessaris 2005,170. 
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bureaucracy. ' These institutions should be free from corruption and have limited 
discretion. They should apply laws and regulations effectively and consistently. The 
rules themselves should be market-friendly, clear, stable and not subject to broad 
interpretation. 
This Chapter has demonstrated why foreign investors should ideally desire a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, and what the features of such a climate are. But 
this study is not questioning whether foreign investors should in theory prefer such 
legal climates, but whether, in practise, the quality of host legal climates actually 
affect foreign investment decisions in the way supposed. While it is clearly 
understandable that foreign investors should be attracted to country's with efficient 
and predictable legal climates, the biggest problem with the Dominant Theory is that 
the evidence that they actually are so attracted is problematic and hard to find 186The 
next Chapter examines the evidence. 
185 Upham 2002,10; OECD 2002a, 9; Berglof et al. 2004,99. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Importance of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate for 
Foreign Investors: A Review of the Evidence 
56 
Introduction 
The Dominant Theory represents a belief in the critical role of host legal systems in 
the attraction of foreign investment; as such, it is a theory of foreign investment 
determination, specifically, law as a determinant of foreign investment. This Chapter 
examines the evidence on law as a determinant of foreign investment, focusing as far 
as possible on the transition region and Russia in particular. Research on the role of 
law in foreign investment can be divided into two main categories according to the 
method applied: studies based on the statistical technique known as 'regression', and 
surveys of foreign investors' decisions. We shall consider the methods, limitations 
and findings of each approach in turn, starting with regression. The aim is twofold: 
to assess to what extent the two types of evidence available support the Dominant 
Theory; and to point out what the limitations suggest about directions for further 
research. 
1 Regression Studies 
Much of the research into the determinants of foreign investment has been 
conducted using the statistical technique known as regression. Before looking at the 
evidence itself, the regression method and its limitations need to be made clear. It 
will be argued that the application of the technique for the purpose of identifying 
whether law is a determinant of foreign investment has significant drawbacks. These 
are grave enough that, relying on this evidence alone, one cannot reasonably assert 
that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is necessary for the attraction of foreign 
investors. 187 
1.1 The Regression Technique and its Limitations 
There are ten specific problems with the use of the regression technique for 
establishing law as a determinant of foreign investment; the limitations fall into three 
187 For a more extensive critique of the statistical approach, see Perry-Kessaris 2003. 
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categories: estimating the quality of legal climates, underlying presumptions about 
foreign investor behaviour, and explanatory power. So that the reader can refer back 
to these, the problems will be labelled and numbered. 
In regression analysis, data is collected about levels of FDI across a group of 
countries and span of years. Data is also collected relating to the 'explanatory 
variables' being used, that is, the factors that are being hypothesised as potential 
determinants of FDI. Comparing levels of FDI and the explanatory variables, a model 
is crafted that indicates with what certainty the various factors across sample 
countries 'explain' foreign investment flows. 
1.1.1 Problems in Estimating the Quality of Legal Climates 
Where these explanatory variables are quantitative phenomenon, such as the level of 
GDP per head, this is relatively uncontroversial. However, measuring law as a 
determinant of FDI requires numerical estimates of the quality of legal climates. 
These approximations are known as 'proxies' or 'indicators', and much hinges on 
how these are chosen. ""' Measuring complex qualitative phenomena such as the 
quality of legal systems is problematic and controversial. Proxies can capture only 
some aspects of the phenomena being estimated, and therefore lead to conclusions 
that vary enormously and often conflict. 189 The precise challenges of quantifying the 
quality of legal climates will now be elucidated. 
One, 'discerning'. In her critique of World Bank indicators, Perry-Kessaris draws 
attention to the fact that the World Bank itself cautions that even in its most 
comprehensive governance indicators, the 'GRICS', it is difficult to "identify 
statistically significant differences in governance among the majority of countries. "190 
This means that it is difficult to discern between the governance quality of similar 
188 World Bank 1996,1-2. 
189 World Bank 1996,2. 
190 Kauffman et. al 1999a, 2, quoted by Perry-Kessaris 2003,9. 
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countries, which is precisely what the statistical studies on law as a determinant of 
foreign direct investment aim to do. 
Two, 'narrowness'. Legal indicators may be of limited application because they only 
capture a narrow set of variables. For example, another World Bank measure, the 
Doing Business database, 191 which is the most objective indicator available, is of 
limited use as it only measures "official requirements, official cost and official 
time"192 and does not account for the impact of bribery and middlemen in 
bureaucratic and judicial processes. In the case of transition economies, this must be 
viewed as a serious limitation. 
Three, Four & Five. Kevin Davis points out three further problems with the use of 
legal indicators: Three, 'overlap'. Though purporting to, the indicators may not in fact 
measure purely legal factors, but may overlap with non-legal institutions, for 
example, political ones. Four, 'vague'. Indicators may be unclear or too highly 
aggregated, for example they may simply refer to 'the quality of the legal system' or 
'the rule of law'. Indicators which are too broad do not facilitate the identification of 
specific parts of the legal climate that are important in the attraction of FDI. Five, 
'fixed'. Finally, the indicators used may capture measures that are not amenable to 
reform, such as a country's legal heritage, making such studies redundant for our 
purposes193 
1.1.2 Underlying Presumptions about Foreign Investor Behaviour 
Regression is also an inappropriate method for assessing the role of law in the 
decision to invest as its application is not based on a theoretical model dedicated to 
the task. Instead of testing an established model of foreign investment behaviour, the 
191 World Bank, Doing Business internet site. 
192 Djankov et al. 2001,1, quoted by Perry-Kessaris 2003,12. 
193 Davis 2004. Davis' focus is on the application of legal indicators in studies associating 
law and economic development. His criticisms still hold for FDI studies as both types of 
studies rely on the quantification of legal systems. Also, FDI itself is one measure of 
economic development. 
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application of the regression technique makes unverified and unspoken 
presumptions about how foreign investors are expected to perceive and respond to 
host legal climates, as shown below. 
Six, 'information'. Legal indicators in regression studies must reflect the perspective of 
potential foreign investors. More specifically, the use of a particular proxy for the 
host legal climate should resemble the information that foreign investors incorporate 
into their decision making process. So by using, for instance, survey data from the 
World Bank, researchers presuppose that such data reasonably reflects the type of 
information around which foreign investors' perceptions of legal climates are 
formed. This is a significant presumption, but one which has not been verified. To 
illustrate, one study actually found that foreign companies find the opinions of other 
foreign investors in Russia to be the most reliable source of information on 
investment. 194 
Seven, 'responsive'. This is the critical presumption at the heart of both the Dominant 
Theory and the use of regression to test it. The use of the regression model to identify 
law as a determinant of FDI presumes that potential foreign investors will avoid 
hosts if they perceive that the host legal climate is weak. Chapter Four will explore to 
what extent both of these presumptions are contentious. For the time being it is 
useful to keep in mind that that the only study to actually test them, by Perry- 
Kessaris, in fact refuted them. 195 
1.1.3 The Explanatory Power of Regression Analysis 
The final category of limitation of the regression approach is its explanatory power. 
Eight, 'causation'. Regression studies show correlation, for example that the level of 
FDI rises as the quality of the legal climate improves. But correlation does not 
actually prove causation, and may well not, in our context, even indicate causation. 
194 FIAC 2005,48. 
195 Perry 2001,97-137. 
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The reason that it may not even indicate causation is that the variables included in 
the model are unlikely to be independent from one another, but instead influence 
one another. '% For example, it is widely held that legal systems affect economic 
growth, but some also argue that economic performance influences the quality of the 
legal climate, 197 legal institutions are also said to influence FDI flows, while FDI levels 
are related to economic growth both as a cause and effect 798 Thus it is hard to discern 
whether the legal system is directly affecting foreign investment, or whether the 
relationship is part of the dynamic and interrelated system of politico-economic 
change that transition countries undergo. 
Nine, 'outside factors'. One can never be sure that there is not an influential factor that 
has not been included in the model which, if added, would change the findings. For 
example, in a recent regression study, a group of economists concluded that human 
capital, which is rarely included in such studies, was much better than institutions at 
explaining economic growth. 199 This contrasts with the broad consensus that 
institutions are the key to economic growth20° This finding further suggests that 
human capital may therefore a determinant of FDI, a point which one study in fact 
asserts 20' 
Ten, 'structure'. Finally, Davis draws attention to the fact that econometric studies do 
not trace the 'structure' of the relationship between foreign investment and host legal 
climates. Thus they cannot tell us whether the legal climate is important to foreign 
investors only up to a point. It may be the case that a legal system, while far from 
This limitation, known as 'endogeneity', frequently arises in regression studies 
measuring the role of institutions in economic growth generally. See, for example, Aron 
2000,114; Rodrik 2004,12. Benassy-Quere et al. argue that most FDI regression studies 
do not tackle the endogeneity bias. Benassy-Quere et al. 2005,11. 
797 Abed & Davoodi 2000,37-38; Raiser et al. 2000,21. 
198 Meyer & Pind 1998,18; Bevan & Estrin 2000,4-5. 
199 Glaeser et al. 2004. 
°° For a survey of the empirical research, see World Bank 2002a 16-20 and Burki & Perry 
1998,18-19. 
201 Miyamoto 2003. 
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ideal, may be satisfactory in the eyes of certain foreign investors. 202 This point hints at 
the elusive question of how good a legal climate needs to be attract foreign investors. 
1.2 Regression Findings 
Even if we temporarily put these concerns to one side, the evidence found in 
regression studies still does not provide a convincing argument that law is an 
important determinant of FDI. While there is some suggestion that law acts as a 
determinant of FDI, economic factors provide a much more robust explanation of 
FDI flows. The evidence that indicates that law is a determinant of FDI is 
inconsistent. Unless otherwise stated, all references are to research on FDI within the 
transition region. 
1.2.1 The Host Economy as a Determinant of FDI 
Research consistently finds that the most significant determinant of foreign 
investment is the host's economy. This is often measured as the level and growth of 
GDP per capita. These reflect the size and growth of average income and therefore 
the market opportunity, and are especially important for 'market-seeking' investors 
who aim to capture the potential of emerging markets. 203 Major international 
institutions, such as the World Bank, UNCTAD and the OECD confirm the 
importance of growth as a driver of foreign investment in developing and developed 
countries. They also note the importance of economic stability. 204 
This principle holds true in the transition region. Studies on the determinants of FDI 
into Central and Eastern Europe conclude that the main factor driving FDI in the 
202 Davis 2004,11. Perry-Kessaris also suggests this, having found that foreign investors 
perceived that the Sri Lankan legal climate did not conform to the theoretical ideal, but 
would still invest in the country in hindsight of this. See Perry 2001,125-126. 
203 Dunning 1998,53. Discussed in Section 1 of Chapter Four. 'Market-seeking' is a label 
assigned to foreign investors whose motivation for investment is to sell their goods and 
services in the host country. 
2D4 OECD 2001,4, UNCTAD 1999,48; World Bank 1996,1. 
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region during the second half of the 1990's was the aim of securing access to local 
markets; thus bigger markets attracted greater investment 205 This has been backed 
up by studies on the motivation for investment in the region. A recent survey of 
foreign investors in Russia found that 88% of potential investors felt that the size of 
the domestic market was the main investment advantage of the country? 06Another, 
in Hungary, showed that 61% of investors surveyed there considered "obtaining or 
increasing the share in local market sales" as the most important motivation for their 
investment decision. 207 
1.2.2 The Host Legal Climate as a Determinant of FDI 
We now turn to the first of the two bodies of research that advocates of the Dominant 
Theory might use to support their claim. Conducted mainly by economists, 
regression studies are the most common empirical source for the claim that the 
quality of host legal climates are a determinant of foreign investment. There are 
numerous regression studies that analyse the possibility that host legal climates are 
determinants of FDI. Overall, they do not provide support for the Dominant Theory 
and fail to provide a clear idea of the role of law in the decision to invest. Some of the 
studies examine legal climates in broad terms, while others aim to assess the 
importance of specific legal issues, including those features of legal systems that 
were highlighted in the last Chapter as important to investors, such as the quality of 
the judiciary, the procedural regularity of law-making, and the extent of corruption. 
Studies on specific legal issues are mixed and inconsistent. Corruption provides a 
good example of this. Wang finds that levels of foreign investment in developing 
countries do not depend on the perceived level of corruption of those economies208 
MS Bevan et al. 2003,20; Bevan and Estrin 2000,4; Lankes & Venables 1996,332-333. 
206 FIAC 2005,33. 
207 Elteto & Sass 1998,11. 
2M Wang 2000. 
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Busse & Hefeker also find that, in transition economies, levels of FDI do not depend 
on the levels of host country corruption209 However, in support of the Dominant 
Theory, corruption has been found to be significant in explaining FDI flows in three 
studies of transition economies210 One of them, by Abed and Davoodi, finds that 
corruption appears to be a significant determinant of FDI until one takes into account 
progress on economic reforms. When progress on economic reforms is added to the 
regression model, corruption loses its significance as a determinant of FDI patterns211 
This means that, when one considers both progress on economic reforms and 
corruption together as potential factors, investors' decisions are better explained by 
the former than the latter. 
Another of these studies, by Smarzynska & Wei, is interesting because, in addition to 
showing that corruption apparently deters FDI, it also shows that corruption 
increases the likelihood that foreign investors will take local partners 212 This simple 
point demonstrates that foreign investors should not be presumed to be passive, but 
that they can react to perceived challenges in the legal climate. Overwhelmingly, this 
point is overlooked in the foreign investment determination literature. 213 
Regression studies that examine the content, application and stability of laws as 
determinants of FDI are also inconsistent. While predictability is deemed to be a 
crucial element of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, a 1997 study by Brunetti et al., 
based on firm surveys, found that the predictability of laws and regulations was not 
significant in explaining FDI flows 214 Bevan et al. found that the quality and scope of 
legislation better explained FDI flows in the transition region than the effectiveness 
of their implementation. This implies, in contrast to the Dominant Theory, that 
foreign investors are more concerned about the content of the law than its 
209 Busse & Hefeker 2005,12. 
210 Smarzynska & Wei 2000; Abed & Davoodi 2000; Brunetti et al. 1997. 
211 Abed & Davoodi 2000,33. 
212 Smarzynska & Wei 2000. 
213 Chapter Four, Section 3.1 examines the evidence about foreign investors and corruption 
in detail. 
214 Brunetti et al. 1997,18. 
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application. However, in support of the Dominant Theory, the same study found that 
in Russia, the opposite was true. 215 Again in support of the Dominant Theory, 
Brunetti found that the quality of the judiciary was important in explaining 
differences in FDI levels in transition countries. 216 Finally, one study found that 
investment risk, as measured by contract viability, payment delays and the risk of 
expropriation, were significant in explaining levels of FDI across a group of 83 
developing countries, including transition ones? " 
Regression studies that take into consideration the protection of property rights in 
host countries provide more consistent findings, but are still problematic. The same 
study by Brunetti et al. found that the security of property rights was significant in 
explaining differences in FDI levels in the transition region. 218 Brunetti's findings are 
seconded by Moers, who also identifies property rights as a determinant of FDI in 
transition. 219 However, while these results show that the security of property rights is 
important to foreign investors, they say nothing about the type of legal climate is that 
is required to guarantee them. Property rights can be secured in legal climates that 
do not resemble the theoretical ideal, for example by informal institutions, 220 or even 
by dictators who chose to respect property rights. 221 Finally, the concept of property 
rights used in Brunetti differs from the concept that features in the Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate. The 'property rights' measure in Brunetti derives from 
responses to questions that focused on theft, crime and personal safety, rather than 
contract enforcement and economic rights. 222 
Two studies using the same commercial indicator, the ICRG, provide more consistent 
support for the Dominant Theory. Busse & Hefeker, and Kinoshita & Campos both 
215 Bevan et al. 2004. 
216 Brunetti et al. 1997,32. 
217 Busse & Hefeker 2005,4 & 13. 
218 Brunetti et al. 1997. 
219 Moers 1999. 
220 World Bank 2002b, 173. 
221 Glaeser et al. 2004,8. 
Brunetti et al. 1997,10. 
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draw on a selection of legal indicators that are part of a commercial risk index called 
the 'International Country Risk Guide', developed by the firm, Political Risk 
Services? The indicators are based on expert assessments. Both studies find that law 
and order, and the quality of bureaucracy are determinants of FDI flows. The law 
and order indicator is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal 
system, and the popular observance of the law. Busse & Hefeker find that the quality 
of the bureaucracy, measured according to its political independence, is a 
determinant of FDI224 Kinoshita & Campos find that the quality of the bureaucracy, 
measured both according to its political independence but also according to the ease 
of the regulatory environment, is also a determinant of FDI? u 
Some studies employ 'composite' legal indicators, for example, they assess the 'rule 
of law' by bringing together different measures of legal climates into a single 
indicator. Two studies did just that. Both Moers and Wilhelms found that proxies for 
the rule of law are significant determinants of FDI, in the transition region and 
emerging economies, respectively. 226 Wilhelms' measure, however, suffers from one 
of the shortcomings raised by Davis (Regression Limitation Three): it does not 
measure legal factors alone, but mixes them with the soundness of its political 
institutions and the orderly succession of power. v This is a limitation that is 
common to a further three studies that might be said to cover the question of law and 
FDI, which will now be addressed. 
Brunetti et al. 's study found that a composite measure of the institutional 
environment, called the 'credibility of rules', accounted for no less than 70% of the 
variation in FDI flows in transition countries between 1990 and 1995228 Their analysis 
tests the idea that foreign investors require that host investment climates be endowed 
The methodology used by the firm for the International Country Risk Guide is 
explained on its internet site: www. icrgonline. com 
224 Busse & Hefeker 2005,4 & 9. 
us Kinoshita & Campos 2004,17 & 22. 
n6 Moers 1999 and Wilhelms 1998. 
227 Wilhelms 1998,18. 
228 Brunetti et al. 1997,22. 
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with a measure of predictability, which is provided by institutions. Their study 
would appear therefore to provide support for the Dominant Theory. However, their 
study cannot be applied here because their composite indicator mixes legal and non- 
legal institutions. For example, it includes questions about whether government 
policy is responsive to business interests, and what firms perceive to be the expected 
impact of constitutional and unconstitutional changes of government. 129 It therefore 
falls foul of Regression Limitation Three. 
1.3 Conclusions 
This review of the main body of research that might have formed the basis for the 
Dominant Theory drew on eight studies. The studies, however, cannot be said to 
provide convincing support the Dominant Theory for any of following three reasons: 
1. Problems in estimating the quality of legal climates 
2. Unverified and questionable presumptions about investor behaviour 
3. The limited explanatory power of regression analysis 
When if we set aside these three important methodological limitations, the findings 
themselves on specific legal issues, such as corruption, the content and application of 
laws, and security of property rights are inconsistent. All in all, the regression 
evidence, which is the most substantial body of research connecting law with FDI, 
provides only lukewarm support for Dominant Theory. It suggests that law may 
affect foreign investment decisions, but certainly falls short of establishing that the 
quality of host legal climates is of critical importance to foreign investment decision 
making. 
The methodological limitations, coupled with the inconsistency of the findings 
suggest that there is much to be learned about law and foreign investment. The 
229 Brunetti et al. 1997,15. 
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regression method, and the findings it produces, do not provide enough insight into 
the role of law in foreign investment decisions, in particular: how potential investors 
perceive and react to host legal climates; to what extent the approach of investors 
may differ; and why investments are made even when investors perceive legal 
climates to be theoretically weak. Regression studies, as well as most surveys on the 
motivations and barriers to investment, are too indirect to tell us about the actual role 
of the law in the decision to invest. This research study takes these limitations as a 
starting point, and moves on to address some of the outstanding issues by taking as 
direct a research approach as circumstances allow. 
2 Surveys on Factors in the Investment Decision 
The second category of research that advocates of the Dominant Theory might use to 
support their claim consists mainly of firm surveys that attempt to address the role of 
law in foreign investment. Conducted usually by business associations concerned 
with foreign investment attraction as well as by legal scholars, these studies address 
the issues at hand more directly than the regression studies, although often not 
directly enough. 
Seven pieces of research are reviewed. With the exception of a unique study of 
foreign investors in Sri Lanka and one worldwide study, the studies are all 
concerned with foreign investment in the transition region. The studies follow 
different formats. Five of them focus on the motivations and barriers to investment; 
another examines foreign investors' actual and hypothetical behaviour, while the 
final study presents anecdotal evidence from a lawyer. On balance, the studies show 
that the Dominant Theory only provides a partial explanation of the impact of legal 
climates on foreign investors. 
The first piece of research is the most relevant, recent and comprehensive of the 
studies of foreign investors. The survey was conducted in 2005 on behalf of the 
Foreign Investment Advisory Council (FIAC) of Russia, a lobby group of 
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multinational investors. The sample consists of 107 current foreign investors and a 
further 51 'potential' investors, that is, foreign companies that have not yet invested 
in Russia; the firms were primarily headquartered in Europe and the United States. 
The FIAC study is supportive of the Dominant Theory in so far as it confirms that the 
foremost concern of foreign investors, both potential and actual, is the legal climate. 
For example, according to potential investors, the top five barriers to investment 
include: corruption, administrative barriers, selective interpretation and application 
of laws and inadequate and inconsistent legislation. 0 Further, the four most 
frequently cited measures that potential investors recommended that the Russia 
government undertake in order to attract more investment were, in this order: reduce 
corruption, increase intellectual property protection, undertake judicial and legal 
reform, and reduce bureaucracy. 231 
The survey does not support the Dominant Theory unequivocally, and does in fact 
provide grounds for further research. The survey shows that foreign firms, when 
prompted to in a multiple choice questionnaire, will identify legal issues as barriers 
to investment. However, this in itself does not tell us to what extent legal concerns 
actually prevented investment. Firstly, the study is tilted towards legal issues: eleven 
out of the eighteen response options on barriers to investment were legal factors 232 
Secondly, the actual impact of the legal climate within the broader context of overall 
perceptions of Russia, is unclear. It seems that the appearance of steps being made in 
the right direction matter more to investors than the current quality of the legal 
climate. This can be seen in the fact that almost three quarters of potential investors 
actually had plans to invest in Russia, despite what they had said about the legal 
climate? Next, the general optimism of potential investors about Russia 
compensated for the weaknesses they perceived in its legal climate, for example, 51% 
230 FIAC 2005,34-35. 
231 FIAC 2005,44-45. 
232 FIAC 2005,34. 
m FIAC 2005,21. 
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of potential investors expected Russia's investment climate to improve over the 
forthcoming two years, while only 18% believed it would get worse. 
The final, and perhaps most important reason why we should be sceptical about the 
extent of harm done by the Russian legal climate lies in the success enjoyed by 
current investors. Despite their assessments of the Russian legal climate, 40% of 
foreign investors had seen their profits rise by over 30% in 2004, and a further 33% 
had seen profits rise between 10-30%. 2-"s Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, 78% of 
investors were planning on increasing their operations in Russia, as against 2% that 
were planning on reducing them? 31 The Russian legal climate, despite all its 
problems, is not preventing foreign investors from profiting and succeeding in 
Russia. This, of course, does not mean that the foreign investors would not welcome 
improvements in the legal climate, however, it certainly suggests that a Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate is not essential. 
The second piece of research is a 1998 survey of foreign investors in Hungary. This 
identified a "stable legal climate" as the second most important consideration in 
investment decisions, after obtaining or increasing market share. While 61% of 
respondents labelled a stable legal climate as "very important" and a further 25% as 
"important", investors at the same time considered the climate "inadequate". This 
paradox is typical of this type of research: why do foreigners invest in spite of a legal 
climate that is in their own reckoning, 'inadequate'? In this case, it may be because 
other factors, such as "prospects for economic development", the "availability of 
skilled labour" and a "stable political situation" may have been more decisive. This 
explanation is in fact supported by the study: if one takes into account whether 
factors were ranked as either "important" or "very important", the legal climate loses 
significance, ranking fourth out of six factors. 237 
2M FIAC 2005,26. 
2 FIAC 2005,16. 
FIAC 2005,17. 
237 Elteto & Sass 1998,10-11. 
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Both the FIAC and Hungary studies suggest that the Dominant Theory, with the 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate as its axis, does not present a complete impression 
of foreign investor behaviour in countries with weak legal climates. According to the 
Dominant Theory these hosts legal climates should be unattractive to investors. What 
the Dominant Theory fails to explain is why, nevertheless, the very same firms 
invested in them. The third piece of research, below, also leaves us with this 
conundrum. 
In a survey of foreign investors in Sri Lanka, Perry-Kessaris first found that 52% of 
investors had not investigated the legal system prior to investing. Further, from the 
standpoint of the Dominant Theory, foreign investors' assessments of the Sri Lankan 
legal climate classed it as an unattractive (inefficient and unpredictable) legal climate. 
Nevertheless, 83% of them would still have invested there if they had known prior to 
investing what they learned during operations about the Sri Lankan legal system. 239 
This suggests, like the FIAC study, that foreign investors have somehow learned to 
cope, and also indicates that while legal climates may not be theoretically ideal, they 
may be satisfactory in the eyes of certain investors 240 
The fourth study is one conducted by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA). MIGA is a faction of the World Bank charged with promoting the flow of 
private foreign investment to developing countries. In 2002, it published a survey 
about the foreign investment plans of 191 large multinational firms. It is difficult to 
draw clear conclusions about the importance of the host legal climate from this 
study. The survey found that the most important factors in site selection were market 
access, followed by social and political stability. The 'ease of doing business' which 
was not defined by the study, but probably encompasses regulatory and legal issues 
to some extent was the third most important factor. More specifically, corruption was 
238 Perry 2001,90. 
239 Perry 2000b, 786; see generally Perry 2001,93-95. 
240 Perry 2001,125. 
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the seventh most important issue241 When evaluating foreign investment risks, the 
authors report that the breach of contract and the lack of law enforcement are a 
"secondary" concern to investors 242 
The FIAC, Hungary and MIGA studies are examples of the most popular qualitative 
approach to investigating law and foreign investment - listing barriers to investment. 
But, as demonstrated in the FIAC study, they cannot be used in support of the 
Dominant Theory for the simple reason that the method does not indicate whether 
the legal concerns that are frequently pointed to are actually great enough to alter an 
investment decision. This is an absolutely critical point. Where the firms surveyed 
are actual investors rather than potential investors in the country under examination, 
evidently, the concerns raised were not significant enough to prevent an investment. 
The next two studies stand out as they identify the extent to which legal concerns 
actually prevented investments from taking place. 
Klavens and Zamparutti conducted a survey of 255 multinational mining, 
construction and manufacturing firms in 1992. The respondents included both firms 
considering an investment and those with a current investment. The study focused 
on whether legal concens relating to environmental issues, such as environmental 
liability and compliance costs, were an impediment to investment in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. The researchers found that 
environmental issues are unlikely to prevent investors from considering an 
investment 2 However, environmental concerns are "secondary, but critical factors" 
once companies begin to consider investing in particular plants 244 In fact, of the 77 
firms that had considered and rejected investment opportunities, 41 (53%) said that 
at least one environmental issue was very important to their decision not to 
241 MICA 2002,19. 
242 MIGA 2002,11. 
243 Kiavens & Zamparutti 1995,4. 
2" Kiavens & Zamparutti 1995,5. 
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proceed245 Though insightful and well designed, the survey's relevance is limited by 
its narrow scope and age. 
The sixth piece of research is a 1996 survey of 26 US firms operating in the Russian 
Far East. It found that the most common reason why firms had not invested in the 
region yet was because the legal system was "too ambiguous and fluid. " However, 
this amounted to only 22% of all responses. 2 
The studies that list barriers to investment present a superficial view of the role of 
law and weaken the claims of the Dominant Theory. Unlike the Klavens & 
Zamparutti's study, they do not tell us the extent to which concerns about host legal 
climates actually deterred investors. As such, they cannot be seen as evidence in 
support of the Dominant Theory. Nor, like the Dominant Theory, do any of these 
studies explain why the respondents may have invested in spite of the apparent 
weaknesses they perceived in the legal climates in question. As a welcome response, 
Perry-Kessaris' study shows that investors may not be particularly well informed 
about the legal climates of potential hosts, and confirms that legal shortcomings may 
not affect the decision to invest. In summary, existing research, regression and 
surveys alike, lack descriptive power, and suggest that the Dominant Theory, which 
relies on these studies for empirical backing, also lacks a degree of realism. 
The limitations in existing research provide grounds for further research, and it is the 
aim of this study to address the questions left unanswered due to the limitations of 
existing work. So, what do we need to know that we do not? First, how potential 
investors perceive and respond to host legal climates in the investment decision 
process. Second, why foreigners invest in spite the fact that they perceive the absence 
of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. Third, under what circumstances the legal 
obstacles are more or less likely to prove a barrier to investment. The next study 
provides general answers to these questions. 
245 Klavens & Zamparutti 1995,6. 
246 Thornton & Mikheeva 1997,96. 
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John Hewko describes his extensive experience as a lawyer in the transition region. 
Significantly, his work shows that the impact of legal shortcomings is circumscribed 
by other factors. For example, corroborating our interpretation of the FIAC study, 
Hewko says that most investors were willing to overlook problems in the legal 
climate provided they had a 'feel good' perception of the country, while an 
improving legal climate would not compensate for a declining general perception of 
the country. 247 He also argues that foreign investors were influenced foremost "by the 
nature of the business opportunity, the potential for high returns ... and an often 
superficial 'feel' about a country. " He contends that while the state of the legal 
system "was a component of foreign investors' perception, it was generally not the 
decisive factor in making an investment decision. " While his evidence is anecdotal, it 
is also uniquely insightful in that it describes how perceptions of host legal climates 
actually affected foreign investors, rather than how it is expected to affect them. The 
main conclusion to be drawn from Hewko for our current purposes is that the impact 
of the legal climate on foreign investment is better judged by understanding the role 
of law in the context of business opportunities and general perceptions of the host 
country rather than by listing the obstacles to investment. 
3 Summary 
Although the logic of the Dominant Theory is compelling, it is also somewhat 
superficial. Foreign investor surveys do indeed show that foreign investors wish that 
host states possess features of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. Until they are 
looked at carefully, the regression studies seemingly link foreign investment levels to 
the quality of host legal climates. Critically, however, the fifteen studies reviewed 
here fail to show that the perceived quality of host legal climates are actually a decisive 
factor in the investment decision process. In fact, only three of the studies2 actually 
address the central question of law and foreign investment, namely: what is the role 
247 Hewko 2002,8-9. 
248 Hewko 2002, Klavens & Zamparutti 1995, Perry 2001 
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of law in the decision to invest? Instead, the vast majority of the research leaves two 
questions about the alleged importance of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
lingering: 
- How do foreign investors perceive the host legal climate before investing? 
- Why do foreigners invest in spite of the fact that they perceive the absence of a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate? 
These shortcomings clearly show that the prevailing view in the law and 
development establishment exaggerates the importance of a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate and oversimplifies the impact of the law. The next Chapter reviews evidence 








A substantial body of literature exists that does not conform to the Dominant 
Theory's position concerning the critical importance of a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate to foreign investors. This Chapter presents this evidence within the 
framework of the research hypotheses. 
Hypothesis One is that "a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not always necessary 
to support foreign investors in Russia. " Three justifications are offered for this 
hypothesis. First of all, foreign investors may overlook the quality of the legal climate 
if non-legal factors are much more important, and take precedence in the decision to 
invest; this is considered in Section 1 by exploring the 'Eclectic Paradigm'. Second, 
potential foreign investors may not be able to acquire and process accurate 
information about host legal climates, especially Russia's; evidence supporting this 
view is discussed in Section 2. Finally, foreign investors may in fact be able to do 
business successfully in legal climates that lack a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, 
for example by using informal institutions or bribery when the official legal system 
does not meet their needs; this is discussed in Section 3. 
Hypothesis Two is that "foreign investors' perceptions of the Russian legal climate 
depend on their firm characteristics. " In Section 4, evidence is presented to show that 
the impact of the law depends on the attributes of the foreign investor. 
1 The Eclectic Paradigm 
According to UNCTAD, it is widely agreed that John Dunning's 'Eclectic Paradigm' 
is the theory that best explains patterns of FDI249 The Eclectic Paradigm is a holistic 
framework that aims to identify the significance of the numerous factors that 
influence foreign production by enterprises. 250 The Eclectic Paradigm is valuable to 
249 UNCTAD 1998,89. 
2W Dunning 1988,1. 
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us because it provides a much broader perspective on the determinants of foreign 
investment than that offered by the Dominant Theory. It explains why the quality of 
host legal climates may be of low importance to foreign investors. 
First, a wide range of factors can influence the decision to invest. According to the 
Eclectic Paradigm, there are three categories of host country determinants that 
contribute to the attractiveness of the host. In order of importance they are: economic 
factors, the policy framework and business facilitation? 51 An UNCTAD study cites, 
across these three categories, thirteen different economic determinants, eight policy 
framework determinants, and five business facilitation determinants. So, according 
to one source, at least twenty-six factors might affect the attractiveness of a host. 
These include attributes as diverse as trade policy, the availability of skilled labour 
and social amenities 252 
The second point to note about the Eclectic Paradigm is that the choice of where to 
invest depends not simply on the attributes of the host, but in fact on how the 
various characteristics of the foreign firm fits with those attributes? m The relative 
impact of different host determinants will thus depend on at least four firm factors, 214 
foremost, the motive for investment. Four motives for investing abroad are 
identified: resource-, market-, efficiency- and strategic asset-, seeking. Firms 
motivated by natural resources are classified as resource-seekers. Those that aim to 
supply the local market are characterised as market-seekers. Firms that aim to reduce 
costs by moving production abroad are efficiency seekers. Those in search of a 
particular local asset, such as knowledge, are known as asset-seekers255 Other 
relevant attributes of the foreign firm include the type of investment (brand new or 
follow-on), the business sector of investment; and the size of investor. 256 
251 UNCTAD 1998,91. 
252 UNCTAD 1998,91. 
253 UNCTAD 1998,89 
254 UNCTAD 1998,90-91. 
255 Dunning 1998,50. 
256 UNCTAD 1998,90-91. 
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Given the multitude of factors identified by the Eclectic Paradigm, it is often difficult 
to pinpoint the most decisive host country factor in an investment. 257 It is helpful to 
be conscious of this complexity and breadth when faced with the relatively 
reductionist and one-dimensional perspective of the Dominant Theory. We can now 
turn our attention to what the Eclectic Paradigm has to say about host legal climates. 
The quality of the legal climate may in principle affect the choice of host, but the 
Eclectic Paradigm suggests that host legal climates have a limited impact on the 
investment decision. The quality of the legal climate is not identified as a host 
country determinant in its own right by the Eclectic Paradigm, but elements of the 
legal climate do fall under two of the categories of host country determinants, 
namely, the policy framework and business facilitation. For example, the 'policy 
framework' for FDI includes the rules regarding the entry and operations of foreign 
investors and tax policies. The protection of property rights, and the "hassle costs" 
arising from corruption and administrative efficiency feature within the category of 
'business facilitation'258 
The core legal concerns that feature in the Dominant Theory, such as the enforcement 
of property rights, bureaucracy and corruption all fall under the category of business 
facilitation. "' However, the point to note is that business facilitation is not considered 
by the Paradigm to be a decisive factor in investment determination260 Conversely, 
legal factors that are considered to be important within the Eclectic Paradigm fall 
outside the scope of the legal climate for our purposes. For instance, the policy 
framework for FDI is a necessary but insufficient condition for FDI; however, it does 
not refer to the quality of the legal climate, but to whether foreign investment is 
actually permitted at all. 261 
257 UNCTAD 1998,90. 
258 UNTCAD 1998,91. 
259 Dunning 2002, Exhibit 4. 
° UNCTAD 1998,105. 
261 Dunning 2002, Exhibit 4. 
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The main reason why the quality of the legal climate might be considered to be a 
determinant of FDI is that the attractiveness of a host country depends in part on the 
cost of doing business there. 262 As argued in Chapter Two, in so far as the quality of 
its legal climate can affect the cost of doing business in a host, it may in principle 
affect the choice of foreign firms to invest. But the Eclectic Paradigm views the costs 
of the legal climate in narrow terms. According to Dunning, the legal climate 
imposes costs in so far as inefficient bureaucracy and corruption give rise to "hassle 
costs. 263 
In summary, the most widely accepted theory of foreign investment determination, 
the Eclectic Paradigm, suggests that law is not an important determinant of foreign 
investment. First of all, a multitude of factors - not just the state of its legal system - 
affect the attractiveness of a host economy. Further, where it does address the host 
legal climate, the Eclectic Paradigm does not appear to give much weight to the legal 
issues that the Dominant Theory consider to be important to foreign investors. One 
of the justifications for Hypothesis One is that non-legal factors may take precedence 
over legal issues in the decision to invest. The Eclectic Paradigm provides strong 
support for this argument. 
Finally, the Eclectic Paradigm establishes that the attractiveness of the host depends 
not on its own attributes alone, but on how it fits the with characteristics of the 
foreign investor. This issue is taken up in greater detail in Section 4. 
262 DUNNING 1993,66 cited in Perry 2001,18. 
263 Dunning 2002, Exhibit 4. 
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2 Do Foreign Investors Acquire and Process Accurate Legal Information? 
2.1 Introduction 
Implicit in the Dominant Theory is the presumption that, when choosing the 
investment location, foreign investors rationally assess the quality of the potential 
host legal climate. In order to show that foreign firms follow the decision process 
implied in the Dominant Theory, it is therefore necessary to demonstrate that, when 
choosing the host, they make use of accurate information about potential host legal 
climates. We can advance our understanding of foreign investors and the law by 
exploring this presumption, which is almost never examined in the FDI literature 2M 
This is facilitated by drawing from a broader array of literature than has traditionally 
been applied in this field. The evidence that is about to be presented shows that, in 
some circumstances, foreign firms may neither be willing, nor able to be acquire and 
process information in the manner suggested. The evidence also shows that in 
contrast to the objective model implicit in the Dominant Theory, there exists a 
notable degree subjectivity and consequent diversity in the perceptions that foreign 
firms have of host legal climates. 
The problems of the Dominant Theory stem from the limitations in the underlying 
theories of law and economics. Traditional law and economics is largely based on the 
standard assumptions of neoclassical economics. 265 These assumptions are that 
human choice involves the maximisation of satisfaction (commonly referred to as 
'utility'), a stable set of preferences to choose from, and an optimal level of 
information upon which to base a decision. 266 Thus humans are expected to 
demonstrate 'global rationality. '267 These assumptions, though useful, are often found 
in practice to be false. 268 
264 Perry 2001 is the only exception. 
M Jolls et al. 2000,49. 
266 Becker 1976,110-112. 
267 Simon 1997,17. 
M Jolls et al. 2000,50. 
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Leading figures in economics have questioned whether actual behaviour resembles 
that of the 'homo economicus' just outlined. Even the founder of transaction cost 
thinking disagreed with the economic assumptions of human behaviour. Coase 
famously stated that "the rational utility maximiser of economic theory bears no 
resemblance to the man on the Clapham bus or, indeed, to any man (or woman) on 
any bus. "269 He was disdainful of the abstract models of economics he referred to as 
"blackboard economics. "270 North also expresses dissatisfaction with the behavioural 
assumptions of neoclassical economics. He argues that further progress in social 
sciences requires that these assumptions be abandoned 27' The final figure in this trio 
of economists with Nobel Prize winning credentials is Herbert Simon, who 
introduced the idea of 'bounded rationality'? n Bounded rationality argues that 
decisions are constrained by limitations in the knowledge, computational capacities 
and skills of decision makers. 273 Bounded rationality has even bred a school of 
thought known as 'behavioural law and economics', which aims to explore the 
implications of actual, rather than theoretical human behaviour for the law274 
Neither this critical view of classical economics, nor behavioural law and economics 
in particular appear, however, to have penetrated mainstream law and development 
thinking, let alone the debate on law and FDI. To their credit, the World Bank has 
recently acknowledged that behavioural law and economics demonstrates that 
individuals are not 'rational' in their attitudes to risk and uncertainty 2m However, to 
my knowledge, law and development scholarship has yet to systematically address 
the work on bounded rationality and behavioural law and economics. Their work is 
germane, in so far as it provides theoretical foundation for evidence that is not 
explained by the Dominant Theory. The following sub-sections will show that 
foreign firms' ability to make objectively rational decisions about host legal climates 
269 Coase 1988,3. 
270 Coase 1988,19. 
271 North 1990,17. 
272 Jolls et al. 2000,14. 
273 Simon 1997,18. 
274 Jolls et al. 2000,14. 
275 World Bank 2004,47. 
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is limited by their ability to acquire and process accurate information about host legal 
systems and legal risk. 
2.2 The Availability of Information 
The FIAC foreign investor survey of Russia picked up on the question of the 
acquisition of reliable information as an issue in the investment decision process. It 
found that 59% of potential investors felt that they did not have access to enough 
credible information about Russia in order to make an informed investment decision. 
Moreover, the 'legal base' was the issue that most investors (66%) felt they lacked 
credible and necessary information on276 Why might they lack such information? 
The collection of information imposes costs, and so with scarce time and resources, 
decision makers may remain ignorant because it is too costly to be fully informed. 277 
Legal systems in transition countries have undergone over a decade of change which 
continues today, 278 and therefore it may be difficult or costly to remain informed 
about one's legal standing and rights, which may in fact change over the time that an 
investment is being considered. Indeed, firms perceive that the Russian legal climate 
is marked by instability and a lack of clarity. 279 Finding information about potential 
investment targets or partners is particularly difficult in Russia as a large number of 
Russian firms fall significantly short of international standards on the disclosure of 
information, making it hard for foreigners to assess their rights. Indeed, the FIAC 
study found that 50% of current foreign investors felt that they lack credible and 
necessary data on Russian companies. 281 
This informational barrier may be exacerbated in cases where the written rules do 
not accurately reflect the course of action usually taken. The gap between the law on 
276 FIAC 2005,46-47. 
2" Kasper & Streit 1998,54. 
278 EBRD 2002a reviews the decade of legal reform; see generally, the EBRD's Law in 
Transition. 
279 Ahrend 2000; EBC 2003,21 & 31. 
280 OECD 2004,23. 
281 FIAC 2005,47. 
83 
the books and law in practice is a feature of transition legal systems, including 
Russia's282 Further, there is evidence (presented in subsection 3.2 of this Chapter) 
that practices across a broad spectrum of jurisdictions are influenced heavily by 
informal norms, rather than just by formal laws and legal enforcement; this is 
especially true in Russia. Even detailed and rigorously compiled sources of 
information on legal climates, such as the World Bank's Doing Business database, 
can be criticised for not taking the impact of informal practices into account 283So, the 
ability of foreign firms to be accurately informed about what goes on in host legal 
climates will be limited in so far as actual practices deviate from official information 
and procedures. 
In Russia's case the informational barrier is so significant that it has been repeatedly 
observed that foreign firms may have biased and unrealistic views of it as an 
investment destination. In the FIAC survey, 66% of current foreign investors 
reported that non-investors perceptions of Russia were more negative than the 
'reality' in Russia 2M In another study, leading western managers in New York, 
London and Moscow were interviewed. The main finding of this study was of a 
"qualitative difference" in the perceptions of the Russian investment climate among 
westerners outside the country and those actually working inside Russia; again those 
outside the country had significantly worse opinions. 2 A further survey of foreign 
investors in Russia also concludes that opinions within Russia about the investment 
climate there are more positive than outsider perceptions. 286 This gap between pre- 
investment and during-investment perceptions seems to be a significant, yet 
generally overlooked aspect of foreign investment determination. It has a particular 
bearing on countries such as Russia, that have stereotyped image abroad . 2B7 
282 EBRD 2002a, 15; Bevan et al. 2004,50. 
W Djankov et al. 2001. 
n4 FIAC 2005,37. 
285 SRU Limited (UK) & Expert Information Group (Russia) 2003. 
26 Ahrend 2000,11. 
287 For example, see The Moscow Times 2004b, 2004c, 2004f. 
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Either for reasons of the infeasibility of acquiring in-depth information or because 
investors simply are not interested enough, there is evidence that foreign investors in 
the region may rely on quite superficial information in their decisions. Hewko argues 
that foreign investors' perceptions were: 
"rarely based on a thorough understanding of the political, social, legal, and cultural 
situation in the country, but rather on information obtained from television news 
reports back home, anecdotes from previous trailblazers, perceptions as to what 
their competitors were thinking and doing, or an article read in the International 
Herald Tribune during the flight over. "2 
Similarly, Perry-Kessaris found that only 48% of foreign investors surveyed had 
actually investigated the Sri Lankan legal system prior to investing; moreover, she 
characterises the method for investigating the legal climate by half of these firms as 
"superficial"289 The study further contests the idea that foreign investors pay any 
material attention to the legal system by finding that those who had investigated the 
legal system were just as likely to be surprised by it, once operating in the Sri Lanka, 
than those who had not 290 A MICA survey also found that, prior to investment, 
multinationals primarily relied upon general economic information about countries 
and then information about foreign investment laws and regulations. The general 
quality of the legal climate did not feature as an information source for FDI 
decisions291 
Economic theory assumes that choices are invariant to the manner in which 
information is presented, and that the media therefore has no impact. Bounded 
rationality, however, asserts that 'presentation effects' exist, and so "people are likely 
to think, mistakenly, that salient events are more common than equally prevalent but 
2 Hewko 2002,8. 
29 Perry 2001,89-90. 
2% Perry 2001,91. 
291 MIGA 2002,30. 
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more subtle ones. "292 This may explain why isolated but attention-grabbing events 
are deemed to have such an influence on Russia's investment prospects. For 
example, BP's high profile investment in Russia, valued at over $6bn, is widely 
considered to have had a significant and positive impact on foreigners' perceptions 
of Russia, with the symbolic meaning that Russia had become a viable investment 
destination. 293 In sharp contrast, however, the infamous 'Yukos affair', 294 is widely 
thought to have ruined the nascent improving image of Russia in foreign business 
circles and media295 It also explains why combating the negative image of Russia in 
the west is among the country's top FDI policies, and was initiated by President 
Putin himself. 2 Interestingly, foreign investment advisors have raised quite cosmetic 
issues in their attempts to attract FDI into Russia. For example, the European 
Business Club drew attention to Moscow's main international airport, which in their 
words "continues to be the main source of the negative image of Russia for people 
coming to Moscow. "2 ' 
2.3 Information Processing Constraints 
In addition to not being always able to acquire reliable information, foreign firms 
may also not be able to process information about legal climates in the presumed 
'rational' way. Research on decision making has shown that individuals often rely on 
heuristics, or rules of thumb, to simplify decisions, 298 especially where there is high 
uncertainty. 299 Other factors, such as emotions and intuition also affect the decisions 
of entrepreneurs. 300 These constraints and influences on computational capacity may 
explain why "businessmen often sign contracts without understanding their legal 
implication, state risk without knowing their legal liability, or invest in property 
292 Jolls et al. 2000,50-51. 
293 Citibank 2003, The Moscow Times 2004g, Doyle 2003. 
Discussed in Chapter Six. 
295 For example, The Moscow Times 2004f, The Financial Times 2004b. 
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improvements without knowing their ownership rights. "301 Hewko argues that 
foreign investors in the transition did in fact fall back on such rules of thumb: 
"In short, most foreign investors were willing to accept or ignore actual problems in 
the legislation and legal system if they had a visceral 'feel good' perception of the 
target country. Conversely, if the general perception of a country were to decline, 
foreign investors would be more hesitant even if, on paper, the state of the legal 
system were actually improving. "302 
It is also possible that businessmen may be uninterested in gathering information 
about the legal system because the business case has already been settled, or that 
they even selectively gather information to merely justify the business case 303 
Further, the process of decision-making can also be greatly affected by the methods 
to collect and analyse information about the host state. 3m We should bear in mind 
that many sources of information about hosts have a vested interest in encouraging 
investment, for example, investment promoters, local and international law firms, 
chambers of commerce or regional investment boards. 
2.4 Summary 
The Dominant Theory presumes that foreign investors both possess and rationally 
assess accurate information about host legal climates during the decision to invest. 
However, for a variety of reasons, foreign investors may not, in the objective and 
thorough manner supposed, acquire and process in-depth information about legal 
climates at the time when they are determining the host. The evidence presented 
suggests that the Dominant Theory is unrealistic in its representation of how foreign 
investment decisions are made. While the studies reported in the two sub-sections 
above do not conform to the Dominant Theory, it is important to note that they are 
readily explained by academic disciplines outside of classical law and economics. 
301 Cooter 1997,102. 
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This Section has thus provided evidence in support of Hypothesis One. Further 
research on the role of information in the decision to invest is warranted. Section 3 
provides the final justification for Hypothesis One. It considers how foreign investors 
may operate successfully in the absence of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. 
3 Alternatives to a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
The final reason why legal systems might have a limited impact on the decision to 
invest is that foreign firms may be able to achieve the efficiency and predictability 
they desire outside of the formal legal system. Bribery, channels of influence and 
informal institutions can serve as substitutes for a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, 
enabling foreign investors to operate successfully in countries like Russia. 
3.1 Corruption 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The Dominant Theory holds that foreign investors expect a regulatory regime that 
operates like a "vending machine"305 - automated, impersonal and efficient. In 
contrast, states and institutions, which can be referred to as 'permeable', may allow 
individuals to access and influence them. 306 In such environments, investors can 
obtain the certainty and low transaction costs they seek by taking advantage of the 
discretion available to public officials. As a result, the legal system can discriminate 
in the investors' favour. 0' And so, while bureaucratic discretion is perceived in 
general terms as a source of uncertainty for investors, one must bear in mind that 
"decisions which may appear to be arbitrary to some may be perfectly predictable to 
others. "308 Indeed, the evidence shows that foreign investors can be highly pragmatic 
in their approach towards permeable legal systems. 
305 FIAS 2001, x. 
306 Perry 2001,67. 
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In their analysis of transition investment climates, the World Bank has identified 
three types of corrupt private sector-state relationship: state capture, influence and 
administrative corruption. State capture is defined as shaping the formation of the basic 
rules of the game, such as laws, regulations and decrees, by means of illicit and non- 
transparent payments to public officials. Influence refers to the firm's capacity to 
shape the rules of the game, not by means of payments, but as a result of factors such 
as firm size, and connections with public officials. Administrative corruption is 
defined as private payments to public officials to distort the prescribed 
implementation of official rules and policies. 309 
A recent World Bank study showed that foreign investors in the transition region, far 
from importing higher standards and refraining from corruption, as was commonly 
thought to be the case, were actually highly involved in corrupt practices. First, they 
were found to be as likely to be engaged in administrative bribery as domestic firms. 
Second, they are almost twice as likely to be involved in state capture. Third, foreign 
investors were found to have made considerable direct performance gains from 
corruption. This led the researchers to conclude that foreign investors were amongst 
the greatest beneficiaries of corruption in the region during the period 370 Hewko also 
observes that opaque and corrupt systems were at times "highly desirable" to 
individual foreign entrepreneurs, especially those with good connections. "' 
3.1.2 Ethical Challenges 
While foreign investors may prefer that hosts be free from corruption, in corrupt 
environments, they may not have a real choice, and may react pragmatically. Foreign 
firms are faced with the dilemma of either missing business opportunities altogether, 
trying to pursue opportunities without paying bribes, or paying bribes 312 The most 
309 Hellman et al. 2000a, 2. 
310 Hellman et al. 2002,3 & 11-12. 
311 Hewko 2002,10. 
312 Bray 2005,114-115. 
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ethical response is to refuse to invest. The difficulty in taking such a stance is that the 
firm will miss an investment opportunity, an outcome which is unlikely to be taken 
lightly. Instead, they may continue with their investment, but decide to not resort to 
bribery, in which case they may find it hard to compete. A company's size and its 
importance to the community may enable it to act ethically and profitably 313 One 
argument is that large firms are in a better position to avoid paying bribes since they 
can publicly announce that they will not pay bribes. If this policy is followed, the 
argument runs, government officials will come to know that there is no point in 
asking employees of that firm. There is anecdotal evidence to support this 
argument 31 Moreover, firms that are perceived as ethical may have an advantage as 
they are more trusted 315 
Foreign investors may also choose to pay bribes where necessary. The payment of 
bribes may not be considered as necessarily unethical. According to Donaldson, a 
business ethicist, administrative bribery is acceptable on four conditions: first, that it 
is "accepted" in the host country; second, that it is "necessary" for successful 
business; third, that it does not violate any fundamental rights; finally, if the practise 
violates a norm of the home country of the foreign firm, then the firm should "make 
its disapproval of the practise known. "316 Donaldson's approach readily sanctions 
administrative bribery, since the key conditions of 'accepted in the host country', and 
'necessary for successful business' are so subjective. 
The existence of petty corruption, in the guise of 'facilitating payments', may not 
pose an ethical dilemma for foreign investors that would alter an investment 
decision. Facilitating payments are bribes "paid to receive preferential treatment for 
something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law" 3" Typical examples are 
the expedition of applications or the clearing of goods in customs. These do not 
313 De George 1993,134 
314 Donaldson 1989,146-467; Financial Times 2001. 
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attract so much opprobrium as other forms of bribery, such a kick-backs, since they 
do not induce the bribe taker to alter a decision, or to violate a norm or law, but 
instead, perform "routine government action". It is felt that in developing countries 
especially, government officials have to be paid a little extra to do their jobs, and that 
salaries may be deliberately set low with the practise in mind 318 Interestingly, the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practises Act of 1977, which prohibits US firms from bribery abroad, 
actually permits facilitative payments 319 To conclude, therefore, the appearance of 
petty corruption in a host may not prevent an ethical and law-abiding foreign 
investors from investing there. 
3.1.3 Corrupt Practises 
By engaging in corrupt practices, foreign investors run certain risks, for example 
being black-mailed, exposed or subject to legal action. A common way in which 
foreign firms manage these risks is by employing a local agent as an intermediary. By 
using intermediaries foreigners firms may not know or can claim they do not know 
about payments made on their behalf and they can therefore deny involvement 320 
Local affiliates are particularly useful to investors in unfamiliar business 
environments, especially ones that lack transparency. 321 It is said that foreign 
investors seek out joint venture partners with political connections, 322 as well as those 
who understand how business in done and have the necessary contacts to facilitate 
business. 323 They will also recruit local staff who are familiar with what actually 
happens within the legal climate, rather than what is supposed to happen 324 
According to one foreign investor the actual tax burden in Russia depends very 
318 Donaldson 1989,104. Financial Times 2001. 
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much on the firm's connections, with well-connected businesses able to significantly 
reduce their tax bills 325 
3.2 Informal Institutions 
Informal institutions are another feature of actual, rather than Theoretically Ideal 
institutional environments, which prompt a rethink of the Dominant Theory. Perry- 
Kessaris argues that the impact of institutional failings on foreign investors depends 
on the ability of firms to find substitutes for weak formal institutions 326 As the 
overall institutional setting is a mixture of formal and informal, focusing exclusively 
on the role of formal legal systems results in a partial impression of the impact of 
legal systems. The Dominant Theory does not take informal institutions into 
consideration at all; in the previous Chapter, the FDI regression studies were 
criticised for excluding them 327 
The most relevant attribute of informal institutions is that they facilitate economic 
exchange where formal - that is state institutions, do not function or are inefficient 328 
The use of informal institutions is conventionally explained quite simply in terms of 
transaction costs: the higher the costs of formal institutions, the more likely parties 
are to likely to rely on informal ones 329 They can be characterised as the "market 
response" to the failure of the state to provide and enforce laws ?0 
Accordingly, a certain amount of the actual implementation of the law in transition 
countries is carried out by informal institutions1 Informal forms of law enforcement 
in Russia can range from social norms and pressures to arbitration, private yet legal 
protection agencies and organised crime2 Informal institutions can define property 
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rights and enforce contracts? The OECD recently observed that arbitrariness of law 
enforcement in Russia leads individuals to rely on informal networks and contacts to 
obtain results which should, in a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, be obtainable or 
guaranteed. 334 They have also served to resolve disputes in Russia's stock and 
commodity exchanges. 335 Thus, the first point is that they 'fill the gaps' in formal 
systems. 
Second, especially in the Russian context, informal practices intersect with official 
rules, laws and institutions For example, a study on the investment climate in 
Russia finds that it is common for the private sector and the bureaucracy to negotiate 
over the application of building regulations, often via a third party 337 Third, 
informality does not necessarily imply corruption, but in some cases, informal 
practices do involve bribes .w The final point to note about informal institutions is 
that, by their very nature, they are not directly amenable to policy, as they are not 
within the immediate grasp of the state 339 
Empirical research in legal contexts as diverse as Russia and the US shows that 
people tend to use formal law and legal enforcement much less than previously 
assumed, and instead structure their transactions or resolve their disputes using 
elaborate informal means. Ellickson and Macaulay provide two classic examples of 
the use of informal institutions in the US. In the early 1960's, Macaulay surveyed 
local American firms and found that their commercial relationships were not 
governed by tight rules. Litigation and reference to legal agreement between parties 
was extremely limited, and lawyers were brought into the dispute settle process as a 
last resort .m Ellickson explains that social norms take precedence over formal 
World Bank 2002b, 173. 
334 OECD 2004,60 
335 Hay & Schleifer 1998,399. 
3M Pastukhov 2002. 
337 Foreign Investment Advisory Service 2001, Chapter Three, pages 56,64. 
3M Wang 2001,536-537. 
339 Raiser 1997,2 and North 2001,329. 
3 Macaulay 1962 cited in Perry 2001,41 
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dispute resolution among people with close social ties. Ellickson studied disputes 
between cattle ranchers and farmers, and found that their disputes were usually 
resolved by appealing to generally accepted social rules, not by bargaining over legal 
rights, even though these existed 3i1 
Where gaps exist in the formal legal system, informal systems enable markets to 
function. Thus one would expect to find a significant degree of recourse to, informal 
mechanisms in transition countries. Indeed, studies conducted on the nature of 
contracting in the region echo the main findings of Ellickson and Macaulay. 
Johnson and colleagues surveyed the contracting strategies of over 1400 firms across 
Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. They found that the basis for most 
contracts is 'relational'. This is where the relationship between contractors itself 
induces cooperation, and where the sanction for breach of contract is the loss of trade 
that results from breaking off the relationship. 342 Research of a similar type 
conducted on over 300 Russian firms by Hendley et al. also found that firms rely 
heavily on direct negotiations between contractual parties, long term relationships 
and trust. 3 
Interestingly, legal systems do not need to be perceived as strong for firms to benefit 
from them. Firms in the Hendley et al. study perceived the courts as ineffective, 
ranking the lack of enforcement as the primary obstacle to submitting disputes to 
court. Nevertheless, the threat of litigation was used by 71% of firms as a way of 
dealing with problem customers, and this was regarded as a relatively effective 
strategy. Further, respondents generally felt that improvements in judicial 
enforcement would do little to persuade firms to seek out new contractual 
partners 
341 Hickson 1991. 
342 Johnson et al. 2002. 
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What these examples show is that alternatives to a rules based system can 
compensate for institutional weakness. In this way, countries might attract and 
support foreign investment without what is conventionally perceived as a sound 
formal legal climate. Three studies, to my knowledge, touch on the role of informal 
institutions in supporting FDI. The most extensive study is by Hongying Wang. 
Wang concludes that guanxi, informal Chinese social networks, explain the country's 
phenomenal FDI record in the absence of what Upham refers to as a legal system 
"worthy of the name. "145 Wang shows that guanxi compensate for weak state 
institutions, enabling foreign investors to protect property rights, resolve disputes, 
gain access to formal legal mechanisms and navigate "ambiguous and even 
contradictory" Chinese laws and policies? Hewko claims that as a result of good 
connections and knowledge of how to exploit the lack of structure in transition 
countries, legal considerations were not necessarily a barrier or even relevant to the 
investment activities of some small foreign entrepreneurs. 3" Finally, in a study in 
India, Perry-Kessaris finds that some foreign investors avoid using the state courts, 
and instead rely upon negotiation, arbitration and lobbying. 
Perry-Kessaris draws attention to the cultural dimension in the choice of using 
informal mechanisms 39 Networks of personal relationships, trust and reciprocity are 
important to East Asian economic activity. For example, Wang argues that ethnic 
Chinese who live abroad will be advantaged in resorting to personal networks for 
foreign investment in China. She also points out that foreigners who are accustomed 
to working in countries lack the rule of law will be advantaged in China, as they will 
have already acquired an understanding of how to deal with uncertainties and 
protect their interests in similar environments 311 In Russia, many firms have 
maintained relationships with commercial partners from the Soviet era, despite the 
345 Upham 2002,13. 
W Wang 2000,535. 
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freedom they have to choose their partners since the end of the central planning 352 
Informality and disregard for state institutions and the law are features which have 
characterised Russian political culture prior to the Bolshevik revolution and up to the 
present day. But in the West too, the persistence of informality reflects the 
interpersonal nature of business, and the desire for flexibility 354 
It is argued that informal institutions have two potential limitations. First of all, they 
are 'biased' against new market entrants, who do not have the connections required 
to enter the social networks. Second, being rooted in interpersonal relations, it is 
thought that they are not 'scaleable' 355 But the example of China would appear to 
refute these arguments. Foreign investors are very much outsiders, China is a huge 
economy (GDP of $2.2 trillion in 2005), very successful in attracting FDI ($54.9 billion 
in 2004) and continuing to grow at an impressive rate (9.9% in 2005), making the first 
two suppositions hard to justify Indeed, Wang confirms that in China, personal 
networks are open to a wide range of people, including foreigners 37 However, she 
does identify some drawbacks to personal connections. Investments which rely on 
connections with particular individuals can suffer if these individuals lose power or 
change positions. Further, she points out that developing good relations with all the 
relevant actors can be difficult and expensive. 
As mentioned already, the use of informal institutions is traditionally justified in 
terms of transaction costs. Campbell and Picciotto, however, caution against 
reducing transactions merely into a question of costs, and stress the importance of the 
352 Gray 1999,62 cited in Perry 2001,40 and Hendley et al. 2000,638. 
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social aspects of transactions9 Informal institutions exemplify how transactions are 
embedded within social relations. 
According to Ellickson, traditional law and economics exaggerates the role of the law 
by analysing legal problems outside of a social context . 360 was not referring 
to foreign investors and the law, but this Section clearly shows that his arguments are 
applicable in the present arena. By not taking the role of informal institutions, 
corruption and influence into account, the abstract approach of the Dominant Theory 
exaggerates the importance of the law to foreign investors. Ellickson also identifies 
the findings of behavioural law and economics as an example of the "lacunae" in 
classical law and economics 31 Indeed, as explained in Section 2 of this Chapter, it is 
behavioural law and economics that explains why foreign investors may not conform 
to economic rationality in the way that they acquire and process information about 
legal climates. These points lead us to conclude that the Dominant Theory, owing to 
its abstract perspective, exaggerates the importance of host legal climates to foreign 
investors. 
3.3 Summary 
The discussion of informality and corruption demonstrates how economic actors, 
including foreign investors, react pragmatically to hosts that lack a Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate. In some cases, foreign investors may have no effective choice 
but to step outside of the formal legal system. It has not been argued, and is not 
contended, that informality and corruption are therefore preferable to a Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate, nor that they provide a comprehensive alternative to formal 
practices. These points are not even relevant to our discussion. 
What is relevant is that these practices demonstrate the means by which foreign 
investors can operate successfully without a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, 
359 Campbell & Piccioto 1998,253. 
360 Ellickson 1998,540. 
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demonstrating how hosts with weak legal climates can attract and support foreign 
investment. This point is notable from the perspective of the host country, as legal 
reform can be a very slow and difficult process, an issue which shall be dealt with in 
Chapter Six. Attitudes towards such practices may also be expected to vary 
according to the characteristics of the firms, especially their size and culture. The 
preceding discussion shows that there are grounds for investigating how informality, 
influence and corruption affect the alleged importance of the quality of Russia's legal 
climate to foreign investors. 
4 The Attitudes and Characteristics of the Foreign Investor 
The assessment of risk is inherently perceived and subjective. Investors make 
decisions based on their perceptions of reality, rather than an 'objective' reality. 
Hence, it is "meaningless and fatally misleading to speak of probability, in the 
objective sense, that a judgement is correct. " It is the interpretation of information by 
the foreign investor, rather than an apparently objective and neutral assessment that 
matters 2 As a result we may expect to encounter differences in the attitudes of 
foreign firms towards legal risk. The evidence in this Section demonstrates that such 
attitudes depend on the attributes of the foreign investors. 
There is growing evidence in the law and development literature that firm 
characteristics affect attitudes towards law and uncertainty. 63 However, the 
Dominant Theory does not account for such differences. The characteristics of 
foreign investors are notable as they determine both attitudes towards law and 
uncertainty in general, and also, the perceived impact of host legal climates. Here, 
evidence regarding the influence of foreign investors' characteristics is mainly drawn 
upon, and there will also be selective use of findings about the characteristics of 
362 Knight 1921 quoted in Perry 2001,43. 
The role of firm characteristics, in particular, size in the relationship between firms and 
legal systems, features in the following works: World Bank 2004b, Batra et al. 2002, Beck 
et al. 2002, Solymossy 2002, Perry 2001, Hellman & Schankerman 2000, Smazynka & Wei 
2000. 
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(domestic) firms generally. Three characteristics of foreign investors appear to have 
an influence in the decision to invest: size, factors relating to the investment, and 
culture. 
4.1 Size 
There is no consensus as to how firm size affects foreign investors' attitudes to legal 
risk. A survey of foreign investors in Russia found that problems faced in Russia 
were common to all firms, though large industrial foreign investors expressed 
greater concerns about the tax authorities. Perry-Kessaris' work demonstrates that 
attitudes towards the legal system in Sri Lanka may depend on investment size; in 
particular, she finds that the quality of host legal systems are less likely to be a 
decision factor for smaller firms . 365 
In contrast to these findings, the most common view is that smaller local firms are 
more prejudiced by weak legal systems. For example, Beck et al. show that the extent 
to which legal obstacles to business and the level of corruption affect a firm's growth 
depends on its size, with the smallest firms being consistently the worst affected. 
Also, the World Bank reports that better judicial efficiency benefits smaller and 
newer unaffiliated firms the most 7 This point is reiterated by Kolodko who also 
argues that property rights protection is crucial for the success of SME 
development Vandevelde extends these principles to foreign investors, claiming 
that states that wish to attract more risk averse investors, such as SMEs, would 
benefit the most from reducing the risk to investors 369 
Hewko takes a slightly different stance. He argues that transition legal climates 
posed the biggest problem for medium sized foreign investors, affecting their 
364 Ahrend 2000,10. 
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investment decisions the most. The reason being that in general, medium sized 
investors were too large to rely on the informal practices used by individual 
entrepreneurs, but too small to have the resources required to deal with the 
challenges posed by host legal systems 370 Further, compared to large multinational 
investors, an investment in transition economies accounted for a larger share of their 
capital, and therefore failure would have more adverse consequences for them. 
Finally, the weakness of the legal climate had less impact on smaller firms in the 
region as such investors avoided relying on it and instead used informal institutions, 
influence and bribery. 371 
4.2 Investment Related Factors 
The impact of the host legal climate has been found to also depend upon two factors 
relating to the investment itself: the mode of entry and investment motivation. 
4.2.1 Joint Ventures 
Undertaking a joint venture is a strategy that firms can choose to employ to alleviate 
the challenges of investing in unfamiliar or difficult environments. This may explain 
why, in the FIAC study, "joint venture" was the most popular response to the 
question: "if your company were to enter the Russian market, what might be your preferred 
entry strategy? " In her study of foreign investors in India, Perry-Kessaris also found 
that foreigners were able to limit their engagement with the Indian legal system by 
relying on local partners 372 
The more adverse the local conditions, the greater the premium on a associating with 
a reliable partner. For example, Wei and Smarzynska show that in the transition 
region in the early 1990s, increased levels of corruption were associated with higher 
probabilities of foreign investors taking local partners 37 In the same way, Lankes 
370 See also Perry 2000b, 793. 
371 Hewko 2002,10 and Perry 2000b, 792-793. 
372 Perry-Kessaris 2005,176. 
373 Smarzynska & Wei 2000. 
100 
and Venables found that a small reduction in country risk had a dramatic effect on 
the preference for full ownership over of joint-ventures in Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union 374 In fact, respondent firms explicitly confirm in the survey that 
they view the joint venture as an effective risk-mitigation device. 375 Similarly, one of 
the interviewees in Perry-Kessaris' Sri Lanka study stated that the quality of the legal 
system did not matter if the firm has enough confidence in the local partner 376 
Finally, in a different study, a number of foreign investors argued that the choice of 
local partner in Russia can be the single most important factor in the success of a 
investment partnership 377 
Interestingly, there is also evidence that points to opposing principles: that foreigners 
with joint ventures find the legal climate more challenging. For example, Perry- 
Kessaris' survey findings show that foreign investors in Sri Lanka who had taken 
local joint venture partners expected to be more prejudiced by the legal climate: they 
were twice as likely to report to be deterred by a legal system that did not conform to 
the theoretical ideal378 They were also more likely to be surprised by features of the 
legal climate 37' This may simply echo the point that firms that are sensitive to the 
quality of host legal climates respond by taking local partners. Finally, in Russia, 
there is a widespread feeling that joint ventures partners often become the cause of 
legal insecurity, as they have been known to abuse the relationship and defraud 
foreigners of their stake in the joint enterprise. 
4.2.2 Investment Motivation 
According to Dunning, the impact of the institutional environment on the choice of 
host depends on the motive for investment. As noted in Section 1, within the 
framework of the Eclectic Paradigm, he identifies four motives for investing abroad: 
374 Lankes & Venables 1997,560. 
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resource-, market-, efficiency- and strategic asset-, seeking1 Dunning notes that 
'institutional competence' is relevant to market seekers, but not resource-, efficiency-, 
and asset-, seeking investors . 382 So the legal climate is deemed to be an issue, for 
example, for those tapping Russia's consumer market, not its oil and gas reserves. 
Verifying Dunning, one survey found that the obstacles faced depended upon 
whether firms were engaged in production or sales, with the latter, market seekers, 
suffering more heavily from tax and customs authorities and payment arrears from 
Russian clients3 Perry-Kessaris also found that the quality of the Sri Lankan legal 
system was less likely to be a decision factor for export-orientated foreign investors 
than for host domestic market seeking investors. 384 
It is generally felt that foreigners that invest with the intention of exporting their 
goods are less engaged with and therefore concerned about the quality of the host 
legal climate. A regression study published by the World Bank found that export- 
orientation was the single most important explanatory variable for FDI flows across 
developing countries, eroding "substantially" the influence of socio-political risk. 385 
This suggests that export-orientated investors, perhaps because they operate in 
export-processing zones, are to some extent insulated from the host country's legal 
and political turbulence. This explanation is given support by Perry-Kessaris' 
interviewees, who explained that export-orientated investors do not come into 
contact with the local legal system, and therefore its failures are less of a concern to 
them. 316 Finally, a study of foreign investors in Hungary also showed that the 
motives and deterrents for investors, including legal risk, depended on whether they 
were exporting or selling locally. 
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4.3 Culture 
Another of the Dominant Theory's shortcoming is that it does not acknowledge the 
fact that cultural values affect perceptions and expectations of legal systems. This has 
been demonstrated by Perry-Kessaris' synthesis of the path-breaking work of 
sociologist Geert Hofstede. Following Perry-Kessaris, here 'culture' refers to the 
"values that economic actors carry with them as a result of their personal experience, 
and according to which they make economic decisions. "388 
Astonishingly, Hofstede survey is based on 116,000 questionnaires sent out IBM 
employees across fifty countries in 1968 and 1972. He found that attitudes towards 
uncertainty, levels of individualism, and attitudes towards the distribution of power, 
all varied according to the employee's nationalities 319 Perry-Kessaris demonstrates 
that the importance attributed to legal systems and the features desired of legal 
systems by economic actors depends on their culture, and can be affected by the 
three variables mentioned. For instance, attitudes towards state involvement in the 
economy and the application of discretion are likely to depend on the level of 
individualism versus collectivism of a society, as well as its sense of how power 
should be distributed. . -390 attitudes towards contracting also depend on the 
individualism versus collectivism of a culture; 391 and laws will tend be more precise 
in countries which have a lower tolerance for uncertainty 392 
A cultural approach to legal systems shows that one cannot assert that a single form 
of legal climate is universally attractive to investors, even the rich country investors a 
host country may wish to attract. Perry-Kessaris shows that substantial differences 
across the three cultural dimensions arise among western industrialised countries, 
such as the US, UK and France, as well as between Asian industrialised economies 
Perry 2002,290. 
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like Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan393 The World Bank has recently acknowledged 
that differences in attitudes to uncertainty exist between national cultures 394 
However, this has not led them to a reappraisal of the Dominant Theory. 
The literature on FDI also identifies the impact of culture. According to Dunning's 
'Eclectic Paradigm', attitudes to risk and uncertainty and the cultural ethos of a firm 
can have an impact on investment decisions 395 One reason for this is that 
geographical and cultural distance are thought to increase transaction costs and risk, 
for example, because they affect the personal relations and linguistic barriers 
between foreigners and locals. Regression studies have verified that the distance 
between source and host countries will have an inverse relationship with FDI 
between the two countries. 396 For example, Resmini found that German investors 
preferred Hungary and Poland, Austrians preferred the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
and Scandinavian countries have invested mainly in the Baltic Republics. She takes 
the point further, arguing that smaller firms are particularly sensitive to cultural 
distance. This may explain why Italian SMEs, who were among the biggest regional 
investors at the time, were mainly hosted by Albania, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and 
Romania. 397 
The evidence available about the effect of foreign investors' nationality on their 
attitudes to the law relates mostly to investment in Asia. Perry-Kessaris finds that 
westerners are more likely than Asians to be sensitive to the Sri Lankan legal climate. 
For example, firms with no western participation were less likely to have conducted 
a pre-investment investigation of the Sri Lankan legal climate. Interviewees 
explained that westerners' sensitivity was due to concerns for repercussions at home, 
or because of a greater emphasis on the rule of law in western culture. 398 Wang holds 
that foreign investors who are culturally proximate to China enjoy substantial 
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advantages when investing there 399 The MIGA study compared the attitudes of 
Asian, Western European and North American multinational's attitudes to breach of 
contract and law enforcement, but did not identify any particular trend 400 In the 
transition context, the evidence is more sparse, but reiterates the role of culture. For 
example, Hewko argues that foreign investors from countries with poor legal 
climates may be more tolerant of imperfections in host legal climates. 01 
4.4 Summary 
The literature reviewed above shows that there is a strong reason to believe that 
attitudes towards host legal climates will vary between investors. Numerous factors 
were identified, ranging from the size of the firm, to its culture and factors relating to 
the investment itself. The evidence shows that the Dominant Theory lacks flexibility, 
as its approach to law and FDI fails to account for how the impact of the law 
variegates. It is clear that future studies in the field must at least recognise the role of 
firms attributes, and where possible, assess their role. Hence, the second hypothesis 
of this thesis is that "foreign investors' perceptions of the Russian legal climate 
depend on their firm characteristics. " 
Further, as it is apparent that the challenge posed by a legal climate depends on the 
perceptions and standpoint of the individual investor, it is impossible to assert that 
host legal climates need to be of a single standard in order to attract investment. 
Some commentators believe that instead of an ideal form, (unspecified) minimum 
standards are required, and others that legal standards will always depend upon 
what will satisfy a particular investor in a particular case. 902 So, while the Dominant 
Theory purports to represent all investors, the literature presented here leads one to 
expect that there this is a significant faction of investors that may not in fact require a 
Theoretically Ideal Host Legal Climate. 
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5 Conclusions 
In Chapter Two it was shown that the Dominant Theory was based on a classical 
economic approach to the design of investor-friendly legal systems. This gave rise to 
the concept a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, which is considered to be uniformly 
important and attractive to foreign investors. The present Chapter drew on a range of 
sources, which included established critiques of law and economics that have 
generally not been applied to the study of law and foreign investors. The Chapter has 
aimed to show that certain investors may not conform to the Dominant Theory. It 
argued that the abstract nature of the Dominant Theory leads to an exaggeration of 
the importance of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate and an oversimplification of 
the impact of the law. 
Hypothesis One is that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not always necessary to 
support foreign investors in Russia. The three paragraphs below summarise the three 
reasons for this hypothesis. 
First, the Dominant Theory puts law at the very heart of foreign investment 
determination. In contrast, the leading theory of FDI determination, the Eclectic 
Paradigm puts law alongside other determinants of foreign investment. In doing so, 
the Paradigm shows that the quality of the host legal climate is not a decisive factor. 
In fact, the attractiveness of a host economy can depend on as many as twenty six 
factors. 
Second, the Dominant Theory also appears to overstate the importance of the law in 
the way it models the decision to invest. It expects that foreign investors will choose 
the host on the basis of an 'objective' and 'rational' assessment of detailed 
information. In fact, perceptions are subjective, and foreign investors may not be able 
to, nor interested in, acquiring and analysing detailed information about host legal 
climates before they choose an investment location. Thus, at the time of choosing a 
host, there is good reason to believe that perceptions of legal climates may be quite 
superficial. 
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Third, the Dominant Theory lacks realism in so far as it expects economic actors to 
avoid legal climates that do not possess Theoretically Ideal attributes. This supposes 
that there exist no alternatives for securing efficiency and predictability other than by 
a rule-bound legal climate. In fact, influence, bribery and informal institutions can 
and do serve investors' purposes in weak legal climates. There was substantial 
evidence showing that, while foreign investors may proclaim that they prefer a 
transparent legal climate, they can readily adapt to opaque ones, and so need not shy 
away from them. In fact, the use of informal institutions and bribery in weak legal 
climates is consistent with the principles of New Institutional Economics, which as 
shown in Chapter Two, predicts that economic actors will opt to use these methods 
where doing so provides greater efficiency and certainty than using the formal legal 
system. A03 
The Dominant Theory further lacks realism because it does not accommodate 
differences in the perceptions and attitudes of economic actors towards legal 
climates. It treats the private sector, let alone foreign investors, as a homogenous 
group. But the attractiveness of a legal climate is in the eye of the beholder. A range 
of literature, from the Eclectic Paradigm, to law and development in general and 
studies on the determinants of FDI, in particular, was surveyed. They all show that 
characteristics including the investors' size, culture, and factors relating to the 
investment itself, have an effect on attitudes towards legal risk and the perceived 
impact of legal climates. Thus, it is very difficult to say that a single legal climate is 
universally attractive or unattractive, as a legal climate that may be sufficiently 
predictable and efficient for one investor may be too risky for another. Instead, the 
heterogeneity of investors must be inherent to our understanding of law and foreign 
investors. Thus the second hypothesis is that "foreign investors' perceptions of the 
Russian legal climate depend on their firm characteristics. " 
403 See Chapter Two, subsection 1.2.1 and 1.22 
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The Dominant Theory claims that investors "need"4G4 the right legal climate, and 
indeed, when asked, foreign investors do themselves claim to prefer a Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate. However, while ideally they would prefer to operate and invest 
in such an environment, when faced with non-ideal legal climates, this Chapter has 
shown that foreign investors can be pragmatic. There is no evidence here, however, 
as to what proportion of investors do not conform to the Dominant Theory. This 
would require a well-designed, dedicated piece of research. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that there is a faction of foreign investors who are less sensitive than expected to the 
quality of host legal climates. 
The pragmatic behaviour of foreign investors is absolutely vital to any appraisal of 
the Dominant Theory. First of all, its advocates claim that the Theory describes the 
role of perceptions of the legal climate in the decision to invest, but the evidence 
contradicts this claim. Second, the evidence shows a discrepancy between the 
expected behaviour of foreign investors and their actual approach to host legal 
climates. Further, because a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate cannot be acquired and 
installed overnight, the actual of behaviour of foreign investors in the absence of 
such a legal climate is of relevance to scholarship and policy-making. In short, the 
behaviour and perceptions of foreign investors show that the Dominant Theory does 
not accurately portray the relationship between foreign investors and non-ideal legal 
climates. 
It is important to bear in mind that while the evidence that contradicts the Dominant 
Theory does not form a tidy alternative theory of law and foreign investment, this 
Chapter has shown that each body of evidence is consistent with well established 
beliefs and research from related academic fields. At the broadest level, critiques of 
the abstract assumptions of traditional law and economics are notable as they 
emphasise the importance of viewing law and economics in a real-world context, 
rather than on the 'blackboards'. Behavioural law and economics questions the 
theoretical behaviour of economic actors, and also argues for the importance of the 
4 See Chapter One, subsection 1.2 
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social context of economic transactions. That field is supported by the work of 
behavioural decision theory, and the evidence on 'bounded rationality' which 
demonstrates the limitations in the knowledge, computational capacities and skills of 
decision makers. Behavioural decision theory assumes that risk is subjectively 
perceived. Another feature of the management discipline is the work of Geert 
Hofstede, who in the 1980s showed the impact of national culture on perceptions of 
risk. All these related fields of study provide credibility and coherence to the 
findings that contradict the Dominant Theory. 
The evidence gathered in this Chapter shows that foreign investors are diverse, may 
not be well informed about host legal climates, and can be willing to invest in hosts 
with weak legal climates. This, however, does not entail that advocates of the 
Dominant Theory are wrong to argue that Theoretically Ideal Legal Climates are best 
suited to attracting foreign investment. What it does show, however, is that there are 
a certain faction of 'non-conforming' foreign investors that are significantly less 
sensitive to the quality of host legal climates than presumed. It also shows that the 
Dominant Theory is only capable of partly explaining the relationship between 
foreign investors and host legal climates. Pointing out the limitations of the 
Dominant Theory is only a starting point. It is more valuable to move on and address 
the neglected issues to develop a more sophisticated and complete understanding of 
foreign investors and host legal climates. Chapter Seven explains how this research 
study went about doing this. 
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Chapter Five: 
Russia's Legal Climate, Past and Present 
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This Chapter is divided into two Parts. The first analyses key aspects of Russia's legal 
heritage, starting from the imperial period and leading up to the present day. The 
second Part focuses in on a range of assessments of Russia's legal climate conducted 
over the period under study. 
Part One: Russia's Legal Heritage 
This Part analyses key aspects of Russia's pre-revolutionary, Communist and 
transition legal environment. The aim is to provide the reader with a sufficient 
background of Russia's legal inheritance, and in particular, to identify the issues that 
have influenced the climate and culture that foreign investors encounter today. We 
start by looking briefly at the rule of law, not as the narrow concept of the 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate which this study is primarily concerned with, but 
in the broader, political sense. 
1 Limiting the Discretion of the Ruler 
One of the challenges that has confronted political thinkers throughout history has 
been the question of how to limit the discretion of rulers, so that citizens are 
protected from the tyranny and whims of those in power. From the time of the 
ancient Greeks, the concept of the rule of law has espoused the belief that state 
authority should be regulated and subject to law, hence the adage the 'rule of law not 
men. ' Aristotle observed that "he who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and 
Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild 
beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men. "405 
According to Tamanaha, Aristotle's disinction between the rule of law as reason and 
the rule of man as passion has endured. 406 
405 Aristotle cited in Tamanaha 2005,9 
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Once one accepts that state authority should be regulated and constrained by rules, 
the critical question that follows is: according to what principles? At this point we 
need to distinguish between two traditions found in the west: the rule of law concept 
that took root in England, France and the USA by the nineteenth century; and the 
rechstaat concept found in Germany in a similar period. 
The former rule of law tradition presupposes the existence of certain rights, rooted in 
human nature and conscience, which the state cannot violate. Within such a system 
one expects to find a body of stable, widely accepted principles that have primacy 
over the power of the state. These are typically civil and political rights, such as the 
right to a fair hearing, equality before the law, and the freedom of speech and 
association 407 
In contrast, the rechstaat concept holds that the supreme source of law is the 
lawmaker. Laws only come into being once they are legislated by the lawmaker, and 
so customs and precedent require codification. More importantly, the rechstaat 
tradition does not presuppose the existence of any body of fundamental laws 
external to the state which the state is compelled to abide by. 408 Nevertheless, a 
rechstaat does require that the state be based on laws, rather than the dictat of the 
ruler. More importantly, it must be bound by its own laws, which it does not abuse. 
Hence a rechstaat is a state governed by the rule of laws, in the narrow sense of legal 
rules (zakon in Russian) rather the rule of law, in the broader sense which implies 
justice or right (pravo in Russian). 
A widely agreed function of the rule of law is to limit the authority and discretion of 
rulers. This function of the rule of law illuminates our understanding of Russia's 
legal heritage. While there has been no shortage of liberal and progressive Russian 
jurists and statesmen, especially in the century prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, as 
the next section shows, there has historically been a lack of acceptance by Russia's 
407 Berman 1991,450-151 
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rulers of an institutionalised authority that might constrain their own. Not only did 
Russia's rulers reject any body of higher principles (rule of law) which could 
constrain their discretion, they were also unaccustomed to respecting the laws they 
themselves promulgated (rechstaat). 
2 Legal Thought and Reform In the Russian Empire (1682-1917) 
2.1 Peter and Catherine the Great (1682-1796) 
Peter the Great (1682-1725) desired to turn Russia into a modem European state and 
his reforms had a profound effect on Russian law and governance. Peter asserted that 
the role of the monarch was to labour for the general welfare of his nation, legal 
justice being a principal component of that. His reforms chiefly took the form of 
legislation. In fact, Peter's reign marks the turning point in Russian history where 
written law (zakon) starts to take priority over custom. 409 Amongst his reforms of 
government was the establishment of a Senate; the rationalisation of government 
departments; and a more meritocratic system of entry into the ranks of the nobility 
and government posts 4'0 
Peter also began the effort to establish legality as the basis of state operations 411 
Using Swedish models, he established the 'Procuracy' which would act as the "eye of 
the Tsar" checking whether local officials were working in conformity to the law 412 
Indeed, Peter borrowed heavily from foreign models and legislation, even recruiting 
Europeans into his system until Russians were adequately trained. An area in which 
Peter borrowed most from western Europe was military and naval law, which 
underwent codification and appeared in statute form in 1715 and 1720. Though Peter 
409 Butler 2003,25 
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appointed three commissions to work on the continuous systemisation of Russian 
law, none of them progressed far. 413 
The next ruler of Russia to have a significant impact on law and legal reform was 
Catherine the Great (1762-1796). Catherine was a moderniser who, inspired by 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Beccaria, Montesquieu and Voltaire, sought to raise 
Russia to the standards that prevailed in Europe at the time. Her famous 
"Instructions" (Nakaz) contain a framework for political reform. Catherine's 
Instructions called for a seemingly constitutional form of monarchy. She advocated 
the seperation of powers between the executive and judiciary. Finally, she also 
recommended that the judiciary have the power to review laws and to remonstrate 
to the monarch when the laws may be unworkable, or not conform to the 
constitution. 414 
The Nakaz, though never enacted, came to symbolise the progressive climate that 
Catherine was fostering. Under Catherine, instead of being perceived as the 
"epitome of arbitrariness, Russia was praised in print and public law lectures abroad 
for having set inspired examples in which other nations might profitably emulate in 
their law reform undertakings. "415 Despite the progressive tone of her Instructions, 
Catherine remained a firm believer in the absolute power of the sovereign. She 
claimed that the very survival of Russia relied upon the vesting of absolute power in 
a single 'Master. ' Further, according to the Instructions, institutions of the state 
would depend entirely on the monarch for their authority. 
Remarkably, the aim of upholding justice translated into a desire to control judges 
and circumscribe their roles. Both Catherine and Peter were suspicious of the legal 
profession. Judges were viewed as officials charged with implementing the 
monarch's law. So that judicial interpretation did not infringe on the sovereign's 
413 Butler 2003,25 
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exclusive privelege as law-maker, the discretion of judges was to be limited as much 
as possible. Hence, interpretation and precedent were excluded from Russian 
procedural law as grounds for judicial decisions until as late as 1864.416 
2.2 The Final Century of the Russian Empire (1801-1917) 
While seeking to institutionalise authority over their vast terrains, Russia's emperors 
could never accept measures that would limit their own absolute power. This 
approach repeatedly held Russia back from reforms that might have established the 
rule of law over that of men 417 This trend can be seen in the stunted reforms of the 
four tsars who ruled the Russian Empire prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. The first 
of these is Alexander I. 
Alexander I, who ruled from 1801 until 1825, like Catherine the Great, played with 
the idea of constitutional reform. In 1808 he commissioned a plan for constitutional 
reform. The project was carried out by Michael Speransky, a pre-eminent reformist 
minister. Speransky was highly critical of the existing political and social order. His 
proposals aimed to create a strict seperation of powers between the legislature, 
judiciary and executive within a monarchical state governed by law. While 
Alexander was apparently approving of the plan, he eventually shrank from putting 
it into effect. Instead, a State Council, composed of Crown-appointed officials was 
instituted. But this leglislative body was not vested with the power to initiate 
legislation, nor were their decisions binding on the Crown. In short, the State Council 
did not create an effective limitation on the powers of the Emperor. 418 
The accession of Nicholas I (1825-1855) saw a period of increased codification. 
Foremost amongst these was a 48 volume chronological collection of Russian 
legislation from 1649 to 1825. The Complete Collected Laws of the Russian Empire is 
judged to be the most ambitious and comprehensive legal systemisation efforts in 
416 Wortman 1976,11 
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Europe. Speransky's account of the tome's preperation shows that an adequate 
record of existing enactments was lacking. The minister recognised that such 
systemisation was vital to the development of a proper legal system in Russia. 419 
Judicial reform was much discussed during Nicholas's reign. However, it was not 
until the rule of Nicholas's son, Alexander II, that an overhaul of Russia's court 
system took place. Alexander II is arguably the greatest moderniser in Russia's 
imperial history. His 'Great Reforms' started with the emanicaption of the serfs in 
1861, but also went as far as decentralisation of government, reform of higher 
education, the Church and the military, as well as a relaxation of censorship 42° 
Alexander's judicial reforms were a response to the corruption and incompetence of 
the court system. The reforms were groundbreaking: equality before the law; jury 
trials; a seperation of the judicial branch from the legislative and administrative 
branches of the state; and the establishment of a legal profession and bar; as well as a 
raft of other measures that emulated the established principles of European 
juriprudence. 411 The post-reform courts were "immeasurably superior" to their 
predecessors, and the last half century of imperial rule is regarded as the 'Golden 
Age' of Russian law. The Russian legal profession started to flourish. In fact, during 
the celebrated political trials of revolutionaries, the Russian courts showed 
themselves to be remarkably impartial and resilient in the face of a hamhanded state 
determined to eliminate political opposition. 
As one might expect with such far-reaching reforms, implementation of the 1864 
judicial reforms proved a challenge. The plans were not applied consistently within 
the empire. Further, there remained a patchwork of ecclesiastical, military and 
township courts that held jurisdiction over a wide range of cases. More importantly, 
in particular at a time of social and political turbulence, the state could not accept a 
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judiciary that would not be subordinated. The executive eventually reasserted its 
influence over the courts and the appointment of judges; trial by jury was 
increasingly precluded; administrative sanction increased; and the openness of trials 
was limited 423 The principles of the supremacy of the law, the independence of the 
courts and individual rights, were irreconcilable with that of autocracy and 
bureaucratic omnipotence. 424 
The panoply of reforms that Alexander II initiated failed to stabilise a country that 
was increasingly restive. Alexander was assassinated by revolutionaries in 1881. 
Upon acceding to the throne, his successor, Alexander III (1881-1894) countered by 
reaffirming the principles of autocracy in a manifesto. This manifesto was a 
repudiation of the Great Reforms of his father, and led to the resignation of liberal 
ministers and marked the beginning of a period of counter-reform. 425Historians 
argue that in reasserting the primacy of state power and autocratic leadership, 
Alexander III's regime oversaw a significant increase in political arbitrariness: 421 Such 
behaviour fuelled the hatred for autocracy that fanned the fire of civil unrest and 
revolution. 
Alexander III was succeeded in 1894 by Nicholas II (1894-1917), the last of the 
Russian emperors. At a time when opposotion to absolutism and the pressure for 
social, political and legal reform was mounting, Russia enthroned a king who from 
the outset openly declared his hostility to participative government 427 However, 
after a decade of his reign, mass strikes, demonstrations and civil unrest - the so- 
called First Revolution of 1905, forced Nicholas II to issue a manifesto setting Russia 
on the course for a constitutional monarchy. 428 
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Nicholas, as a firm believer in the principles of autocracy, could not accept any 
limitations on his personal power. The eventual 1906 Consititution violated both the 
spirit and letter of his October Manifesto. Civil liberties, such as free association and 
speech were restrictively interepreted 429 Further, a "mistrust of democratic methods 
permeated the structure of the new legislature". For instance, no law could be passed 
without the sanction of the Emperor. The Cabinet of Ministers rather than being 
accountable to the legislature, only reported to the Crown. Further, shortly before the 
opening of the First Duma, the government issued a set of 'Fundamental Laws' 
which stated that the Constitution could only be amended on the initative of the 
Emperor. ' 
The state was intolerant of independent institutions of power. For instance, in 1913, 
Nicholas sought to amend the Constitution to revert the legislature to a purely 
consultative body. 431 Nicholas's Interior Minister Stolypin consistently abused 
provisions of the Fundamental Laws in order to force his will upon the legislature. 432 
For example, a loophole in the Constitution allowed him the powerto dissolve the 
Duma, which he did when it was not compliant 433The transition to a constitutional 
monarchy was bound to be difficult given the climate which prevailed in Russia at 
the time: high illiteracy; insufficient experience of self-government and formal 
political organisation; a strong bureaucratic tradition; and widespread unrest and 
dissatisfaction that had reached a violent pitch. 434 
The political and legal development of the last hundred years of imperial Russia 
show that the country was developing elements of a democratic tradition, but was 
lacking, was the institutionalisation of liberal traditions, that is, freedom form the 
state 435 In this regard, the underlying political philiosophy of Russia's emperors 
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attracts our attention. Historians note that despite extensive reforms, the tsars could 
never accept that laws, courts or any independent institutions of power should have 
primacy over their own perogative 436 Although laws abounded and had been 
codified, until the 1906 Constitution, Russia's emperors refused to submit to any 
body of law that could not be subordinated or reversed, and after 1906, the state tried 
its utmost to undermine such rules 437 The codification of laws failed in part because 
of this reluctance on the part of the crown to delegate legislative authority. 4MHence 
historians argue that Russia, in contrast to its eastern and western neighbours, lacks a 
tradition of restraint on the actions of its rulers. 439 
As we have seen, late imperial Russia had planted the seed of what might have 
become a genuine constitutional monarchy based on the seperation of powers. It is 
important to point out that some historians argue counterfactually that, had certain 
events and leading characters been different, Russia's imperial regime may have 
succeeded in reforming itself peacefully. We can see both liberal and conservative 
forces at work in her history. Further, it is hard to imagine that, if the country had 
averted the Revolution of 1917, its rule of law fabric today would not have been far 
stronger than that which was inherited with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
advent of Communism arrested the course of liberal reform in Russia. Before moving 
onto the theory and practice of Soviet law, it important to establish that Russia's 
failure to reform itself effectively was not for lack of liberal and progressive jurists 
within its borders. In fact, Butler believes that perestroika and the quest for the rule of 
law in the post-Soviet era had their roots in Russia's jurisprudential legacy. 44° 
2.3 Russian Legal Thought in the Golden Age 
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Historians mark the 'Golden Age' of Russian law, somewhat loosely, from 1850 until 
1900 441 Here a brief survey of some of the leading liberal Russian theorists legal will 
be attempted. It is evident that liberal forces existed among jurists and the 
intelligencia. But, it also apparent that the reformists failed to transform Russia into 
any form of law based state prior to the Bolshevik upheaval of 1917. 
There were numerous Russian legal scholars who argued in favour of a law based 
Russian state. Many were galvanised by their opposition to an autocratic form of 
government. At the same time, however, their beliefs about the role of law, the state, 
the use of power and morality differed widely. Boris Chicerin is recognised as the 
foremost legal scholar of the classical liberal type. For instance, he argued that the 
aim of the state was to define and defend civil rights and freedoms. 443 Sergei 
Muromstev contributed to the view of law as independent of the wil of the ruler. ' 
Vladimir Solov'ev's approach synthesised the need for individual freedom and 
rights, with the need for law to establish a basic level of morality. 445 
Up until the final years of the Russian Empire, there remained thinkers who 
advocated the principles of the rule of law. For example, Sergei Kotliarevskii wrote a 
major treatise on the rule of law state, in which he argued for the supremacy of jus 
over lex and the necessity for popular representation. Pavel Novgorodstev was 
critical of autocracy, while blaming juridical positivism for the "anti-legalistic" 
consciousness that pervaded Russia. "? While an advocate of natural law ideals, 
Novgorodstev was at the same time wary of the application of Enlightenment 
models to Russia-448 Finally, Bogdan Kistiakovskii was also highly critical of 
autocracy, but also aware of the imperfections in bourgeois parliamentary 
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democracies. He theorised that the ideal model, a socialist rule of law state 
(sotsialisticheskoe pravovoe gosudarstvo) would guarantee the realisation of both human 
and civil rights. 449 
Historians argue that there was a missing link between what was said in progressive 
legal theory and political rhetoric, and the actual political reality which prevailed in 
Russia in the years prior to the Revolution. While Prime Minister Stolypin declared 
that Russia should become a state based on law rather than on the whim of the ruler, 
both the Constitution of 1906 and the way that in which he governed were very 
much contrary to rule of law principles. As noted above, the Constitution neither 
made provision for the seperation of powers, nor for the supremacy of the law, nor 
for the liability of ministers and the sovereign. Instead of limiting the discretion of 
the government and serving as a springboard for a rule of law state, the 1906 
Constitution served the political necessity for reversible reforms, and thereby 
compounded disillusionment with the legal process 450 
3 Soviet Legal Theory and Practice 
3.1 The Response to Capitalism and the Assumptions of Soviet Legal Theory 
Marxist-Leninist theory is best understood in contrast to the capitalism from which it 
reviled. According to Marx, the "means of production of material life condition the 
social, political and spiritual processes of life in general. "451 Marxist-Leninist theories 
of the state, society and law can be seen to flow from this axiom. 
Marxism-Leninism is highly critical of the bourgeois concept of the law-based state 
as an independent third party that enforces exchange. Marx and Engels believed that 
the state, instead of being a neutral mediator, in fact was an "organisation of the class 
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of the 'haves' to defend itself from the class of the 'have-nots"' 452 Lenin also argued 
that, as the law and the state are rooted in the economic order, they reflect the will of 
the dominant capitalist class 4 Soviet scholars went as far as to argue that the state, 
as an instrument of force, was the most powerful weapon in the arena of class war. 
Further, Marx was scornful of the increase in the power of the courts in Europe with, 
which he associated with the rise of capitalism. 4M Consequently, the rechstaat is 
written-off as a "mirage" to conceal the rule of the bourgeoisie. 455 
Marx himself did not develop an economic theory of law. The 'commodity exchange 
theory of law' was articulated in the late 1920's by E. B. Pashukanis. His theory, 
which actually fell from favour in the 1930's under Stalin, is regarded as the Marxist 
economic theory of law. 4-56 According to Pashukanis, all law was based on 
'commodity exchange'. For instance, in a capitalist economy, buyers and sellers enter 
into contracts to define and enforce their reciprocal economic relations. 57 But, in a 
situation of common ownership and the absence of a free market, buyers and sellers 
nolonger act freely in their own distinct interest, and therefore do not require a legal 
relationship. So it was theorised that the need for commercial law would disappear 
when common ownership replaced private enterprise. Further, in a centrally planned 
command economy, the role of firms is to fulfill the Plan. Such a role, removing their 
ability to act freely in their own interest, also will, according to Pashunkanis, 
"destroy their 'legal personality"' 4 Hence legal nihilism in economic law was, 
according to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the natural parallel to the withering away of 
the state, itself the result of establishing the ideal classless society. 
Soviet political theories are also important to our analysis. While Lenin argued that 
power should be in the hands of the proletariat, he also asserted that the masses were 
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incapable of acting in their best interests. Instead, Lenin developed the notion that a 
vanguard party should propel society forward, acting in the best interests of the 
proleteriat. As a result, the interests of the leadership of the Communist Party came 
to be presented as those of society at large 459 
This role was first outlined in Lenin's own writings, and later in the Communist 
Party programme of 1919.460 Eventually the Communist Party was anointed in Article 
126 of Stalin's 1936 Constitution as the "leading core of all organisations of the 
working people, in society as well as the state. "461 This role was later given more 
prominence, by being elevated to the sixth article of in the 1977 Brezhnev 
Constitution. 161 Commentators argue that the instrumental use of law by the 
authorities came about partly from the preeminent role bestowed upon the 
Communist Party. 463 As noted, Marxism-Leninism outrightly rejected, for its 
association with bourgeoisism, the notion of a law-based state. More practically, the 
rule of law conflicted with the Leninist political structure, since the former proceeded 
from the assumption that "law enjoys primacy over the state and restricts it. "464 
Hence such a system could not exist alongside the ultimate supremacy of the 
Communist Party. 465 
Vyshinksy, a jurist whose works articulate the official Soviet line and who enjoyed 
prominence during Stalin's presidency, provides a brief theoretical justification for 
the primacy of the state over the law. To Vyshinsky, the idea of the "voluntary self- 
limitation" of the state is artificial, since the state is the source of all laws. Instead, the 
binding of state institutions to its own laws is not an expression of the 'self- 
limitation' of the state's will, but rather the very expression of the will itself. ' 
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Finally, Vyshinksy rejects the notion that the state can be obligated by laws, but 
counters that the state in fact "obligates its subjects. "467 
Legal theory did evolved significantly over the life of the Soviet Union. Developing 
on Marx's ideas, Pashukanis and his contemporaries believed that the transition to 
socialism would mark the the death of law and the state. In contrast, the leading 
Soviet legal theorist of Stalin's rule, Vyshinksy, argued that the state must in fact get 
stronger, and that law was integral to socialism. However, Stalinist law was 
associated with extra-legal persecutions and a regime of terror. The Post-Stalinist 
reaction led to greater procedural and substantive guarantees against state terror, 
and a revival of interest in the work of Soviet jurists who had been banned under 
Stalin. In the 1960's and 1970's, there was a more open debate about the definition 
and meaning of law. Also, the Soviet Union was nolonger conceived as being based 
on the dictatorship of the proletariat, but was viewed as the state of "all people". This 
state was expected to "rely less on coercion and more on persuasion", social 
organisation and democratic processes. The Soviet Union also ratified both the UN 
Covenants on human rights: International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In fact, 
these human rights principles penetrated the 1977 USSR Constitution, the fourth and 
final Constitution of the Soviet Union (the first was in 1918, followed by 1924 and 
1936). 41,8 As subsection 5.2.1 below shows, Soviet legal theory underwent great debate 
and radical development during the mid to late 1980's, which eventually led to the 
espousal of the rule of law as the basis for governance. 
3.2 Soviet Legal Practise 
While legal theory did evolve, what is more important to rule of law analysis is that 
the core qualities of a rule of law state, such as the legal confinement of state 
authority, independence of the judiciary, and the procedural regularity of the judicial 
system are apparently absent from Soviet legal practise. Indeed, the use of law by the 
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authorities did much to undermine the progress that Russian jurisprudence had 
made before the Revolution. Here we shall highlight the politicalisation of Soviet 
law, as well as its procedural and substantive characteristics. 
The instrumental use of law by the authorities was a prominent feature of the Soviet 
legal system. As noted earlier, Soviet ideology rejected constraints on the authority of 
the state. In fact, Lenin viewed the courts as organs of state power. This political 
philosophy laid the basis for the instrumentalisation of the law. 419 The new legal 
institutions were instructed to ignore laws that contravened the spirit of the 
Revolution. In fact, all references to pre-revolutionary laws were outlawed, though 
areas untouched by ideology continued to function as before 470 By defining law in 
terms of revolutionary justice, law became inherently unstable and liable to abuse. 
Later, under Stalin, a highly positivistic concept of law as the will of the sovereign, 
prevailed. Though Stalin's successors did not use law as a vehicle for coercion and 
terror in the manner that he had, law remained a one-way projection of authority. 471 
The instrumentalisation of the legal sytem included the control of the Soviet courts. 
After the Revolution, most tsarist judges were fired, while many fled 4n Judges were 
heavily dependent upon their political, bureaucratic and judicial masters 473 Above 
all, judicial selection and tenure was controlled by the Party 474 Further, judges were 
heavily penalised for not achieving performance targets. Judges also lacked financial 
security, as salaries were low and prized benefits were allocated by local politicians 
or bureaucrats. The independence of judges was heavily compromised by the fact 
that a large share of their compensation package depended upon them maintaining 
good relations, and meeting performance targets 4m 
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Given the political co-opting of legal institutions, 976 it is argued that Soviet law did 
not apply equally to citizens. Instead, its application depended on political criteria, 
such as membership of the Communist Party or connections with its officials. While 
publicly the Communist Party decreed that interference by its members in invididual 
cases was not allowed, 47 in reality judges were often instructed how to decide cases 
by Party officials 478 In fact, the so-called practise of "telephone law" was openly 
discussed among jurists and the media during glasnost 479Worse, legal institutions 
were manipulated to give the facade of law to the political persecutions that spanned 
a quarter of a century. Remarkably, the term "presumption of innocence" was only 
introduced in Soviet legislation at the very end of its life, in 1990 480 After Stalin's 
death, Khruschev reformed the courts to ensure that the purges could not happen 
again. While the risk of government terror subsided after Stalin, both in theory and 
practise, the legal system remained an instrument to further the goals of the 
regime 481 As a result, ordinary citizens viewed law as something to be avoided 
rather than relied upon. 82 
When cases did not have a political dimension , even in Stalin's reign, the courts 
operated normally. But there were no clear lines between political and non-political 
cases, and so the "specter of interference always hung over a trial. " More 
importantly, while the Party did not take an interest in most cases, the willingness of 
the courts to submit to political authority undermined the credibility of the legal 
system and public trust. Hence the Soviet system exhibited a "dual legal culture" in 
which procedural regularity was not always absent, but lacking often enough that it 
could not be relied upon. 183 
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Hendley examines the characteristics of Soviet laws and law-making. While the 
statute books themselves were quite stable, legislation was frequently amended by 
administrative regulations that went unpublished, contributing to the inaccessibility 
and instability of laws. The law also lacked coherence as rules were issued in 
response to discrete problems, with the jurisdiction of departments often 
overlapping. Further, laws were often changed to suit the requirements of the 
powerful. In fact, judges often had to reason backwards to add the 'colour of law' to 
the outcomes demanded from them. Finally, the Bolshevik mistrust of written law 
resulted in laws that were often deliberately vague. 4" 
4 Perestroika & Transition 
The legal developments of perestroika and transition occurred on the surface of the 
demise of the Soviet Union and a radical change in Russia's political-economy. Thus, 
before addressing the legal developments, it is necessary to provide an overview of 
the political-economy of the period. 
4.1 Economic Reforms under Gorbachev. Yeltsin and Putin 
By the 1980's, the Soviet Union was in clear economic decline, suffering from wide a 
range of problems, such as: low investment returns, inefficiency, poor management, 
and shortages in a wide range of consumer provisions: 485Gorbachev's response was 
tempered, apparently believing that while in need of reform, the core elements of the 
Soviet system, such as central planning and the leadership of the Communist Party, 
could be maintained. One of his first economic policies was an anti-alcohol 
campaign, designed to improve economic efficiency and reduce social expenditures. 
In 1986, private economic activity was permitted in the strictly limited form of small 
family businesses. In 1989, the Law on Leasing decentralised the economy to a 
certain extent, by increasing the rights of leaseholders. Gorbachev also recognised the 
importance of price reform. However, such a move was anticipated to provoke 
484 Hendley 1996,25-29 
485 Sakwa 1991,268 
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inflation and was therefore too politically challenging. 4 By the end of the 1980's, it 
was becoming clear that piecemeal changes were inadequate, and that the Soviet 
Union had to implement more fundamental reforms. 
The radical economic reforms needed to 'marketise' the Soviet economy occurred 
from 1991 onwards, under Yeltsin's leadership. The task of transforming the Soviet 
economy into a capitalist market economy rested on three main policy pillars: the 
liberalisation of prices; strict monetary and fiscal policy; and rapid privatisation. 
These radical reforms were undertaken in very quick succession from late 1991. 
Shock therapy, as these reforms collectively came to be called, were based on the 
IMF's advice and were often a condition placed by the Washington institution on its 
loans. Unfortunately, Russian GDP fell dramatically, by around 54% between 1990- 
1999; there was massive currency flight; and dramatic increase in the share of 
Russians living in poverty (2% in 1989,23.8% in 1998). In August 1998, heavily 
indebted, the Russian government defaulted on its international debts and devalued 
the rouble 487 
Putin succeeded Yelstin in 2000, and his presidency has benefited greatly from the 
steady increase in the price of oil. Around 20% of the state's revenues come from oil 
exports, and so according to one calculation, every $1 increase in the oil price garners 
the $1 billion in income. This income has massively improved the country's fiscal 
position, and provided with foreign currency surpluses, allowing the government to 
repay its vast foreign debts. Under Putin, Russia came to fully accept capitalism, and 
moved on to the next round of reforms. These reforms have concentrated on 
improving the investment climate, for example by reducing the burden of taxation 
and regulation, improving the legal system, and strengthening corporate 
governance 488 
486 Sakwa 1991,274-280 
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4.2 Legal System 
4.2.1 Developments in Legal Thought During Perestroika 
The ambition of establishing a 'socialist law-based state' (sotsialisticheskoe pravovoe 
gosudarstvo), was according to Butler, the most significant policy of perestroika. In 
fact, he argues that the success of all the other political and economic reforms rested 
on this policy. 489 The term 'pravovoe gosudarstvo' was actually banned during much 
of the Soviet era for its association with bourgeois thought 49OPolitical discussion of 
the rule of law did occassionally occur in the Soviet Union after Stalin, and the issue 
was even debated at the 1976 Communist Party Congress. However, it was only after 
the free debate or glasnost which Gorbachev encouraged that those within the Soviet 
Union were ably to publicly criticise the corruption, injustices and political 
subversion of the legal system without fear. This debate, among journalists, 
academics, politicians and legal professionals, developed into a movement for legal 
reform 491 For the first time since the Revolution, Soviet jurists started to associate 
themselves with the tradition of legal and political thought that went back to Locke, 
Kant and even Plato and Aristotle. 492 The debate was groundbreaking as it 
presupposed the introduction of genuine democratic principles. By 1988, a law-based 
state emerged as fundamental new dimension in Soviet political thought and a 
central tenet of perestroika. 493 
This period marked the most significant development in Soviet legal theory: the 
acknowledgement that law in the narrow sense of rules (zakon) is distinct from law in 
the broader sense of justice and right (pravo). Legal rules, as the Soviet experience 
showed, are forever subject to the whims of the legislator, while the broader concept 
was notable as it held out the promise that the Soviet Union might come to embrace 
universal human values. Indeed, human rights principles and the rule of law were 
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set out in the 1990 Draft Constitution of the Russian Federation, and were eventually 
enshrined in the 1993 Constitution. The very first Article of the Russian Constitution 
declares the country to be a rule of law state, while the most extensive chapter of the 
Constitution enumerates the rights and freedoms of man. 494 
4.2.2 The Judiciary: Reform and Present Structure 
Gorbachev was well aware of the need for legal reform. The Soviet courts were a 
priority, as their quality, professionalism and independence were all in question. In 
1989, legislation was enacted to increase the salaries and tenures of judges. The new 
law also attempted to protect judges from interference and provide redress against 
unlawful actions by public officials. In 1991, the Constitutional Court was 
established, finally elevating the judiciary, at least formally, to a branch of 
government equivalent to the executive and legislature 495 The following year, in an 
important step for judicial independence, judges were granted life tenure. The power 
and jurisdiction of the courts was also expanded during this period 4% 
Russia's present judicial structure was established by the 1993 Constitution (Articles 
118-129), in conjunction with the Federal Constitutional Law of the following year. 
Russia's Constitutional Court is composed of 19 judges. The Constitution grants it a 
broad jurisdiction, for example: it may examine the conformity to the Constitution of 
federal and regional laws and treaties; it also determines disputes concerning 
competence between State agencies; the Constitutional Court also considers appeals 
against violations of the constitutional rights of citizens, as well as the 
constitutionality of laws being applied. 497 
The arbitrazh courts, which in the Soviet era arbitrated and adjudicated disputes 
between state enterprises, today deal with economic cases. Headed by the Supreme 
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Arbitrazh Court, the courts are regulated by the 1995 Law on Arbitrazh Courts and 
2002 Code on Arbitrazh Procedure. Their jurisdiction encompasses economic 
disputes involving foreign firms and foreign investors. In 2001, the courts received 
745,626 petitions to sue; remarkably, half of these were in the domain of 
administrative disputes, such as taxation, or cases to declare the acts of state agencies 
invalid 498 
The courts of general jurisdiction which deal with civil and criminal cases have a 
separate system of trial, appellate and Supreme Court process. Article 126 of the 
Russian Constitution establishes the Supreme Court as the highest judicial body for 
civil, criminal and administrative cases. The judicial system is administered by the 
Ministry of justice, which has an important range of responsibilities, such as the 
drafting of the courts' operating procedures, the training of its personnel, and the 
harmonisation of laws across Russia's numerous republics, regions, territories, 
municipalities and other jurisdictions. The procuracy form another important 
element of the Russian judicial system. The procuracy was first established by Peter 
the Great in 1702, sidelined in the 1864 reforms, and revived under Lenin in 1922 419 
The institution is responsible for ensuring the implementation of statutes by the 
various government ministries and agencies. 
Believing that the economic development of Russia and the attraction of investment 
required a competent and reputable judicial system, President Putin has taken a 
strong interest in the judiciary. The judiciary had suffered from a perception of 
widespread corruption which did not reflect the improvements that had occurred in 
the post-Soviet period 500 Under his leadership, Russia's far reaching judicial reform 
has gained momentum. One example is in the financial support of the courts. Article 
124 of the Constitution determines that the courts should be financed exclusively 
498 Butler 2003,166-169 
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from the federal budget 501 but in practise, the courts have relied heavily on 
supplementary payments and allocations provided by local or regional 
governments. 502 In the first years of his presidency, Putin increased the federal 
budget for the courts significantly. This move was coupled with the removal of 
regional governors from the process of appointing and promoting judges, making 
the courts more independent of local politicians and businessmen 503 Putin also 
adopted new procedural codes for the civil, criminal and arbitrazh courts, and made 
efforts towards the harmonisation of laws across Russia. 504 
At the same time, however, there have also been some significant impetuses towards 
counter-reform under Putin which, if realised, would have undermined the 
fundamental principles of judicial independence. First, there were proposals 
authored by the Minister for Economic Development to replace the life tenure of 
judges with non-renewable 15 year terms. Second, in late 2002, a Parliamentary 
Committee approved proposals to make the decisions of the Constitutional Court 
non-binding on regional governments, thereby reducing the Court to an advisory 
body. The final significant assault on judicial independence came in the form of the 
proposals authored by Seregi Mironov, speaker of the Federation Council, the upper 
house of the Russian Parliament. In September 2004, his draft law was approved 
almost unanimously by the Federation Council. The proposals aimed at significantly 
increasing the influence and discretion of the President in the Judicial Qualification 
Collegia, the body responsible for the appointment, promotion and discipling of 
judges. The opposition of jurists prevented the plans from coming into action 505 
4.2.3 Legislative Developments 
In this subsection we will address some of the essential legislative developments that 
have taken place over perestroika and transition. The reader should keep in mind 
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that it is widely felt that there is a sizeable gap between the law on the books and the 
law in practise in Russia The perceptions and actual experience of foreign 
investors is examined in the next Part, as well as, of course, in the fieldwork. 
The transition to a market economy required the enactment of a panalopy of laws 
and the establishment of a range of institutions. The foundation of Russia's market 
economy, or the so-called 'constitution of the economy' is the Civil Code. The Code 
was enacted and came into force in three parts, Part One in 1994-1995, Part Two in 
1995-1996, and Part Three in 2001-2002. Part IV, on intellectual property rights, has 
been drafted and is being debated. 507 The Civil Code draws on Russia's pre- 
revolutionary civil law tradition, as well as continental civil law, Anglo-American 
law and Soviet laws. 508 
The Civil Code covers, inter alia: contracting, purchasing, leasing, banking, insurance, 
and intellectual property. The Code is wide-ranging but not comprehensive, and 
instead provides for the enactment of federal laws on particular matters. Here we 
shall demonstrate the operation of this principle in three areas of commercial law: 
incorporation, bankcruptcy and taxation. The Code regulates, in conjunction with 
Law on joint-Stock Societies, the incorporation of joint-stock companies, the most 
common organizational-legal form of business in Russia. Bankcruptcy is not 
regulated by Code, but by separate federal legislation. Since 1992, there have also 
been a series of bankcruptcy laws in Russia: in 1992,1997,1998, and most recently, 
the 2002 Law on Bankcruptcy. 509 Russia's present taxation system is similarly the 
product of a series of legislation spanning a decade. Investors can be forgiven for 
feeling that tax system in Russia lacks stability, as the 2002 reforms contained 200 
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amendments, including a celebrated reduction in corporate profit tax from 35% to 
24%. 510 
Legislative development in transitional Russia has been assisted by the World Bank 
and EBRD, although the actual impact of their lending and advice is not well 
documented. One of the aims of the World Bank's involvement in legal reform 
projects in Russia has been to improve the performance of the legal system in areas 
necessary for the proper functioning of market institutions. Part of a $58m loan in 
1996 was spent on establishing a Russian centre for coordinating legislative drafting, 
called the Commission on Legal Drafting Initiatives 511 The EBRD's role has been 
more particular. The EBRD helped in training officials in the implementation of 
capital market regulations. The organisation also held seminars with Russian 
parliamentarians to explain amendments to company and securities legislation. 512 
There have been a number of legal and administrative reforms that have affected 
foreign investment since President Putin took office in 2000. Above all, there has 
been a strong push towards centralisation of government. Although there were 
political reasons for this policy, as far as foreign investors are concerned, the move 
should help to reduce regional variability in Russia, and reign in regional 
governments, all of which can help to make the business environment more 
transparent and predictable. This strategy was implemented via the harmonisation of 
laws, the reduction in discretion allowed to the regions in tax policy and 
administration, and also the creation of seven federal districts or 'super-regions', 
each monitored by a plenipotentiary appointed by and reporting to the President 513 
Four other administrative reforms have improved the investment environment in 
Russia. The foremost is the new Tax Code. Prior to the reforms, possibly foreign 
investors' biggest complaint about Russia was the country's tax laws. There were a 
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multiplicity of different taxes, as well as a bias inherent to the tax structure which 
discouraged business activity, and thereby forced firms to do evade taxes. The new 
Tax Code, which was came into force in two parts, first in 1999 and then 2001, 
contained many welcome changes relating to VAT, excise, social taxes, personal 
income tax and corporate profit tax. Further reforms aimed at harmonising the tax 
system, reducing tax rates, and limiting the discretion of administrative agencies 
have also taken place since 514 Other reforms that have affected the business 
environment include improvements in shareholders' rights, a new customs code, and 
new foreign exchange laws, which bring Russia in line with international practise 515 
5 Foreign Investment Laws and Policies 
5.1 Perestroika and the Yelstin Presidency 
Interestingly, the cycle of economic reform in the Soviet Union actually started with 
foreign economic relations 516 Foreign investment was encouraged by Soviet 
reformers as it was viewed as a catalyst for the domestic economy. The move was 
part of a broader acceptance, as witnessed in the 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-1990), that 
the Soviet Union should aim for greater involvement in the world economy. Joint 
ventures were first made possible by three decrees spanning mid 1986 to early 1987. 
Initially, the legislation governing the operation of JVs was quite restrictive, but was 
latter relaxed, leading to an increase in registrations. "' According to one source, by 
July 1990,1830 joint ventures were signed 518 and by 1991, this figure had risen to 
over to 3000 519 Joint ventures were seen by Soviet policy-makers as way of 
transferring western technology, skills and management practices, and producing 
goods and services that were not adequately produced domestically 520 Western 
partners in joint ventures were not subject to Soviet planning instructions, nor were 
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515 OECD 2004,14. For a comprehensive review, see OECD 2004, Chapter Three. 
516 Butler 1996,424 
517 Geron 1990,43 
518 Geron 1990,39 
519 Butler 1996,14-15 
520 Geron 1990,40 
135 
they guaranteed purchases and sales. Thus the introduction of JVs symbolised the 
decentralisation of the Soviet economy, a major departure from past policy 521 
Between 1990 and 1991, a quick succession of laws enabled foreign juridical and 
natural persons to actually fully own, or invest in, Soviet legal entities. A Presidential 
Decree in 1990 was followed by the Principles of Foreign Investment Legislation in 
July 1991, and eventually the Russian Foreign Investment Laws of October 1991522 
An overview of investment policies under President Yeltsin will be presented before 
we examine current legislation. 
The Government Decrees of the mid-1990's present a glimpse of the foreign 
investment policy activity of the Yeltsin goverment. The "Decree of Government of 
the Russian Federation on Activization of Work Relating to the Attracting of Foreign 
Investments to the Economy of the Russian Federation", adopted first in September 
1994, and subsequently amended several times until November 1999, appears to be 
the blueprint for Russia's transition foreign investment policy. The Decree instructs 
numerous federal ministries and agencies to submit policy proposals within two to 
three months, and within the scope of their competencies aimed at promoting foreign 
investment. The Ministry the Economy was to lead foreign investment policy, 
working in conjunction with, inter alia, the Ministries of Foreign Economic Relations, 
Finance, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Construction, as well as the State Committees of 
Industrial Policy, Defence, Administration of State Property, Customs, Anti- 
Monopoly, and the Central Bank and other federal institutions 523 
The range of government bodies and the scope of activity mandated by the 
document show that the Yelstin administration felt that much needed to be done to 
create the conditions for the attraction of foreign investment. Above all, the Decree 
instructs the various ministries and committees to submit amendments to Russia's 
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main foreign investment legislation. Also required was a list of activities and 
territories where foreign investment would be restricted. The Government of the day 
was also concerned about the provision of information for foreign investors on 
relevant legislation, programmes and projects. Interestingly, further areas of activity 
mandated by the Decree include improvements in the system of registration of firms 
and statistical reporting. 524 
One other Government Decree, issued in January 1995, is of interest. This Decree 
establishes a "Centre for the Promoting of Foreign Investments". The Decree 
amounts to a charter for the Centre. The principal tasks of the Centre involve 
providing information and assistance to foreign investors, as well as "improving the 
image of Russia as a country accepting investments" and other marketing tasks 525 
The government texts cited on foreign investment policy have been translated by 
Professor Butler, however, he does not provide any commentary on them. Similarly, 
this author has not been able to find any information on the realisation and 
effectiveness of these initiatives, nor on the activities of any of the government 
bodies, including the Foreign Investment Promotion Centre. In any case, the foreign 
investment policies of the Yeltsin administration are not our immediate concern. 
5.2 Present Foreign Investment Laws and Policies 
5.2.1 The Law on Foreign Investments 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late December 1991, there was a swift 
succession of legislation relating to foreign investment. The aforemention 1991 
Russian Foreign Investment Laws was amended four times: in 1995,1999 and 2000 
and 2003. However, it is a separate 1999 Law on Foreign Investments, itself amended 
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in 2002,2003,2005, and 2006 that is considered most important in the eyes of 
investors 526 i 
The 1999 Law defines who may be a foreign investor. Foreign firms, citizens, states 
and international organisations are all permitted to invest in Russia. Under the 1991 
Law on Investment Activity foreign investments are defined in the same way as 
investments generally. The 1991 Law offers an economic definition oPinvestment 527 
The 1999 Law on Foreign Investments provides a more specific definition: "the 
investing of foreign capital in an objecct of entrepreneurial activity on the territory of 
the Russia Federation in the form of objects of civil rights which belong to the foreign 
investor... "518 
Writing in 2003, Butler argues that every foreign investor in Russia has, "somewhere 
in its subconsciousness the apprehension" that political powers seeking to 
renationalise state property may prevail, or that the state or its subjects may attempt 
to deprive foreign investors of ownership over their property. 529 Thus, it is significant 
that the 1999 Law provides, at least in principle, a string of guarantees to foreign 
investors. There are ten guarantees, including: guarantee of compensation in the 
event of expropriation or renationalisation; guarantee to the use of revenues and 
profits, including transfer abroad; and the guarantee to participate in privatisation 530 
The 1999 law also stipulates national treatment for foreign investment 13' 
5.2.2 International Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Russia is also party to a number of international agreements that govern or affect 
foreign investment. Russia ratified the 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Tribunal Awards in 1960. The 
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implementation of the treaty since the 1990's has been controversial. Consistent with 
Butler's assertion about foreign investors' fears, the Russian courts are perceived as 
being overly willing to interpret and apply the narrow grounds upon which foreign 
tribunal awards may be legitimately refused recognition or enforcement. The absence 
of published judicial decisions, however, makes an accurate assessment difficult. The 
country has signed the Energy Charter Treaty, which it has yet to ratify. The Treaty is 
a legal framework that seeks to regulate investment, trade and transport of energy 
resources. -131 Finally, the country is also party to the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights which can affect foreign investor's rights via Article 6, on the right to 
a fair trial. In fact, a number of cases relating to the Yukos affair, described below, are 
due to be held in the Strasbourg court 533 
A further important aspect of the Russia's foreign investment regime are the 
country's Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITS). By the end of 2004, Russia had 35 BITS 
in force, with a further 17 awaiting ratification. According to the OECD, Russia lags 
behind international good practise in the BITS. For instance, recent trends in BITS 
include provisions regarding: the entry of key personnel, the transparency of laws 
and proceedings and third party participation in dispute resolution. These provisions 
can be found in a small number of Russia's BITS, but not in its Model BTIS. 534 
5.2.3 Formal Restrictions 
While most formal restrictions on foreign investment have been lifted, many are still 
in force. Foreign investment in the following sensitive sectors can be subject to 
restrictions: aerospace, agriculture, aviation, banking, defence, insurance, natural gas, 
electric power, mass media and natural resources. Restrictions typically take the 
form of a limitation on the share of capital a foreign investor is permitted to hold, 
although in some cases, such as land acquisition and construction projects, the 
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Russian state reserves the right to block any investment 535 There is no research, to 
the author's knowledge, about the impact of these laws and whether they constitute 
effective barriers to investment, or whether loopholes in these laws exist, or whether 
senior government officials can intervene to permit foreign investment in certain 
cases. This would make an interesting case study. 
There have been recent moves towards making foreign investment restrictions more 
transparent. A new law, due to be submitted to the Russian Duma by the end of 
2006, is being drafted which will attempt to unify the restrictions within a single 
piece of legislation. The law aims to establish the principles around which foreign 
investment can be restricted, by addressing three questions: which sectors should be 
restricted? What form of control should be imposed? Who should implement the 
controls? Subsoil laws governing investment in natural resources are also being 
discussed. 516 
There is another way in which the legal climate might act as an absolute barrier to 
investment. It is arguable that the absence of a particular body of commercial 
legislation, such as intellectual property law, may render investment in Russia very 
difficult or impossible. However, a recent survey of intellectual property owners has 
shown that they are most concerned with the enforcement of existing legislation, and 
would like the Russian government to concentrate their efforts on enforcement rather 
than the drafting of new legislation. Further, of eighty firms surveyed, only 4% had 
cancelled or reduced new investments in Russia due to concerns about inadequate IP 
rights protection or enforcement 07 In any case, this research study, does not focus on 
the impact of absolute legal barriers to foreign investment or specific bodies of 
legislation. 
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5.2.4 Foreign Investor's Perspective 
Keeping in mind the extent of change that Russia has under gone in the last fifteen or 
so years, and the shortcomings of the country's judiciary and bureaucracy, it is 
unreasonable to expect that legislative and administrative reforms will take effect 
fully in the short term. For this reason, it is important to continue to assess foreign 
investors' perceptions of the investment environment. Here we shall review a 2005 
OECD survey of 102 foreign investors which examines their perceptions of foreign 
investment policy. 
The survey found that 64% of respondents believed that Russian government policy 
for attracting foreign investment was "insufficient and ineffective", although a 
similar proportion, 70%, were satisfied with the availability of relevant regulatory 
information. What may explain this divergence is the poor quality of the general 
regulatory environment. Firms complained most about visa information, land 
registration, and environmental regulations, especially in the regions. Further, 
foreign investors while generally satisfied with the role of federal authorities in 
implementing investment policy where dissatisfied with regional, local and lower 
levels of government in the same capacity. 538 
6 The Role of the State in the Economy 
6.1 Introduction 
As Professor Butler pointed out, in Russia, the political climate. and the role of the 
state in the economy have a clear impact on the perceived security of foreign 
investors' rights. At this point we therefore turn away from the formal legislative 
developments and nominal reforms that have taken place, and try to present a fuller 
and more realistic picture of how the legal system actually functions in Russia, rather 
than how it is supposed to. In order to do this, a brief introduction into the law and 
538 OECD 2006,26-27 
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politics of transition is required. Part One of this Chapter closes with an analysis of 
recent key events in the legal and business world in Russia. 
It is said that countries in transition face the tension between the need for a strong 
state to enforce law and order, and the need for constraints on state power. ̀ , 9 While a 
weak state gives rise to the "unrule" of law, a strong state can be even worse if the 
state is manipulated by narrow vested interests 540 According to political 
commentators, for a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate to emerge, the enhanced law 
enforcing capacity of the state must be coupled with 'autonomy': policy formation 
must be independent, and not hijacked by special interests 54' 
The state that President Putin inherited was lacking in both authority and autonomy. 
Yeltsin's presidency was marked by a deterioration in state capacity, an increase in 
corruption, tax evasion, and lawlessness generally. 542 The Yelstin presidency 
witnessed the archetype of state capture: the sale of hugely valuable national assets, 
especially natural resource firms, to well-connected 'oligarchs' at undervalued prices. 
Once these Yeltsin supporters had funded his re-election, they exercised enormous 
influence over the state, 543 emerging as major corrupters of the government, and 
undermining reform efforts 5" Many felt that the Russian state was close to collapse 
by the time Yelstin resigned in 1999.545 
Enhancing the capacity of the state and lawfulness was therefore an inevitable policy 
goal for President Putin. 146 Putin famously announced that establishing the 
"dictatorship of law" would be the core of his first term in officO" To this end, in 
2001, a series of judicial reforms were enacted that aimed to improve the reputation 
of the courts. Judicial reform was considered critical by policy makers for attracting 
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investors. Among the Russian public, there continues to be a widespread desire for 
a strong state and law and order. For example, in the run-up to the 2004 presidential 
elections, a nationwide poll found that the second most important domestic priority 
that respondents expected from their president of choice was "the strengthening of 
law and order". Part of President Putin's popularity is owed to his association with a 
stronger state. 549 
President Putin's main priority upon acceding to the Presidency was to strengthen 
the Presidential Administration and the central state. One of the ways in which he 
achieved this was by curbing the power of the oligarchs who, it was widely felt, had 
'captured' the Russian state. In July 2000, he held a meeting with 21 of Russia's 
tycoons. In the meeting, which "soon acquired the status of something like a 
foundational political myth" President Putin laid out the basis for business-state 
relations: he promised, it is alleged, that the illegitimate privatisations in which the 
tycoons had made their fortunes would not be revisited, on the condition that the 
businessmen refrained from politics. 5550 The political imprudence of two erstwhile 
media magnates and Putin propagandists, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, 
led to their exile; their media empires were transferred to the state 551 
The feature of Putin's recent policies and the Russian legal environment today that 
draws our attention is the role of the state in the economy. The involvement of the 
state and government officials in business life, from the Kremlin down to regional 
governors and local bureaucrats, is arguably the distinguishing feature of the 
Russian investment climate. In the subsections that follow we shall analyse, first, the 
Yukos affair, which is the most symbolic and notorious example of the state's 
involvement in the private sector, and second, the institutional features that have 
fostered the nature of this relationship. 
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6.2 The Yukos Affair 
Over the course of 2003-2004, the oil firm Yukos was issued with retrospective tax 
claims and penalties amounting to over £12 billion 552 By freezing the company's 
bank accounts and setting impossible deadlines, the courts ensured that the company 
was unable to pay its tax bill. These claims led Russia's most successful firm to the 
verge of bankruptcy and the forced auction of its most valuable asset, a major oil 
production unit. The unit, Yuganskneftegaz, was sold in a government auction to an 
unknown financial group, called the Baikal Financial Group, which was apparently 
registered at a provincial grocery shop! Matters became clearer as Baikal was 
immediately taken over by Rosneft, the state owned oil producer. In this way, the 
state became the owner of the most prized asset in the Russia oil industry 553 
The manner of the demise of the country's largest oil firm symbolises why the role of 
the state in the Russian economy might unsettle foreign investors. For a start, the 
very campaign against the firm and its owners is widely attributed to the Kremlin, 
rather than the tax authorities. The prevailing view - endorsed by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the European Council, no less - is that the assault on Yukos was a 
calculated plan by the Kremlin to eliminate political opposition from the oligarch- 
founder of Yukos, 154and to strengthen the state's control over its natural resources, 
which are central to the country's economic development and foreign policy. 555 This 
view is given credence by the fact that, at the same time as the Yukos prosecution, a 
parallel campaign was waged against Yukos' founder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who 
was tried and convicted (in June 2005) on various counts of fraud and tax evasion. 
Mr. Khodorkovsky stands out from the rest of the oligarchs, who have not been 
prosecuted for similar crimes, in so far as he was considered to be becoming too 
powerful and politically ambitious. So, his 'real crime' is that he funded various 
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55 Council of Europe 2005. 
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opposition parties in the Russian Duma to Putin's United Russia, forged relations 
with US oil firms and politicians, and used his position to sway energy policy 55 
To add to the suspicion, the chairman of Rosneft, the firm that has benefited most 
from Yukos' collapse, is a close ally of the President and a deputy head of his 
administration 557 Further, Yukos' lawyers and the Council of Europe both allege that 
there were numerous abuses of legal and administrative processes in the two cases, 
hence contravening rule of law principles and even violating Russia's human rights 
commitments! 558 A senior economic advisor to President Putin broke ranks and 
openly called the affair the "swindle of the year. "559 
The involvement of the highest authorities in Yukos as well as other big businesses in 
Russia during 2004 created a damaging level of uncertaininty. For example, a marked 
increase in capital flight and the downward revision of investment and growth 
forecasts were blamed by economists on the assault on Yukos. 510 Another tax claim 
that was also suspected to be politically motivated, 5561 against VimpelCom, Russia's 
second biggest mobile communications provider, resulted in a 10% drop in the value 
of the entire Russian stock exchange over two days. The tax claim heightened fears 
among investors of increasing political interference in business. Commenting on the 
climate at the time, a former economics minister remarked that "as long as the 
situation in the country depends on the mood of the president or his colleagues in 
the Kremlin, business has no reason to trust the future. " 562 
6.3 The Institutional Settin 
The 'mutual penetration' of the state and private sector in Russia is great, even when 
compared historically to countries such as Japan or Italy. Moreover, it occurs at 
556 Economist 2005. 
557 The Financial Times 2005. 
ras See Council of Europe 2005, and Amsterdam & Peroff 2004. 
559 The Economist 2005. 
560 The Wall Street Journal 2004. 
561 The Moscow Times 2004a, The Financial Times 2004a. 
562 The Washington Post 2005. 
Hanson & Teague 2005. 
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every level of government and business, from multinationals such as Yukos down to 
small businesses. 564 We are prompted to inquire: what is it about Russia's 
institutional environment that causes such an unusual interdependence between 
business and the state? This issue is so salient to the Russian business environment 
that interest in it is no longer confined to the business press, but has recently 
provoked scholarly interest too. 
Tomspon characterises the relationship between the state and business as "mutual 
penetration. " During Yelstin's presidency, the oligarchs 'captured' the state by 
cultivating relationships with key officials and securing the appointment of their 
representatives into posts at every level of government. Smaller businesses too had to 
maintain cordial relations with government officials. In reality, the relationship is one 
of mutual exploitation. In the words of German Gref, the Minister who has been the 
architect of Russia's economic reforms "there remain a mass of administrative 
barriers and a rather wide field for officials to make subjective decisions. As a result, 
there is the wish of officials to participate in the unlawful redistribution of company 
profits. " This discretion enables bureaucrats to intervene at all regulatory levels, 
from the granting of natural resource and telecommunications licenses that can be 
worth hundreds of millions of dollars, to everyday fire and health inspections, 
"which can shut down small businesses on the flimsiest of excuses. "w Naturally, this 
provides bureaucrats with power over the private sector plus a source of additional 
income, and in turn, businesses with an incentive to capture the state, bribe its 
officials, or at least cultivate friendly ties with them. 
Indeed, foreign investors use their connections to resolve legal, regulatory and tax 
problems. For example, the Swedish retailer IKEA, which is one of the highest profile 
foreign investors in Russia, appealed to the Minister for Trade and Development as 
well as to the governor of the Moscow region when the opening of its £150 million 
Tompson 2005b, 166-167 
The Moscow Times 2004i. 
Tomspon 2005b, 166-167 
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'mega-mall' was delayed by Moscow bureaucrats 567 The chairman of Russia's 
biggest foreign investor BP met with President Putin shortly after two unsettling 
developments for the firm: the first, a £500m tax claim on the firm's local subsidiary, 
and the second, new subsoil laws that aim to restrict firms with majority foreign 
ownership from participating in bids for strategic oil and gas fields 568 
At a general level, the state is the stronger party in this relationship, because it holds 
both the metaphorical carrots and sticks. According to Tompson and Ledeneva, 
everyone in Russia is under the threat of punishment. The reason for this lies in the 
characteristics of the institutional climate. State institutions tend to be opaque, and 
their officials arbitrary. This is exacerbated by the inconsistency and complexity of 
laws, which is a double-edged sword: it not only invites arbitrary action, but makes it 
difficult to know how to abide by the law. The regulatory, legal and taxation climate 
creates a situation, it is argued, that makes it impossible to do business in Russia 
without breaking the law 569 Reviews of the Russian investment environment 
consistently confirm the arbitrariness of law enforcement and extent of bureaucratic 
corruption. 570 Thus, according to Ledeneva, everyone is under the threat of 
punishment, and so the criteria upon which to decide who to punish becomes a 
matter of discretion rather than law 571 The Yukos case is a good example of this. 
At a countrywide level, this relationship of mutual penetration is difficult to set right. 
While state officials retain regulatory power and discretion, the private sector relies 
on their collaboration, and cannot unilaterally disengage, and try to operate 
transparently, even if it wanted to. On the state side, administrative reform is a 
massive challenge. Property rights require a state that is not only strong enough to 
secure them, but also one that is itself restrained and accountable for its actions 572 
Thus, the securing of property rights requires the state to surrender much of its 
567 The Moscow Times 2004b. 
568 BBC News Online 2005a. 
569 Ledeneva 2001,13. See also: The Moscow Times 2005, The Moscow Times 2004h 
570 See, most recently, OECD 2004,60 and FIAS 2005,10,12. 
sn Ledeneva 2001,13. 
572 Tomspon 2005b, 165 
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leverage against the private sector, and so the stream of bribes. Unfortunately, the 
mechanisms for holding the government accountable - the courts, press, civil society 
and political opposition, are weak, and in President Putin's second term, arguably 
getting weaker in comparison to the state. 573 
The legal environment that foreign investors encounter in Russia today is shaped by 
the country's consistent tradition of state involvement in the economy as well as the 
state's refusal to be bound by legal authority, a feature which dates back to the tsars. 
Thus commentators say that it is of utmost importance that the state make a credible 
commitment to abide by the law 574 Interestingly, this shows that the concept of a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate in Russia must emphasise protection from the state 
as much as it emphasises the protection of the state. This prevalence of 'might over 
right' is particularly reflected in the judiciary's lack of independence, which is 
examined along with other facets of the present day legal climate, in Part II of this 
Chapter. 
7 Summary 
Imperial Russia had a strong autocratic tradition which resisted the development of 
democratic institutions and an independent judiciary. However, elements of a 
constitutional monarchy based on the seperation of powers was beginning to emerge 
in the years leading up to the 1917 Revolution, and may have been established were 
it not for the radical changes that occurred after 1917. Marxism-Leninsim was 
ideologically and practically opposed to the rule of law and the seperation of powers. 
The late Soviet years, under Gorbachev, saw a revival of interest in the rule of law. A 
remarkable amount of positive legal development, not to mention political and 
economic reform, occurred in the transition period, during the presidencies of Boris 
Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. However, much still remains to be done. Finally, the 
course of events in the last few years have made commentators question the 
573 Tompson 2005b, 164-165. 
574 Frye 2002,125. 
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commitment of the Putin administration to an accountable, transparent, rule of law 
state. 
PART TWO: Assessing the Present Day Legal Climate 
8 Introduction 
In this Section, more recent assessments of the Russian legal climate are presented. 
The Section mainly relates the opinions of foreign investors and foreign 
commentators, but the perspectives of Russian firms and commentators are also 
included. Existing research is supplemented by an analysis of Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), a joint effort of the World Bank and 
EBRD. 
The BEEPS is a comprehensive investment climate survey conducted on behalf of the 
World Bank and EBRD to firms in the transition region. The BEEPS is a multiple 
choice questionnaire, composed of around 200 individual questions; the survey was 
first conducted in 1999, then in 2002, and most recently in 2005 575 The study is 
extensive: BEEPS I surveyed over 4,000 firms in 22 countries of Eastern Europe, the 
former Soviet Union, and Turkey, while BEEPS II was applied to 6,000 firms in 28 
countries in the same region 576 The responses to the questions, along with interactive 
tools for analysing them are made available on the World Bank's website. 5n The 
Bank's efforts in making this data accessible to the public, and the tools they have 
provided to enable researchers to analyse the data with ease, must be lauded. 
575 Although the BEEPS III was conducted in 2005, detailed results were not available at the 
time of writing. 
576 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, FR Yugoslavia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgizstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, The 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan (discontinued), Turkey, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan. 
577 The dataset and related publications can be found within the World Bank's 'Governance 
& Anti-Corruption' website, at 
http. //info. worldbank. org/governancelbeeps2002/ 
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The purpose of the BEEPS survey is to generate measures of the quality of 
governance and the investment climate. As with most of the World Bank's measures, 
the BEEPS is based on private sector perceptions 5Th The research is an ongoing World 
Bank project, and part of a myriad of the Bank's data tools aimed at generating 
comparative measures of the quality of governance and the investment climate 
across the world. The scale and comprehensiveness of the BEEPS is its main 
advantage. The survey includes 82 foreign investors in Russia alone. It analyses the 
legal climate in some detail as well - it poses over forty questions relating to the legal 
system. Needless to say, it is not feasible for a single researcher to conduct a study on 
such a scale in Russia. 
Though the BEEPS does not provide answers for the main research agenda of this 
study, it does provide a excellent background to foreign investors' perceptions of 
Russia's legal climate. For this reason, it serves as a valuable introduction to the 
issues discussed in greater depth in the field interviews. For example, the BEEPS 
identifies specific problems in Russia's legal and regulatory environment while the 
interviews explain how investors respond to these challenges. The data analysis is 
available on file with the author. 
It can be said that Russia is not one country, but 89 regions. It is very difficult to 
generalise about the legal system of a country that spans eleven time zones, from 
Finland to japan. Whether it is for reasons of geographical diversity, the rate of legal 
and regulatory change or the sheer complexity of the legal environment, assessments 
of Russia's legal climate are mixed. One commentator provides a welcome note of 
caution: 
"There is a serious danger that contemporary concepts of Russia will be grossly 
distorted under the impact of several simplified stereotypes prevailing in the minds 
of scholars studying the Russian state and its law. These stereotypes include, above 
all, the belief that violations of the law are universally widespread and the machinery 
578 World Bank Institute internet site, page on'Govemance Data' visited on 14/8/05. 
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of state is totally corrupt. The actual state of affairs is more complicated; yes, both 
violations of the law and corruption coexist simultaneously in contemporary Russia. 
But these are not the phenomena that determine the legal background and ambience 
of the country. In truth, what determines the character of contemporary Russia, in this 
regard, cannot be clearly defined and may be distinguished from lawlessness and corruption at 
an empirical level only with great difficulty. "579 [Emphasis added]. 
Keeping in mind then the inherent difficulty of accurately measuring the quality of 
legal systems -a point which has also been addressed elsewhere in this study, 580 we 
proceed to analyse perceptions of the Russian legal climate. The following sub- 
sections present assessments of 'laws and legal stability', 'courts and law 
enforcement', 'bureaucrats and bureaucracy' and 'corruption' in turn. While the 
division is necessary to provide structure, the reader will appreciate that these are 
very much interconnected issues. 
8.1 Laws and Legal Stability 
First, the scope and quality of business laws. In 2001, the OECD judged that 
commercial legal rules in Russia were "sufficiently clear, coherent and operational to 
support business activity in general. "541 Despite some legislative gaps, the right laws 
are apparently in place. 582 Gaps in legislation exist in the sphere of corporate 
governance, including shareholder rights and labour rights 583 Intellectual property 
legislation is also due to be amended 51' Perhaps due to inconsistency in the 
interpretation of laws and regulations, some commentators claim that laws are 
conflicting, overlapping and changing .m Accordingly, a commercial report on 
Russia's investment climate argued that harmonisation of laws with legal practices 
would particularly benefit foreign investors. 586 
579 Pastukhov 2002,1. 
580 Chapter Three, subsection 1.1.1. 
581 OECD 2001,7. 
582 Schaffer et al. 2004,8, EBC 2002, Hertzfeld 2000. 
593 OECD 2002b. 
584 Novosti 2005. 
585 US Department of Commerce 2001; OECD 2002,33. 
EIU 2003. 
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Evidence from foreign investors themselves shows that they perceive that Russia 
lacks legal and regulatory stability. For example, one survey of European investors 
identified the "inadequate and ever changing" tax laws as the biggest obstacle faced 
by respondents 187 In another survey of European investors, by the European 
Business Club in Russia (EBC), legal instability was ranked as the fifth of ten 
obstacles to business 188 In the same study, foreign investors complained about the 
complexity of the legal system and legislation, as well as about the lack of 
information about changes in government policy. -', 19 The 2002 World Bank 'Business 
Environment Snapshot' shows that only 25% of foreign investors agree that 
government officials' interpretations of regulations are consistent and predicable. 
Most recently, an 2005 OECD survey of 102 foreign investors, found that half the, 
sample felt that legal and regulatory changes as well as delays in licensing and 
registration were a 'medium to severe problem'. The survey also found that lack of 
predictability of the customs rules and regulations was more aggravating to foreign 
investors than the extent of corruption. 59° 
Foreign Investor Perspective from the BEEPS 
Only 16% of foreign investors in the BEEPS study felt that government officials' 
interpretations of laws and regulations were consistent and predictable. While there 
is a widespread perception among foreign investors that Russia lacks legal stability, 
there is not a similarly widespread view about its impact. For instance, the BEEPS 
asks: "How likely do you think it is that an unforeseen change in laws or regulations will 
occur in 2003 and have a significant impact on your business? " Only a slight majority, 
54%, felt it was at all likely. 
587 Ahrend 2000. 
5m EBC 2003,31. 
EBC 2003,21. 
5 OECD 2006,26-27 
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8.2 Courts and Law Enforcement 
A review of judicial reform in Russia argued that the main obstacle to a Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate in Russia was the susceptibility of the courts to outside influence 
- the prevalence of "might over right" 591 A chorus of commentators agree that judges 
are neither independent within the judicial hierarchy, nor isolated from influence 
from other branches of government 592 Experts claim that it is hard to obtain 
independent dispute resolution, and that the courts are subject to political 
pressure 593 Recent judicial reforms, such as removing regional governors from the 
appointment and promotion process and reducing the courts' reliance on regional 
and private funds, demonstrates that policy makers accept the need for greater 
judicial independence. 594 
The impact of 'might over right' is manifest in private sector disaffection with the 
judicial system. In a study on perceptions of the courts, 66% of local respondents to 
the question "based on your experience and the experience of your colleagues, do you think 
that pressure is put on the decisions of the arbitration court in your region? " said that they 
did think that pressure was applied to courts, especially by governors, politicians, 
government officials and influential business people 595 As a consequence, the public 
are to some extent alienated from the courts: in another survey, 79% of respondents 
agreed with the statement "many people do not resort to the courts because they do not 
expect to find justice there. "591Other studies have also found that local businesses use 
the courts much less than they need to 597 Echoing the point made earlier about 
public cynicism towards authority, it is suggested that Russians avoid the courts 
591 Holmes 2002,91. 
592 For example, Krasnov 2002,94; Berglof et al. 2003,83-86; S&P 2004,2. 
593 US Department of Commerce 2001. 
Solomon 2002,122. 
595 Frye 2002,128. 
5% Frye 2002,94. 
597 Frye & Schleifer 1997 find that 45% of shopkeepers surveyed in Moscow said they 
needed to, but did not use the courts in last two years, compared to 10% in Warsaw. 
Similarly, Frye & Zhuravskaya 2000,494 find that 49% of surveyed in Moscow said they 
needed to, but did not use the courts in last two years, as opposed to 20% in Smolensk. 
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because Russians they are unwilling to expose themselves and especially their 
financial affairs to the legal system and the 'predatory' state. 598 
An issue that relates to the partiality of the courts is that firms feel more confident in 
disputes with private firms than they do in disputes with government bodies. Frye 
finds that 38% of businesses surveyed felt that a court could ensure compliance if a 
decision goes against the local/regional government, while 84% felt confident in 
compliance against a business partner 599 Similarly a Moscow think-tank found that, 
in contesting the actions of government officials only 6% initiate court proceedings, 
while 13% initiate administrative appeal, 25% use personal connections and 23% use 
gifts. 600 
There is a widespread belief, among Russians and the foreign investment 
community, that the enforcement of laws is currently of greater concern than their 
actual content 601 Observers point out that laws are not applied uniformly by the 
judiciary, but in an arbitrary and inconsistent manner. 602 As a result contracts can be 
hard to verify and enforce Moreover, even if one does obtain a favourable court 
decision, it if often hard to execute, and is likely to require payment of a bribe. 605 A 
combination of factors conspire to render the courts ineffective: delays, weak 
enforcement mechanisms (such as bailiffs), inadequate funding and remuneration, 
unfamiliarity with new and often poorly drafted legislation, 606 as well as the 
corruption and partiality that has already been mentioned. Judicial reforms have 
addressed some of these constraints, notably, funding and incentives for judges and 
598 Hay & Schleifer 1998,398. 
599 Frye 2002. 
600 Reported in Berglof et al. 2003,85. 
601 Schaffer et al. 2004,8; EBRD 2002a; EBC 2002; OECD 2002b, 33; Hertzfeld 2000. 
602 Doyle 2003; Economist Intelligence Unit 2003; OECD 2001,5-6 and 16-17; Levin & 
Satarov 2000,6-7. 
603 OECD 2004,60 
OECD 2001,16; US Department of Commerce 2001. 
605 OECD 2004,60 
606 Berglof et al. 2003,72,80-84; OECD 2001,16-17; Levin & Satarov 2000,6-7. 
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bailiffs 607 In the 2005 OECD survey cited earlier, foreign investors complained in 
particular about the perceived lack of uniformity and impartiality of the courts, and 
more so, their perceived slowness and ineffectiveness. 608 
Foreign Investor Perspective from the BEEPS 
Table 1, below, presents the BEEPS' findings about the quality of the judiciary. The 
six multiple choice response options have been divided into three 'negative' 
responses and three 'positive' ones. 609 As the predominance of the dark over light 
areas illustrate, the perceptions are overwhelmingly negative. 
Table 1: Foreign Investors Perceptions of the Russian Courts: 












Feature of the Courts 
Source: World Bank, Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
607 Berglof et at. 2003,88-96; Solomon 2002 119-121. 
608 OECD 2006,26-27 
For example, on the questions about whether the courts were fair/impartial, 
honest/uncorrupt, quick, affordable, and whether the respondents had confidence in 
them, the responses 'never' or 'seldom' were classified as negative, while the responses, 
'sometimes', 'frequently' and 'usually' were classified as positive. On the question of 
whether the courts were an obstacle to business, the responses 'no' and 'minor' were 
classified as positive, while the responses 'moderate' and 'major' obstacles were 
classified as negative responses. 
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Fair & Honest & Quick Affordable Enforce Confidence in Obstacle to 
Impartial Uncorrupt decisions protecting business 
rights 
It is interesting that, despite the negative assessments of the courts, 73% of foreign 
investors perceive the judiciary to pose either 'no obstacle' or only a 'minor obstacle' 
to their business growth. This is shown by the last bar on the right. This suggests that 
the courts are not of great importance to foreign investors. 
8.3 Bureaucrats and Bureaucracy 
Bureaucratic discretion and interference is a definitive characteristic of Russia's 
regulatory and legal climate. The Russian civil service numbers one and a quarter 
million, which is greater in number than the Soviet Union's bureaucracy, despite the 
abandonment of command economy and the latter's larger population. 610 
Bureaucratic interference is propped up by the sheer weight of regulations in Russia. 
As an indication of the scale of regulations, before recent reforms were enacted, over 
business 500 activities required licensing 611 This vast bureaucracy has broad 
discretionary powers and limited accountability. 612 The regulatory climate has been 
labelled - by academics - as a "monstrosity"613 and the cause of a "serious illness" to 
the economy. 614 The bureaucratic environment there can be antithetical to the ideal 
of a 'level playing field', in which regulations are applied in a transparent and non- 
discriminatory manner, and thereby provide investors with certainty about their 
legal standing. 
The administrative reforms which are a pivotal part of President Putin's current 
policies bear witness to the problem of excessive bureaucracy and bureaucratic 
discretion. In 2001-2002, measures were taken to streamline regulations, curtail 
discretion and increase accountability. 615 They had mixed results. For example, 
limitations were placed on the number of business inspections permitted, such as, tax 
administration, fire and police. The new law resulted in an initial drop in official 
610 EBRD 2004,14. 
611 Berglof et at 2003,103. 
612 Berglof et al. 2003,98. The findings of fieldwork for this study, presented in Chapter 5, 
make the same point. 
613 Berglof et al. 2003,97. 
614 Pastukhov 2002,7. 
615 Berglof et al. 2003,102-104. 
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inspections, however, its impact was undermined by an increase in inspections 
without warrants, as well as an increase in fines and bribes 616 Similarly, reform of 
licensing reduced both the number of activities requiring licenses and their fee, and 
extended the term of licenses. However, again, a study measuring the impact of the 
reforms found mixed results: while the process did in fact become streamlined, with 
fewer firms having to apply for licenses, the money and time costs of applications 
also increased over the period 2002-2004.617 
Numerous observers draw attention to the arbitrariness and intrusiveness of 
bureaucracy as a problem for investors. 618 According to a leading business 
association, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, "foreign companies 
are getting lost in our administrative tangle as they do not know whom to apply to, how to 
ensure the adoption of a desired decision, (according to) which rules to play. "619 Not only is 
bureaucratic discretion a cause of uncertainty for businesses, but excessive and 
complex regulations also fuel corruption 620 In the EBC study cited earlier, 
bureaucracy was the second biggest obstacle of ten to current foreign investors 621 
Foreign Investor Perspective from the BEEPS 
The BEEPS measures the regulatory burden: it shows that the requirements of 
regulations occupies 10% of senior management time. Table 2 compares the extent to 
which different aspects of the regulatory environment are felt to be obstacles to 
foreign investors' businesses. The chart shows that tax administration and 
regulatory and economic policy uncertainty and customs/trade regulations are the 
issues that have the most notable effect on the majority of foreign investors. In fact, 
616 CEFIR 2005,6 
617 CEFIR 2005,7 
618 Doyle 2003, EBC 2003,31; EIU 2003; OECD 2001,5-6. 
619 Quoted in OECD 2004,61 
620 Berglof et al. 2003,99-102; Black & Tarassova 2002,13; see also, Hessel & Murphy 2002, 
who chart a positive linear relationship between the increases in government discretion 
and corruption, and also demonstrate that both phenomena feature strongly in Russia. 
For an insightful account of how bureaucracy affects everyday lives in Russia, see 
Pastukhov 2002. 
621 EBC 2003,31. 
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regulatory and economic policy uncertainty and tax administration rank as the top 
two of twenty one obstacles to business assessed in the BEEPS, overshadowing 
factors such as the courts (13th) and corruption (14th). 
Table 2: Foreign Investors' Perceptions of Regulatory Obstacles 











Source: World Bank, Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
8.4 Corruption 
Commercial studies have labelled corruption in Russia as "endemic"622 and 
"rampant"623. According to the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, its 
impact on small and medium size businesses is "devastating. "624 A Russian research 
which organisation which has tried to measure corruption estimates that businesses 
paid an astonishing $316bn in bribes during 2005, which if correct, amounts to almost 
half of the World Bank's estimate for that country's entire income for the year. 625 
Multilateral institutions such as the EBRD and OECD agree that corruption there is 
622 A. T. Kearney 2003,21. 
623 McKinsey 1999,3. 
624 The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, quoted in OECD 2004,61 
625 Indem 2005. World Bank Internet Site: Data & Statistics, Russian Federation. 
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Tax admin. Econ. & regul. Customs & trade Business Labour regul. 
policy uncertainty reg. licensing & 
permits 
Legal Obstacles to Business Growth 
pervasive 626 In 2004, according to Transparency International, the corruption 
watchdog, Russia was the joint 90th most corrupt country out of 146 worldwide; the 
following year it had fallen to the 126th. 627 However, echoing the cautionary note at 
the beginning of this Section, it has been said that studies based on the opinions of 
foreign experts often find Russia to be more corrupt than surveys of actual business 
people in the country 628 
Foreign Investor Perspective from the BEEPS 
The BEEPS examines the extent and impact of corruption quite comprehensively. In 
Table 3, below, the extent of corruption in different legal spheres is compared. The 
figures represent the percentage of foreign investors that reported any degree of 
bribery in the spheres in question. So, the percentages represent the proportion of 
investors who indicated that they "seldom", "sometimes", "frequently" or "usually" 
made "additional payments", as opposed to those who claimed that they "never" 
paid bribes. Figure 3 shows that bribery is most frequently paid to deal with taxes 
and tax collection, customs and imports, and to obtain business licences and permits. 
626 Schaffer 2004,9 analysing World Bank data; EBRD 2004,14; OECD 2001,5-6. 
627 Transparency International 2004 and 2005 
628 Schleifer 2004,23. 
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Courts Environmental Health & Fire & Building Licenses & Customs & Tax Officials 
Inspections Safety Inspections Permits Imports 
Inspections 
Legal & Regulatory Sphere 
Source: World Bank, Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
A further point, not illustrated by the diagram, is notable. On average, 32% of foreign 
investors paid bribes across these spheres. However, these questions under-represent 
the degree of corruption, as, when asked the general question of whether the firm 
"pays additional payments to get things done? ", 73% of foreign investors indicated 
some degree of corruption 629 
Despite the pervasiveness of corruption, 49% of foreign investors in the BEEPS cite 
corruption as 'no obstacle' to their business, and a further 25% as a 'minor obstacle'. 
The reason for this might be that corruption serves to a degree to alleviate the 
onerous tax and regulatory burden in Russia. In fact, corruption ranks as the 14th 
greatest obstacle to business, while tax administration and regulatory and economic 
policy uncertainty rank first and second, respectively. Similarly, it has been said that 
as a result of the red tape in Russia, "in an overwhelming majority of cases, it is necessary 
to pay [bribes] not to obtain something contrary to the law, but in order to defend one's 
629 It is possible, but unlikely, that the authors of the BEEPS questionnaire have omitted a 
sphere which is particularly corrupt. 
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lawful interests. "'0 Hellman et al. offer another explanation. Commenting on the 
BEEPS evidence, they argue that foreign investors "undertake forms of corruption 
that are suited to their comparative advantages" and that this generates "substantial 
gains" for them 631 Another possible reason why corruption is not as great an obstacle 
as one might have believed it to be is that it is also avoidable: only 15% of foreign 
investors reported that they can never avoid paying a bribe when a government 
agent acts against the rules. 
9 Summary 
Part 2 provided an assessment of Russia's legal climate from 2000-2006, based on a 
range of academic studies, professional opinions and wide scale surveys of domestic 
and foreign firms operating in Russia. The breadth and depth of the studies offer the 
best assurance that the assessments are as accurate as possible. The BEEPS provides 
an incisive account of foreign investors' perceptions the Russian legal environment. 
Table 4 below shows that the most significant obstacles within the investment 
climate of the twenty-one covered by the BEEPS, exist in the tax and regulatory 
spheres. Notably, though the Dominant Theory emphasises the quality of the courts 
and extensiveness of corruption, as far as investors are concerned, the regulatory 
environment is much more of a problem. 
6O Pastukhov 2002,3. 
631 Hellman et al. 2002,21. 
161 
Table 4: Constraints on Foreign Investors' Business Growth 
1 Tax administration 
2 Economic and regulatory policy uncertainty 
3 Tax rates 
4 Macroeconomic instability 
5 Customs and trade regulations 
6 Contract violations by customers & suppliers 
8 Business licensing and operating permits 
13 Functioning of the judiciary 
14 1 Corruption 
Source: World Bank, Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
A particularly interesting aspect of the BEEPS' findings is that there is a marked 
discrepancy between how poorly foreign investors describe features of Russia's legal 
climate versus how significant investors feel the impact of these same features to be. 
The features of the legal climate are generally described as very poor. This would 
lead us to expect that their detrimental impact would be particularly significant. 
Surprisingly, however, as the next paragraph shows, the perceived impact of the 
these features is not in fact so bad. 
For instance, while laws and regulations were overwhelmingly perceived to be 
interpreted inconsistently, only a slight majority of foreign investors felt that this 
would impact their firm in the following year. Next, despite the fact that over 80% of 
foreign investors held negative views about the honesty of the courts, 73% felt the 
courts were either no obstacle or a minor obstacle to their business. This suggests that 
the courts are of limited relevance to foreign investors. Similarly, while 59 of the 76 
respondents admitted to paying bribes, with greater or less frequency, almost the 
same number, 58, felt it was either no obstacle or only a minor obstacle to their 
business. 
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Part II reveals three interesting and important points. First, it shows that foreign 
investors are more concerned about the impact of the regulatory environment and 
government administration than they are about the quality of the courts, and 
corruption per se. This is notable because the Dominant Theory stresses the latter 
points. Second, the Dominant Theory assumes that a legal climate that is perceived as 
poor is both very damaging to investors, and therefore also an investment deterrent. 
However, the points observed in the preceding paragraph suggest that the Russian 
legal climate, despite its flaws, does not have as great an impact on foreign investors 
as we might assume. This is because, as Chapter Four explained, a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate is not the only way of securing efficiency and predictability. The final 
point is that these surveys typically tell just half the story - they do not explain how 
foreign investors respond to the legal climate. 
To conclude, further, in depth, research is required in order to fully appreciate how 
the Russian legal climate affects foreign investors, in particular: by clarifying how 
foreign investors' characteristics affect their perceptions; by identifying which 
aspects of the legal climate are more or less challenging; and finally, by 
understanding what strategies foreign investors use to navigate the Russian legal 
climate. 
The next Chapter looks at the role of law in Russia from another perspective: by 
examining the prescription of the Dominant Theory, that is, the question of 
establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. 
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Chapter Six 




The Dominant Theory argues that to attract foreign investment into Russia, a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate needs to be firmly established first 63z Crucially, 
despite giving this prescription, the advocates of the Dominant Theory never 
seriously take into consideration the prospects of establishing a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate in Russia. In fact, the literature on the determinants of foreign 
investment, and declarations of the Dominant Theory are notably divorced from the 
extensive literature on transition legal and judicial reform, especially the more critical 
commentary. This research study seeks to integrate these two bodies of literature. 
This dichotomy between the two spheres would not have been problematic if a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate were a commodity that could quickly and easily be 
acquired and put in place. Unfortunately, it is not, and we should not take for 
granted our ability to establish a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate in Russia in the 
near future. In fact, this Chapter argues that establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate in Russia is an immense and complex, long term endeavour. The Dominant 
Theory's credibility and value is undermined in so far as its solution to attracting 
foreign investors in Russia has proved so elusive and will remain so for the 
foreseeable future. 
Before proceeding it is important to underscore the links between the Dominant 
Theory, on foreign investment, and what can be referred to as the "rule of law 
orthodoxy", on legal reform. As Chapter Two demonstrated, the Dominant Theory 
derives from traditional law and economics. This classical approach holds that the 
legal system is important in determining economic behaviour and development; the 
theory that law is a determinant of foreign investment,. is therefore a derivative of 
this more universal view. With the aim of spurring economic development, this 
universal view has inspired legal and judicial reform in developing countries; this is 
6n World Bank 1999,1-2. 
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what Upham labels as the "rule of law orthodoxy". 6m This approach, stemming from 
the same school of thought as the Dominant Theory, shares a range of similarities, 
which shall be expanded upon later. 
The point to note here is that the focus of this Chapter has broadened from foreign 
investment determination, to consider the establishment of the conditions allegedly 
needed to attract foreign investment, the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. With this 
change in focus comes a change in terminology. Instead of the Dominant Theory, this 
Chapter examines its counterpart in the sphere of legal reform, the so-called 'rule of 
law orthodoxy'. The rule of law orthodoxy is the name given to the legal reform 
approach that has dominated the transition period. This approach hinges on the 
importance of pristine formal legal systems for economic development, believing in 
the instrumental ability of legal reform to affect a change in behaviour. Aspects of the 
rule of law orthodoxy will become clearer as we proceed. Finally, instead of using the 
term the Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, which was coined exclusively for foreign 
investment, we shall refer to the broader and more common term, the rule of law. 
A great deal of effort and money has been devoted to developing the rule of law in 
the transition region. In fact, the keen interest that multilateral institutions and 
western development agencies took in the legal development process is a defining 
feature of the transition era 6m The scale of the World Bank's involvement alone in 
legal reform within the region is astonishing. By 2001, almost all of the 549 World 
Bank operations in the region involved some element of legal reform, such as the 
change of laws, promulgation of new laws, legal education and so on 635 In the 
region, between 1990 and 2001, the World Bank lent some $10.8bn for projects which 
included some aspect of legal and judicial reform. Until recently, the largest loan 
633 Upham 2002. 
Hendley 2004,607. 
635 Gupta et al. 2002,2. 
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dedicated to legal reform was given to Russia, for $58m in 1996 636 In 2005 this was 
surpassed by a $100m World Bank loan to Russia for civil service reform 637 
Despite over a decade of legal reforms, the rule of law has not yet been established in 
Russia. Moreover, the economic disappointments of transition - for instance, the fact 
that Russia's economy a decade into transition was over 35% smaller than it was 
when the Soviet Union collapsed631 - are blamed on the failure to establish supportive 
institutions. According to some, the legal system is the foremost of the institutions 
required for transition, 639 and consequently the lack of a supportive legal structure 
has been labelled the "Achilles' Heel" of transition. "° This Chapter now attempts to 
demonstrate the difficulty of the establishing the rule of law in Russia. 
2A Framework for Analysing Legal Reforms 
Thomas Carothers provides a useful framework for understanding the challenge of 
legal reform in Russia. Here we shall use the term 'rule of law reform' to refer to the 
overall process, of which 'legal reform' is one element. Carothers divides rule of law 
reform according to its depth. 'Type One' reforms relate to changes in the laws 
themselves. This typically involves the drafting of new legislation, especially in the 
economic domain, such as new bankruptcy, corporate governance and taxation laws. 
'Type Two' reforms involve strengthening law-related institutions, such as the 
courts, local government, and law enforcers. The aim is to make them more 
competent, efficient and accountable. Typical policies include increasing the salaries 
of judges and court officials, judicial training and legal education. 'Type Three' 
reforms involve increasing the government's own compliance with the law. Here, 
government officials must "give up the habit of placing themselves above the law. " 
6M Gupta et al. 2002,4. 
637 Known as the Cadastre Development Project (ID P078420). See World Bank's Russia 
internet site. 
6M Svejnar 2001, Figure 1,39. Unfortunately a single source of data for Russia and the 
wider region spanning from the beginning of transition until 2005 was not found. 
639 Raiser et al. 2000,18. 
640 Svejnar 2001,8. 
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Achieving genuine judicial independence is essential to this. While the measures 
above can encourage this, according to Carothers, the key to Type Three reforms lies 
in the political domain. The success of such reforms depends less on technical and 
institutional measures than on "enlightened leadership and sweeping changes in the 
values and attitudes of those in power. ""1 
Carothers' framework is valuable because it provides clarity in understanding the 
multilayered and multifaceted question of establishing the rule of law. He shows that 
bringing about the rule of law not only requires legislative change, but also 
improvements in the effectiveness of law-related institutions, and ultimately, more 
profound change in the political environment. Legal reform is difficult because the 
success of Type One reform depends on Type Two reforms, while the success of 
Type Two reforms in turn depends on their compatibility with Type Three trends. 
Thus, while technical changes can go so far, their success and the establishment of 
the rule of law ultimately depends on much deeper change. His framework suggests 
that establishing the rule of law is a difficult long term endeavour. Russia verifies 
this hypothesis. Finally, Carothers' approach, if not his exact typology, is supported 
to by other commentators. For example, Faundez's notion of 'institutional 
development' combines Type Two and Three reforms. He also argues that the 
success of legislative reform depends on institutional development . 642 
Rule of law reform being a complex and incremental process, reforms of different 
Types do affect one another. The processes of lawmaking and institutional building 
cannot be easily distinguished While Carothers' framework provides clarity by 
dividing the issues, it is important to be aware that reforms of different types are 
interwoven, a point which Carothers himself notes 64`' For instance, reducing 
regulations, which involves rule changes (Type One), can in principle serve to reduce 
opportunities for bribery, thereby improving law enforcement institutions (Type 
641 Carothers 1998,97-98. 
642 Faundez 2000, Section 5. 
643 Faundez 2000, Section 5. 
6" Carothers 1998,98. 
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Two). In any case, it is not the purpose of this Chapter to provide a comprehensive 
framework for understanding rule of law reform. Instead the point is to argue that 
while the Dominant Theory takes the establishment of the rule of law in Russia for 
granted, in fact, it is a very difficult and long term endeavour. The next Section uses 
Carothers' typology as an aide to presenting this argument. 
3 The Challenge of Legislative Change 
3.1 The Implementation Gap 
This sub section demonstrates that the difficulties of transition legal reform have 
largely been associated with the inability of states to properly implement and enforce 
the new laws they have enacted. A review published by the EBRD concludes that an 
overemphasis on legal content over context accounts for the disappointing effects of 
transplantation in transition countries M5 It is now widely acknowledged that an 
effective legal system cannot simply be imported "6 Establishing the rule of law in 
transition countries has been difficult as legislative reforms only have a limited effect 
if they are not supported by strong law-related institutions. 
Research shows that legislative change is an insufficient condition for bringing about 
effective change in legal practices. For example, Pistor et al. found that even "radical" 
and "impressive" improvements in the legal framework for the protection of 
shareholder and creditor rights in transition countries were insufficient to help newly 
privatised businesses draw in much needed financing. This was because legal 
protection formally afforded in the statute books was not correlated with how 
effective these laws were perceived to be "7 This is what is often referred to in the 
645 Walsh 2000,7. 
See EBRD 2002a, 7; World Bank 1995,10; Berkowitz et at. 2000; Pistor et al. 2000,21; 
Black & Tarassova 2002,36. 
647 Pistor et al. 2000,14. 
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literature as an 'implementation gap. ' Research has also identified implementation 
gaps in intellectual property and insolvency regimes "' 
As an indication of the difficulty of legal reform, it is remarkable that a decade of 
transition legal reform was required before the implementation gap received 
attention: as late as 2002, the EBRD admits that legal reformers had "only recently 
begun" to emphasize implementation. "9 In fact, the effectiveness of legal reform 
projects was often overlooked in the World Bank's internal evaluation reports 650 This 
dichotomy between changes in laws and changes in actual practices is currently one 
of the most pressing issues in legal reform, and was a central theme of the EBRD's 
review of the transition decade, 65' and continues to feature in the EBRD's literature 02 
A recent review of transition legal reform demonstrated that the extensiveness of 
laws outstripped their effectiveness across the entire region, and further, that this 
implementation gap actually increased between 1999-2002.653 
Remarkably, both the law reform movement of the 1960's and the contemporary one 
first focused on legislative change and later realised that legislative changes were 
being nullified by institutional weaknesses. For example, in their classic 1974 Scholars 
in Self-Estrangement article, Trubek and Galanter argue that: 
"Where it becomes apparent that immediate rule changes will not affect social 
behaviour, attention shifts to the institutional changes that will be needed to 
guarantee this will occur. Thus when the literature discusses problems of 
'penetration' and legal 'effectiveness' its concern is to narrow the gap between law in 
action and law in the books: ' 
6U Economist Intelligence Unit 2003 and Ramasastry et al. 2000,36-39, respectively. 
649 EBRD 2002a, 8. 
6W Gupta et al. 2002,11-12. 
651 EBRD, Law in Transition Autumn 2002,15. 
652 For example, Law in Transition Online 2004. 
6M Anderson et al. 2005,25-25 
654 Galanter & Trubek 1974,1079. 
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Note the similarity to the EBRD's review of a decade of legal reform, almost thirty 
years later: 
"The EBRD's early legal surveys and research revealed that the orthodox approach to 
legal reform, where laws are developed first and implementing institutions 
strengthened second, needed to be reconfigured, with greater and earlier attention 
given to implementation and institution building. This revised sequencing of legal 
reform assistance continues to be supported by the results of the Bank's annual Legal 
Indicator Survey. Since 1997 the EBRD Survey has revealed a troublingly consistent 
'implementation gap' between the extent of new commercial and financial laws and 
their effective application. "655 
Someone should pose the pressing question of why such evident lessons were not 
heeded before the World Bank and other agencies committed such great resources to 
a flawed model of legal reform. In fact, some commentators did caution about 
transplantation led legal reforms. ' The point to draw attention to here is that two 
decades of legal reform activity drew the same frustrated conclusion: that changing 
the rules does not amount to changing practices. This clearly suggests that legal 
reform is a difficult enterprise. 
Because of the importance of implementation, Faundez argues that the legal reform 
agenda today is much broader than in the past. For new legislation to work, 
institutions must be strengthened. Combining Type Two and Three reforms, 
Faundez argues that reformers must look beyond the "limited confines of the legal 
doctrine and consider the compatibility of the new rules and institutions with the rest 
of their legal and political systems. " This stage of reform is slower and more difficult 
than the earlier phase of legislative change 657 Among the tasks facing reformers is 
655 EBRD 2002a, 7. 
See for example, Waelde & Gunderson 1994,360-362. Even the World Bank seemingly 
recognised the limitations of legal transplantation and the importance of context. See 
Shihata 1991,227-230. 
657 Faundez 2000, Section 2.1. 
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changing the culture of bureaucracy. Indeed, civil service reform is ongoing in 
Russia 
3.2 Abstract Perspectives on Legal Reform 
The disappointments of legislative reform show that when law and legal reform is 
viewed out of context - especially with the popular but often myopic lens of 
traditional law and economics - legal change appears to be simple. This abstractness 
is derived from the same theoretical roots of the Dominant Theory, and has parallels 
with the way in which foreign investors are expected to perceive and respond to the 
host legal system. It will now be shown that reformers in transition countries 
overlooked local context and how law is used in society. The challenges of rule of 
law reform become more apparent as one steps away from this abstract approach, 
towards understanding how law is actually used (or misused) in Russia, and what 
the broader influences on the development of the rule of law there are. 
Commentators often criticise the advocates of the rule of law orthodoxy for their 
"misplaced devotion to theory. "659 Faith in legal transplants is an example of how an 
out-of-context approach can create the misleading impression that rule of law reform 
is straightforward. It was felt that the collapse of Communism left a tabula rasa for 
legal reform: an opportunity to "design comprehensive academic wish-lists and 
intricate models of theoretical perfectionism. "660 This approach views law as a force 
that can be manipulated to govern behaviour, and as the only means of rapidly and 
directly affecting the changes needed for development 661 According to Carothers, most 
policymakers view institutional change in this mechanical way 662 Upham also 
characterises the rule of law orthodoxy as a view of law as a `technology', something 
that can be acquired, transferred and put in place, like good business practices. 613 
08 One example is the Cadastre Development Project. See World Bank's Russia internet site. 
659 Faundez 2000, Section Nine. 
° Waelde & Gunderson 1994,376. 
661 Burg 1977,505-506 and Campbell and Piccioto 1998,250. 
662 Carothers 2003,9-10. 
w Upham 2002,8. 
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Faundez and Garth both argue that despite the consensus among reformers that the 
local context does matter, in practice, an adequate analysis of the local context was 
rarely conducted This claim is verified by the World Bank. Their internal assessors 
point out that reviews of country conditions were not conducted prior to lending 
conditioned on legal reform in the region Upham too argues that the "truth" of 
law being contextual is absent from the present rule of law orthodoxy 666 
Failure to appreciate context had a detrimental effect on the outcome of the 
privatisation process. Joseph Stiglitz argues that proponents of the Washington 
Consensus failed to understand the social context of reforms. They ignored the views 
of experts in the socialist economies who held that the Soviet Union's lack of 
experience with markets, and the absence of the rule of law, an independent 
judiciary and appropriate institutions, would render genuine reform in Russia very 
difficult 667 The position of western economists was that "there was no 'Soviet man, ' 
only 'economic man, ' and given democracy and privatization, those 'economic men' 
who benefited from privatization would create an automatic and irresistible lobbying 
force for the rule of law. " History shows that those who benefited emerged as an 
overwhelming force against the rule of law 669 
Hence the state of legal systems in target countries were overlooked as reformers felt 
that the 'right' laws would provide sufficient incentives for economic actors to abide 
by them; enforcement in this way would be automatic 670 Hendley is of the view that 
transition legal reforms were unwaveringly technocratic, based on rigid assumptions 
of cause and effect. Commercial laws did not meet needs because how law worked 
664 Faundez 2000, Section 5 and Garth 2000,15-16. 
665 Gupta et al. 2002,7-8. 
666 Upham 2002,7-8. 
667 Hoff & Stiglitz 2004,14. 
w Hoff & Stiglitz 2004,15. 
669 Black & Tarassova 2002, Stiglitz 2002,157-160 
670 Hendley 2004,609-610; Hoff & Stiglitz 2004,15; Gupta et al. 2002,7 
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was never explored before privatisation. This, she feels, was particularly unadvisable 
given the legacy of distrust in state institutions 671 
Unfortunately, the lessons of transition do not seem to have changed the way that 
scholars of traditional law and economics think. The analysis that follows offers 
another example of how an out-of-context approach to legal reform gives the 
impression that the problem addressed is easily fixed, while a contextualised 
approach alerts one to the limited efficacy of legal reform. Writing in 2004, Richard 
Posner propounds the 'rules-first' strategy as a way of trying to get around the 
problem of weak legal institutions: 
"... since it is much more costly and time-consuming to create efficient legal 
institutions than to enact efficient rules for the existing inefficient institutions to 
administer, the focus of reform should be on the latter... The creation and 
dissemination of a rule involves small fixed costs and (like other information goods) 
negligible marginal costs, while legal institutions require heavy inputs of high-priced, 
educated labour. "672 
At first sight, this proposition appears logical. But when one examines it more closely 
and against the evidence available, its limitations become clear. The concepts that 
Posner employs are simply too vague: why should we expect that inefficient 
institutions will administer efficient rules any better than they administered 
inefficient rules? Do these institutions remain "inefficient" even though they apply 
the new, "efficient" rules? He views legal reform in mechanical terms and out of 
context, and in doing so, it appears as an easy task. 
Posner makes a further suggestion for improving judicial competence and reducing 
corruption. He argues that when the "greatest danger to a developing nation's 
671 Hendley 2004,607-611. 
672 Posner 2004,77. The idea is not original to Posner. In Hay et al. 1996, a variation on this 
idea is presented; the authors suggest that instead of aiming to bring about wholesale 
change, reformers should start by enacting clear and simple rules that follow business 
practise. While Posner is referring to legal reform in developing countries generally, 
Hay's work is based on Russia. 
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prosperity is the threat that government will confiscate people's property" then a 
good idea is to create a "special court whose sole mission is to check the 
government. " Further, "if the court is confined to purely economic issues, the 
political authorities may be willing to tolerate its independence, especially if they 
understand how much such an institution can do for the nation's prosperity673 
Applying Posner's prescription to Russia highlights the difficulty of Type One 
reform. In particular, it underscores the extent to which rule of law reform depends 
upon more profound changes. Though the state's infringement on property rights is 
certainly a central concern in Russia, Posner's suggestions are wholly unworkable in 
the current climate. It is precisely because the issues are "economic" that political 
authorities intervene and influence the courts; because economic regulation is not 
confined to the statute books but determines the allocation of vast wealth, power, 
and in the case of natural resources, Russia's international standing too. In today's 
Russia such a court would probably just serve as another venue for vested interests. 
Can such a hypothetical court really exist in a country where "all bets are off" if a 
legal dispute is at all politica1674 in a legal system which is characterised by "might 
over right" 675 in an environment where major investors will only commit if they can 
be assured of support from the President? 676 Is it reasonable to believe that the 
authorities in Russia will "tolerate" the independence of a court, while in the opinion 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the state's use of the law in 
the Yukos affair resembles a co-ordinated attack with the aim of weakening political 
opposition and regaining control of strategic economic assets? 677 The evidence 
strongly suggests that the foundations for such a court are not in place in Russia. It 
also clearly demonstrates the risks of abstract approaches to legal reform. 
673 Posner 2004,78. 
674 Interview LAW 2 (US). 
675 Holmes 2002,91. 
676 For example, Interviews FIN 2 (UK) and PRO 3 (UK). 
677 Council of Europe 2005. 
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This Section has shown that legislative change in transition, especially in Russia, 
cannot be entirely successful unless it has institutional support. Legislative change 
was undermined because the supportive institutions were not in place, and 
furthermore, reformers believed that the quality of institutions and the way in which 
laws were used, abused and avoided, 678 was not important. The abstractness of the 
legal reform approach has a parallel in the abstract assumptions about the impact of 
the legal climate on foreign investors. By moving away from an abstract approach to 
a contextual one, both on the subject of law foreign investment and rule of law 
reform, one begins to understand the numerous influences that affect the role and 
impact of the law. The next Section examines whether the support of law-related 
institutions can be readily acquired. 
4 The Challenge of Strengthening Law-Related Institutions 
We now move on to examine Type Two reforms, which involve strengthening law- 
related institutions. Again, as rule of law reform is inter-related process, it is 
somewhat artificial to divide these types of reform up. Nevertheless, doing so 
provides the clarity needed to navigate this tricky subject. The strengthening of law- 
related institutions draws attention to the context in which institutional change 
occurs. As we shall see, strengthening Russian institutions is itself a challenging task 
made more so by the fact that success depends on deeper changes in the political, 
legal and economic environment. 
It is useful to start with a standard prescription for Type Two reforms. For example, 
the OECD's 2004 recommendations for improved corporate governance in Russia: 
"184. Considering the gap between the letter of the law and actual practice, priority 
should be given to improving implementation and enforcement of existing rules and 
regulations. This requires a significant empowerment of the judicial system... 
678 This term is borrowed from the title of Perry-Kessaris 2005, Use, Abuse and Avoidance: 
Foreign Investors and the Legal System in Bangalore. 
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185. The capacity of the judicial system must be strengthened to effectively deal with 
commercial disputes. 
186.... It is therefore of utmost importance that the Russian judiciary is immediately 
granted sufficient resources. More specifically, the compensation of judges and other 
court personnel should be increased... 
187. Priority should be given to improving training in commercial law... 679 
The OECD rightly recognises the gap between law on the books and law in action in 
Russia, and rightly points out the importance of strengthening the judiciary in 
addressing this gap. The problem with the OECD's prescriptions is that they appear 
to be unaware of some the lessons of legal reform and Russia. As Carothers pointed 
out six years previously, the success of Type Two reforms is not simply a matter of 
resources and training, but depends ultimately on the broader political and legal 
climate and especially the independence of the judiciary. The World Bank's Director 
of Global Governance, Daniel Kauffman, also published this view in 2003 680 But the 
OECD never mentions the issues of judicial corruption and lack of judicial 
independence in Russia. In fact, they appear to view judicial empowerment as a 
policy level that simply needs to be pulled. Thus there is a divide between what is 
prescribed by commentators and what is known about the feasibility of their 
prescriptions. This divergence shows why it is important to integrate and share 
knowledge between neighbouring fields of study. 
Analysing rule of law reform within the wider context inevitably adds a great deal of 
complexity to the issue. Garth argues that the simplistic rhetoric of the rule of law 
orthodoxy veils "complicated social realities. "681 Similarly, Upham interprets the 
contextual nature of law as a sign that legal systems are too complex to be planned 
679 OECD 2004,33. 
Kaufmann 2003,21-25. 
681 Garth 2000,11. 
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from the top down 682 We now examine how the strengthening of law-related 
institutions can be particularly complicated and hard to achieve. 
Black and Tarassova, lawyers with first hand experience of reform in Russia, argue 
that the essence of institutional reform in Russia is its complexity and 
interrelatedness. They illustrate their point with a chart that summarises all the major 
aspects of institutional reforms and how they relate. The diagram is an intricate mesh 
of arrows, with dozens of major reforms and hundreds of relationships between them. 
Their message is that "many reforms are needed, most are interconnected, all can't be 
achieved at once. " Addressing the two core law-related institutions, the judiciary 
and bureaucracy, it will be demonstrated that the reform of these institutions 
requires a holistic approach and ultimately depends on deeper changes. 
Genuine judicial reform depends, inter alia, on the development of a free press, the 
control of organised crime and corruption, civil law procedures, and the 
development of small and medium size businesses (SMEs) 6M Take one of these 
elements, SMEs. The development of SMEs depends on numerous factors, including 
democratisation measures, deregulation, control of corruption and organised crime, 
fair competition and anti-monopoly policy. 685But the factors are interdependent: the 
development of democracy and civil society relies in turn on a more even 
distribution of financial and human capital, which requires that both SMEs and the 
middle classes feature much more strongly in Russia's economic and political life. 
Administrative reform exists in a similarly complex and inter-dependent world. 
Regulations in a wide range of spheres, from land registration to business licensing, 
taxation and customs, must be scaled back and refined '' This reform started has 
been underway in Russia for several years, and is ongoing. The creation and 
682 Upham 2002,7 and 33. 
683 Black & Tarassova 2002,4. 
684 Berglof et al. 2003,76-77; Black & Tarassova 2002,3. 
685 Black & Tarassova 2002,3. 
686 Berglof et al. 2003,149. 
687 Black & Tarassova 2002,3. 
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enforcement of these regulations turns on the bureaucracy, which inevitably opposes 
reforms that will reduce its size, influence and opportunities for extra income. 
Administrative reform will also partly turn on the ability of the courts to see that the 
new administrative laws are enforced 668 Thus its success depends on the 
effectiveness of the judiciary and its independence, as well as economic reforms such 
as on banking and competition policy. 689 
The control of corruption is seen as a particularly crucial aspect of institutional 
reform. Corruption undermines reforms by leading to poor policies, poor regulation 
and legislation, and also weak enforcement of them 690 Moreover, bribery defends 
corrupt vested interests both in government and in the private sector. It also erodes 
trust in society, which is a particularly valuable asset in times of change 691 Despite 
giving twenty one reasons for the importance of controlling corruption as a 
prerequisite to institution reform, Black and Tarassova themselves offer no advice 
about how to go about accomplishing the agenda they lay out. 692 
The extent of corruption in the legal systems of transition countries has prompted the 
World Bank to revise its belief in the efficacy of legal and judicial reforms as a means 
of improving governance. This is a major shift in thinking. Among the interesting 
reflections in the World Bank's aptly named paper Rethinking Governance is the 
realization that in countries in which legal and judicial processes are "privatized" - 
that means so corrupt that judgeships can be purchased - legal institutions are 
actually part of the governance problem, rather than a means of solving them. Thus, 
Kaufmann argues that the very orthodoxy of legal reform must be rethought. This 
means that reforms must come from outside of the legal and judicial sphere, for 
example from a competitive business and financial sector, and from specialised 
NGOs. Moreover, the encouragement that political leaders require must also come 
6M Berglof et al. 2003,103. 
689 Black & Tarrasova 2002,3 
690 Black & Tarrasova 2002,13-14. 
691 Raiser 1999,6 and 14. 
692 Black & Tarrasova 2002,12-16 
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from outside the country, with the carrot for rule of law reform being, for example, 
the prospect of membership of the WTO or EU. 693 
Incentives for reform have so far been difficult to come by in Russia. Hay and 
Schleifer point out that during the transition period, attempts at strengthening the 
Russian state backfired because the incentives were insufficient. For instance, as the 
tax police became more powerful, they also became more arbitrary, abusive and 
corrupt. When the elite units of the police were armed with new guns with which to 
combat organised criminals, they simply sold these weapons on to the mafia 
themselves, earning more than they would when they sold the older guns! 694 
A further example of reforms being undermined by the very weakness of state 
institutions and insufficient incentives can be seen in Russia's 2001-2003 
administrative reforms. The Minister in charge admits that despite the changes, there 
remains many administrative barriers and opportunities for extracting bribes 695 In 
the present research, interviewees confirmed that they have yet to feel the effect of 
the tax, administrative and customs reforms that have taken place 6% One executive 
said that the new customs code had not changed how the system worked but that the 
reforms were merely "glossy" 697Deregulation did reduce the number of inspections 
that firms face, but as described in the last Chapter, according to CEFIR, the Russian 
think tank monitoring the changes, substantial abuses in direct violation of the new 
laws continue by agencies. For instance, while the number of planned inspections 
was supposed to be limited to one per year, agencies made repeated, illegal, 
inspections 698 
A final complicating factor in Russia comes from the existence of informal 
institutions. Informal institutions places limits on the efficacy of Type One and Two 
693 Kaufmann 2003,21-25. 
6% Hay & Schleifer 1998,400 
695 The Moscow Times 2004i. 
696 Interviews CON 2(US), FDI 7 (UK), JOU 1 (US), FDI 8 (EE). 
697 Interview FDI 8 (EE). 
698 CEFIR 2003,5-6; CEFIR 2005,6 
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reform in an variety of ways. In so far as they serve as a substitute for formal 
institutions, informal institutions may reduce demand for the rule of law 699 In Russia 
this situation is aggravated by the suspicion that people feel towards officialdom. For 
example, parties may avoid using courts, not due to their ineffectiveness, but because 
proceedings expose their financial and regulatory affairs and thus make them targets 
for predatory bureaucrats and tax inspectors 700 So mistrust between society and state 
reduces the effectiveness of top down change without a concomitant change in 
'cultural orientations' from below. 701 
Informal institutions can slow the progress of rule of law reform. Societal norms, if 
they are at odds with the direction of reform, can have a countervailing effect and 
bring unintended consequences702 Further, the more radical the reform, the greater 
the need for sanction to be perceived by economic actors; this requires a strong state. 
Hence a weak state like Russia should opt for a gradual approach, keeping reforms 
close to existing practices? But because policy makers only have direct control over 
formal rules, they have a limited ability to make the improve the system. 704 Finally, 
informal institutions themselves do not change quickly. 705 
In summary, the strengthening of law-related institutions in Russia is particularly 
difficult for a number of reasons. It is a complex process involving many reforms 
across many spheres, not just legal ones. Further, the outcomes of individual reforms 
depends on one another. Such reforms in Russia have not been as effective as they 
need to be. In fact, reforms are undermined by pervasive corruption and the 
existence of informal institutions. Remarkably, the challenge of institutional reform 
has led at least on leading figure within the World Bank to question the entire 
orthodoxy of legal and judicial reform as a means of governance improvements. 
6W Gel'man 2004,1023. 
700 Hay & Shleifer 1998,399. 
701 Gel'man 2004,1023. 
702 Parisi & Von Wangenheim 2004,2-5. 
703 Hay et al. 1996,565. 
M4 North 2001,329. 
705 Gel'man 2004,1023. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, reforms depend on a significant shift in the 
values of both the state and private sector, an issue which is explored further now. 
5 The Challenge of Deeper Change 
In the previous Section it was shown that institutional, or 'Type Two', improvements 
require reform beyond the legal and judicial sector. To be successful, changes need to 
penetrate to a deep level. This Section develops these arguments further. It is shown 
that establishing the rule of law in Russia ultimately amounts to a 'cultural' change. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this analysis, Carothers characterises Type Three 
reforms in terms of increasing the state's own compliance with the law, which 
involves achieving genuine judicial independence. Further, he argued that while 
Type Two measures could encourage this, in the end, the success of Type Three 
reforms, depended on "sweeping changes in the values and attitudes of those in 
power. "706 
Today, commentators agree that the task facing Russia is no less than the reforming 
the state and national institutions. According to the EBRD, this is the single most 
important and difficult challenge facing Russia 707 It is agreed, not least by the 
Russian government itself, that the further economic development of the country is 
dependent on the condition of state institutions 708 The review of the Russian legal 
climate in the last Chapter drew attention to the characteristics of the bureaucracy 
and judiciary in Russia. Of particular concern is the behaviour of government 
officials of all ranks. The EBRD has expressed concerned over, and called for a 
clarification of, the role of the state in the country's economic life709 In short, for the 
rule of law develop, it is critical that the state itself make a credible commitment to 
706 Carothers 1998,97-98. 
707 EBRD 2004,20. 
EBRD 2004,20; The Moscow Times 2004i. 
7 EBRD 2004,20. 
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abide by the law, 710 something which it has yet to do. An interviewee summarises the 
situation in Russia well: 
"We have a lot of laws in this country, but not any law, and we're not going to have 
any law in this country until the people who write the laws in this country start living 
under those laws, and when police can stop a minister for a traffic violation, you've 
got law in this country. Right now that can't happen. When it's dangerous for them to 
take bribes. And that's going to have to come from the top, and at the moment it's not 
happening. "nl 
Literature on institutional change demonstrates the profundity of this Type of rule of 
law reform. Consistent with what has been argued in this Chapter, North argues that 
institutional change amounts to a change in beliefs. Reforms must cohere with a 
country's heritage, culture and beliefs. This makes the task of engineering change 
particularly difficult 712 Similarly, Carothers argues that law is a "normative system 
that resides in the minds of citizens" and so reformers should try to "intervene in 
ways that would affect how citizens understand, use, and value law. " Carothers 
gives the example of improving the compliance with the law. Underscoring the 
political underpinning of effective rule of law reform, improved compliance requires, 
in part, that the political processes from which laws comes about be perceived as 
fair. 713 Interviewees also felt that, what they referred to as, 'cultural' changes needed 
to occur for the rule of law to be established in Russia. 714 So changes are required 
both in the values of the rulers and the ruled. Interestingly, one interviewee felt that 
the reason Russia had improved was a consequence of the influence of young people 
710 Frye 2002,125. 
711 Interview LAW 2 (US). 
712 North 2001,327. 
713 Carothers 2003,8-9. 
714 Interview FIN 2 (US). 
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in business life, who shared a western rather than Soviet outlook on how business 
should be conducted n5 
North criticises the traditional economic approach to institutional change, arguing 
that economists do not understand the importance of a country's history and culture. 
To North, Russia is an example of the failure of their narrow and abstract approach. 
For instance, he compares the success of the Czech Republic's transition with the 
failure of Russia's. He points to how changes in formal rules were undermined by 
the lack of supportive norms in Russia. He argues that a primary reason for the 
success of the Czech Republic is that, prior to Communism, it was market economy 
and democracy. The changes that took place in 1991 were successful because they 
resonated with norms already in the country's heritage. On the other hand, Russia 
lacked a suitable precedent in its history for market institutions and so similar legal 
reforms did not have the same effect 716 Hay and Schleifer too argue that legal reform 
in Russia would have been more successful if the country had a "collective memory 
of law and order". 717 Others have also noted the impact of the differing legal 
heritages of transition countries on reform outcomes 718 The review of Russia's legal 
heritage presented in the last Chapter also emphasised that Russia has had little 
experience of rule of law and economic freedom, and much more experience of 
autocracy and the use of law as an instrument of power. 
Thinking behind law and development has been influenced by German sociologist 
Max Weber, 719 whose works has provided an framework for understanding why it 
was that capitalism had flourished in the West. His work again implies that a rule 
based legal climate cannot be easily replicated but depends on the broader societal 
influences upon it. Weber, like North, viewed the law not just in economic terms, 
but in the broader context of society. The European legal climate was itself 
715 Interview LAW 6 (UK). 
716 North 2001,327. 
717 Hay & Schleifer 1998,4. 
n8 For example, Berkowitz et al. 2000, and Pistor et al. 2000. 
719 Ahrend & Tompson 2005,45; Upham 2002,8. 
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considered to be the outcome of a mix of religious, political, economic, social and 
legal traditions, "0 and he maintained that law could only be understood in this wider 
context. n1 
Not only does a country's heritage matter to its reform prospects, but the climate at 
the time of reforms also has an impact. According to Trubek, Weber's view of the 
economic role of law was linked to a laissez-faire economic order, or competitive 
markets where participants had relatively limited economic power? 2 These 
conditions differ markedly from those inherited with the demise of Communism in 
Russia. For example, it was shown throughout the last Chapter that the state 
maintains a strong influence in the economy. A glance at Russian business headlines 
amply demonstrates that the climate there can be called anything but laissez-faire1723 
Further, recent World Bank research in Russia has shown that the country's 
economy, over a decade into transition, remains concentrated in the hands of small 
number of industrial groups n4 This suggests that Russia is not yet ripe for the 
development of a Weberian rule-based market economy. 
Examining Latin America, Maria Dakolias shows that for legal reform to be 
successful, they must occur in the background of suitable conditions. She points out 
that the Latin American region was politically, economically and socially better 
suited for judicial reform in the 1990's than it was in the 1960's and 1970's. For 
example, by the 1990's greater economic stability and activity created demand for 
more formal dispute resolution mechanisms; democracy was more deeply rooted, 
and so society expected greater accountability from government; civil society and 
local actors were also more involved in reforms. Hence legal reform can be expected 
T° Trubek 1972,724. 
Tel Trubek 1972,753. 
n2 Trubek 1972,752. 
For example, Oligarchs on the search for hide-outs as the Kremlin intensifies its tax-recovery 
warrants (The Russia journal, 22 April 2005); Distrust Keeps Business From Talking to State 
(The Moscow Times, September 16,2004. Page 10) Small Businesses Harassed in Russia 
Despite New Deregulation (Beyond Transition, July -September 2002). 
724 World Bank 2004,118. 
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to be more effective when the right conditions are in place. 725 In a study on US legal 
assistance after the collapse of Communism, Jacques DeLisle also concludes that the 
viability of legal reform depends on whether appropriate legal, political and 
economic infrastructures exist and are sufficiently strong n6 
So, prospects for the establishment of the rule of law in Russia depend, not on 
policies and reform strategies alone, but on whether Russia is ripe for them. For the 
rule of law to emerge, the Russian state must make progress towards restraining 
itself, from the Kremlin down to the junior bureaucrat. Overwhelmingly, the 
evidence indicates that the Russian state lacks the incentives and ability to restrain 
itself and make its power more accountable. This is another reason why it is felt that 
successful institutional reform which will establish the rule of law in Russia is a 
distant prospect. 
6 Can it be Done? And, How Long will it Take? 
Literature on institutional change demonstrates that rule of law reform is a long term 
process. North suggests that between five and fifteen years is required to see 
changes? 27 Putnam argues that institutional change is to be measured by decades n8 
Minister Gref, the architect of Russia's economic and administrative reforms has said 
that the Russian state is forty years behind in governance n9 Interviewees felt that a 
generation of judges needed to be replaced,, 730 others speculated that genuine change 
would take one or two generations? ' This is consistent with Tamanaha's argument 
that the first law and development movement, in the 1960's and 1970's, gave up too 
quickly. He argues that a decade was not enough to evaluate the success of what 
M Dakolias 1995,230. 
M DeLisle 1999,228. 
727 North 2001,329. 
728 Putnam 1993,184. 
729 Citibank 2002,2. 
° Interview PRO 4 (UK). 
731 Interview CON 3 (WE). 
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"was universally recognised to be a monumentally difficult project. "732 A question 
that arises - though not for this study - when one considers legal change over 
protracted periods, is the extent to which law is actually a result, rather than a cause, 
of other political, economic and social changes. 
Finally, it is useful to note the general scepticism of some commentators about rule of 
law reform. Faundez argues that "while it may be true that, theoretically, market 
friendly legal systems have some attributes in common; in practice, the interplay 
between law, the state and markets is complex and far from predictable. "7 
Carothers is also sober about the nature of the challenge at hand. He argues that the 
rule of law is a subject of great conceptual and practical complexity. Further, it can be 
"extremely" difficult to understand both how the law functions in a society, and also 
how it changes? TM Perhaps indicative of the complexity of the subject, while an array 
of approaches exist, there is, as yet no comprehensive and widely accepted theory of 
institutional changes nor transition? Finally, the pre-eminent scholar of 
institutions, Douglass North concedes that Russia's failure to establish the rule of law 
shows that: 
"We do not know how to create a political system that will produce and put into 
place property rights that will provide incentives for people to be productive, and put 
into place a judicial system that will make for low cost enforcement of agreements 
and contracts, both of which are necessary conditions for getting a viable polity. We 
do not know how to create such a polity. We do not even know how we did it 
ourselves. " 7 
732 Tamanaha 1995,473. 
7 Faundez 2000, Conclusions. 
7 Carothers 2003,12. 
735 Pistor 2004; Burki & Perry 1998,34. 
736 Voigt & Engerer 2002,151. 




Despite much investment in legal reform projects and many years trying, the rule of 
law is far from being established in Russia. This Chapter presented a series of reasons 
why we should be very cautious about Russia's prospects for establishing the rule of 
law in the foreseeable future. Though new market-friendly legislation has been 
enacted in transition countries, the absence of strong law-related institutions has 
undermined the effectiveness of the new laws. After a disappointing decade of 
transition - at least in Russia, attention turned to the hitherto neglected role of legal 
institutions. There has already been and continues to be policies aimed at reforming 
law-related institutions, such as the judiciary and bureaucracy, in Russia? m 
However, success of such reforms in the end turns on much wider and deeper 
changes in the attitudes and behaviour Russian society and government. Therefore it 
does not appear as though the rule of law can be engineered, although measures can 
be taken to encourage its development to a certain extent. 
To be successful, rule of law reform requires the appropriate environment. Russia, 
unfortunately, has lacked the legal, political and economic heritage that is congenial 
to the emergence of the rule of law. It also lacks the present day conditions that 
commentators say are required to encourage the development of rule of law. Of 
course, analysis of current political and legal trends in Russia is best left to the 
experts. Nevertheless, while President Putin has professed his commitment to the 
'dictatorship' of law, there is little to convince one that Russia's leaders have the 
requisite "credible commitment"739 to the rule of law. 
Even if the political preconditions were in place, the sheer complexity and 
interconnected nature of rule of law reform suggests that the task at hand is both 
very difficult and slow. It has been noted that rule of law reform requires changes 
7M See Berglof et at. 2003, Chapter 4 for a detailed summary. 
739 Frye 2002,125 
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outside of the usual legal and judicial arena. In fact, commentators have pointed out 
that legal and judicial reforms must be accompanied by numerous other factors, for 
example, greater democratisation, more competition in the business sector, a freer 
press, and even the emergence of a middle class in Russia. Unfortunately, experts on 
institutional reform and the rule of law, such as Douglass North and Thomas 
Carothers concede that we know very little about how to achieve this Herculean task. 
Finally, the existence of alternatives to the rule of law, in the shape of informal 
institutions, influence and bribery, undermine the demand for the rule of law and 
policies themselves. 
So far, we have avoided defining 'successful' rule of law reform, except in the 
circular fashion that successful reform amounts to establishing the rule of law. 
Indeed, the measurement of the rule of law raises tricky questions such as: how 
much rule of law does a country need to have in order to attract foreign investment? 
Or, when do we know that we have achieved the rule of law? 7° Fortunately, we are 
spared the contentious question of measuring the quality of legal climates by the fact 
that there is no suggestion that Russia may have yet achieved the rule of law. 
A final point of clarification is required. In asserting the difficulty of rule of law 
reform, this Chapter has inevitably had a pessimistic tone. The intention has not been 
to be pessimistic about Russia, however. In fact, it must be acknowledged that a great 
deal has changed in the economic, political and legal climate since the collapse of 
Communism. For example, one businessman involved in Russia for forty years 
argued that westerners often do not appreciate the huge progress that Russia has 
made since adopting a politico-economic system that was the exact opposite of the 
one that was in place for seventy years before it. 741 There was also a general 
consensus among interviewees that much in the business and legal climate had 
740 For a critique of numerical legal indicators, see Davis 2004, Hendley 2004, Siems 2004, 
Perry-Kessaris 2003. 
741 PRO 4 (UK). 
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improved significantly in Russia 7 Despite this change, however, the rule of law still 
appears to be a distant prospect. 
7.2 Implications for the Dominant Theory 
When revisited in the light of these arguments, the merit of the Dominant Theory 
seems limited. As a rhetorical and normative device the Dominant Theory possesses 
a value in setting a benchmark and exhorting policy makers to rule of law reforms. 
But the Dominant Theory neither tells us how to bring about the rule of law, nor 
what to do if we cannot. It prescribes the rule of law as the only way of attracting 
foreign investment into a country like Russia. But it appears that the rule of law is a 
long way off, and it cannot be engineered. Advocates of the Dominant Theory should 
at least show that they are aware of the difficulty of legal reform. Better yet, just as 
some commentators have revised their view of legal reform in the light of what has 
been learned in the field over the course of the transition, the advocates of the 
Dominant Theory should rethink their prescription for attracting foreign investment. 
This would make for a more useful and credible theory of the rule of law and foreign 
investment. Further, it may nurture the development of alternative ideas about how 
to attract foreign investment. We can conclude that as a normative theory, the value 
of the Dominant Theory is limited in so far as it does not appreciate the challenge of 
its own prescription. 
742 For example, LAW 3 (UK), LAW 6 (UK), BUS 3 (US), FIN 6 (US). 
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Chapter Seven 
Researching Foreign Investors in Russia 
191 
1 Why Examine the Dominant Theory? 
In order to build on the Dominant Theory, it is necessary to examine as directly as 
possible the issues where the Dominant Theory does not provide satisfactory 
answers. The interview questions relate to the three limitations in the Dominant 
Theory that have been raised. The first two issues are: 
1. How do foreign investors perceive the host legal climate before investing? 
2. Why do they invest in countries that lack a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate? 
Hypothesis One, that "a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not always necessary to 
support foreign investors in Russia" relates to the two shortcomings above. 
Hypothesis Two, that "foreign investors' perceptions of the Russian legal climate 
depend on their firm characteristics" relates to issue number three: 
3. What factors affect the importance that foreign investors attach to host legal 
climates? 
Before reviewing the research approach, it is useful to summarise how these issues 
and hypotheses were arrived at. 
The following quote is a succinct expression of the Dominant Theory: "The sound 
implementation of rule of law is crucial for the country's investment climate... "743 
Chapters Three and Four, however, demonstrated that this Theory lacks a robust 
empirical base, and has various limitations? 44This study is not questioning whether 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climates are beneficial to foreign investment, or whether in 
an ideal world, foreign investors would rather that hosts be endowed with high 
743 Lemierre 2003. 
744 Chapters Three and Four review evidence available. 
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quality legal climates. Instead, using the Dominant Theory and its limitations as a 
starting point, this study is intends to: first, assess the importance of the overall 
quality of Russia's legal climate to the attraction and support of foreign investors 
around 2004; second, to develop a more accurate understanding and explanation of 
the relationship between foreign investors and host legal climates. 
Chapter Three showed that the claims about the role of law in foreign investment are 
not supported by robust evidence. It is clear that there is much to be learned about 
the role of law and foreign investors in Russia. The regression studies gave mixed 
and conflicting results about the role of law as a determinant of FDI. Further, ten 
technical limitations in the use of regression studies for our purposes were 
numbered. The survey evidence was also mixed. Above all, they simply do not 
answer the central question of foreign investment determination, which is: what is 
the role of law in the decision to invest? Instead surveys frequently report that, 
according to foreign investors, the legal climate was an obstacle to business, from 
which they conclude that it must be deter investors. But such a conclusion is quite 
plainly undermined by the fact that those very same firms invested anyway. 
Chapter Four showed why a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate may be less important 
to foreign investors than the Dominant Theory supposes. First of all, the impact of 
the law on the decision to invest may well be overshadowed by a range of non-legal 
business considerations. Next, the quality of host legal climates may not affect the 
choice of host if foreign investors are unable or unwilling to acquire and process 
accurate information about legal climates in the manner presumed by the Dominant 
Theory. Further, the absence of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate may not prevent 
an investment if foreign investors can compensate for the failures of the formal legal 
system by relying upon influence, informal institutions and bribery. Finally, attitudes 
to the law and legal risk are contingent on the characteristics of the investor itself, for 
example, its size, culture and features of the investment. 
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This study has not argued that the quality of the legal climate is irrelevant to foreign 
investors nor that a 'good' legal system would not be beneficial to FDI, nor that 
foreign investors would not prefer a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. Instead, it is 
evident that a notable faction of foreign investors are less sensitive than presumed to 
legal climates, and therefore do not behave in the way expected. 745 This shows that 
the Dominant Theory does not accurately portray the relationship between foreign 
investors and host legal climates. In fact, it seems in some cases to overstate the 
importance of the quality of host legal climates and to oversimplify their impact. 
Examining the Dominant Theory is important for two reasons: first, in its own right 
as the prevailing theory of foreign investment determination in the law and 
development community; and second, because the Dominant Theory has been an 
influential and integral part of the general belief in the necessity of a Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate for economic development, a concept which is vigorously acted 
upon in legal reforms funded by public money. 
2 Method 
2.1 Can Existing Evidence be Applied to Address the Research Ouestions? 
The only survey to partly meet the requirements of this study is the BEEPS, the 
findings of which were presented in Chapter Five. These survey questions are 
valuable for understanding in some detail how actual foreign investors perceive the 
legal climate. For example, one group of questions enable researchers to assess the 
extent to which firms are burdened by legal factors, and to comparing the impact of 
legal challenges to non-legal aspects of the investment climate. The second set 
examine perceptions of particular features of the legal climate, for instance, the 
honesty of the judiciary, the extent of corruption, or the impact of the regulations. 
The BEEPS was used in Chapter Five to provide an original and in-depth analysis of 
foreign investors' perceptions of the Russian legal climate as a background to the 
main research findings, which are presented in the next Chapter. 
745 A term introduced by Perry-Kessaris, for example Perry 2000b, 790. 
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While the BEEPS is useful for sketching the perceptions of the legal climate, it is not 
an appropriate source of data for the research agenda. The first inquiry in this study 
is on the role of law in the decision to invest. The BEEPS, though, tells us nothing 
about the accuracy of information that foreign investors had about the Russian legal 
climate at the time of choosing the investment host. Nor does it tell us anything 
about the impact of perceptions of the Russian legal climate on the choice of host. In 
order to assess this, it is clear that we need to inquire about the role of law in the 
decision to invest as directly as possible, from investors and their advisors. 
The second inquiry in this study concentrates on discovering what legal strategies 
foreign investors use in order to operate satisfactorily in Russia. Again, the BEEPS 
indicators are inappropriate because they only tell half the story. It interesting to 
know what percentage of foreign investors in Russia view corruption as a major 
obstacle to their business, or how often foreign investors go to the courts, and how 
stable they perceive regulations to be. However, such questions does not tell us how 
investors invest and succeed in spite of a less than perfect legal system. In fact, none 
of the questions in the BEEPS really serve this purpose. 
A particularly useful feature of the BEEPS is that it records firm characteristics, such 
as ownership, size and export-orientation. This might have enabled researchers to 
compare the performance and attitudes of foreign investors in Russia according to 
these factors. Unfortunately, however, the attitudes of foreign investors there cannot 
be comprehensively analysed according to firm characteristics, as the World Bank 
does not reveal the characteristics of the respondents where doing so would 
compromise their anonymity. 
The aim of the BEEPS, like other surveys of its genre, is to assess the quality of the 
investment climate from the perspective of its 'users' - firms. It does this by looking 
at the formal legal system only, and concentrating almost exclusively on problems. In 
contrast, the aim of this study is to assess the overall impact of the legal climate on 
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foreign investors, which requires that we look at both problems and solutions, both 
the formal and informal spheres. The BEEPS can therefore only be applied to provide 
us with an introduction into foreign investors' perceptions of the Russian legal 
climate. 
2.2 Methodology 
This study uses semi-structured, in-depth interviews to understand and describe the 
research issues. This research method has its theoretical underpinnings in 
ethnography. Ethnography is a social science research method in which the 
researcher involves themselves in the lives of their subject, especially by asking 
questions 7 Ethnography also lends theoretical support to the use of multiple data 
sources. For example, by combining the BEEPS with the interviews, we can compare 
and 'triangulate' findings, which serves as the most effective way of validating 
them. "' 
The descriptive nature of ethnographic fieldwork is said to be particularly valuable 
in challenging "misleading preconceptions" that are often brought to research. 748 
Indeed, here it has been argued that the Dominant Theory lacks descriptive power, 
and that the presumptions of existing research need to be questioned by means of an 
alternative, more exploratory research approach. An exploratory and descriptive 
approach is suited both to the development and testing of theory. 749 
Ethnography also sanctions a responsive fieldwork approach. Researchers may find 
that unforeseen issues arise during the fieldwork, and may want to respond to them, 
for example by posing particular questions to test new ideas750 I found this to be the 
case during the fieldwork, and over the course of the month, I adapted the interviews 
746 Hammersley & Atkinson 1995,1-2. 
747 Hammersley & Atkinson 1995,24. 
748 Hammersley & Atkinson 1995,23. 
749 Hammersley & Atkinson 1995,20 & 23. 
7 Hammersley & Atkinson 1995,23. 
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and made efforts to find particular interviewees in order to better understand issues 
that I felt needed more attention. 
2.3 Fieldwork Attempts 
The most obvious way of gauging the role of law in the foreign investment decision 
process is to interview recent investors or those that are in the process of investing. 
Both of the techniques were attempted and abandoned. The intention was to 
interview British firms at their UK headquarters. The survey therefore required a 
sample list of recent British investors, and another of businesses that were in the 
process of investing. There is no single source to identify all recent British investors 
in Russia. Firms incorporated in Russia must register at the Russian State Registration 
Chamber, who are supposed to make these records available for a nominal fee. 
However, despite repeated attempts from the UK and Russia, it was not possible to 
obtain a list of recent British investors from that source. 
Instead, a number of sources that gave approximate investment dates for British 
firms were identified and then screened. These sources were the Russian Chamber of 
Commerce, and three market research firms: OCO Consulting, Dun & Bradstreet and 
Bureau van Dijk. The firms in their databases were then screened, via their websites 
and telephone calls, in order to ascertain whether they fit the category of British 
based foreign direct investors since 2002. Out of an initial total of 203 records, 
including various repeats, firms that could not be identified, firms that were not 
British, firms that were not recent investors and so on, only 30 firms remained. Only 
a single interview came after various attempts at contact via mail, e-mail and 
telephone. As a result, attempting to address recent British investors in the UK was 
abandoned. Part of the problem is that not very many British companies have 
invested in Russia. 
It was also impossible to form a sample list of firms in the investment process. Most 
potential investors will not publicly announce that they are contemplating an 
investment. Attempts to form a list via investment promotion bodies such as the 
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Russo-British Chamber of Commerce, the UK government Trade & Investment 
service, and the Russian Trade Delegation also came to dead ends, because the very 
limited information they had about companies contemplating investments could not 
be divulged to third parties. 
A business professor also suggested another way of identifying potential investors 
into Russia. This would start by taking a list of the UK corporations with the most 
investments throughout the world. This assumes that any company that has made a 
number of foreign investments might also consider investing in Russia. One could 
then approach these companies and ask about their perceptions of the country and 
its legal climate, and the reasons they had not invested, or their investment 
experience. I did attempt to approach large multinational companies on a few 
occasions, but it was a frustrating and ultimately fruitless exercise. There were three 
reasons: first of all, such large companies do not have a division that is called 'foreign 
investments' and so it is very difficult to identify which department in a company to 
approach; secondly, a foreign investment is a major strategic decision, usually dealt 
with at the highest corporate level - this makes it almost impossible for an academic 
researcher to gain access; finally, firms are secretive about such a significant and 
sensitive issue as an ongoing or potential investment in a country, again making it 
almost impossible for a researcher to gain access. The FIAC study cited in Chapter 
Four did, however, manage to access a large pool of existing and potential investors. 
However, their study was on a commercial scale, employing twelve researchers from 
the PBN Company, a consultancy, working for three months in London, Moscow and 
Washington751 
Thus the options for researching the issues were limited by the circumstances. 
Instead of interviewing recent British investors for the purposes of understanding the 
role of law in the investment decision process, it was necessary to rely more on 
foreign investment experts, such as lawyers, private and state investment promoters, 
ßl This information was obtained in an email from the PBN Company, the firm which 
carried out the research. Available on file with the author. 
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investment consultants, and staff at business associations and chambers of 
commerce. While necessitated by the circumstances, in some ways this is preferable. 
Advisors play an integral role in the investment process, and will have extensive first 
hand experience of it. Unlike most businessmen, who will only have been involved 
in one foreign investment in Russia, advisors are routinely and professionally 
involved. Their opinions and experience are therefore particularly valuable. 
2.4 Pilot Stage 
Given the data limitations, the pilot stage was relatively small. Six interviews were 
carried out with investors, lawyers, and investment promoters, and there was one 
consultation with a professor at London Business School with expertise on FDI in 
transition countries. These helped to decide on the format of the questions and 
fieldwork method. 
2.5 Fieldwork Approach 
The fieldwork investigates both the role of the legal system in the decision to invest 
and engagement with the Russian legal system. In-depth, semi-structured interviews 
were used. Forty-five interviews were conducted in total - six in London, and thirty- 
nine in Moscow. The research in Moscow took place over January and February of 
2004, and the London component was conducted both before the trip and following 
up from it. 
Interviewees were deliberately chosen for the insights they were expected to have. 
For instance, one might expect that investment advisors and lawyers would be in a 
position to identify how foreign investors' approaches differed according to their 
firm characteristics. The sample list of individual candidates was constructed from 
various sources: the directories of foreign investors already mentioned; via business 
associations; the websites of the firms of target interviewees, such as law firms, trade 
promotion agencies and consultancies; and recommendations. Russia is not a 
country that is particularly suited to the collection of information, especially about 
the sensitive topic of businesses and the law. The pool of foreign investors and their 
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advisors in Moscow is also fairly limited. Candidates were contacted by a 
combination of telephone, email and fax communications. 
The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth. Predominately, they took place at 
the interviewees' place of work, though a number were conducted in public facilities, 
such as hotels and cafes. They lasted between twenty minutes to over an hour. 
Candidates were informed about the purpose of the study, namely doctoral research 
on foreign investors and the Russian legal climate; this was done at the time of the 
interview, or when initially contacted, by means of an introductory letter from Dr. 
Perry-Kessaris. The permission of candidates was always sought to tape-record the 
interviews, and they were assured of anonymity. I occasionally made hand written 
notes during the course of the interviews. 
I was hosted by a Moscow think tank, the Institute for Complex Strategic Studies 
(www. icss. ac. ru). They generously provided me with administrative and linguistic 
support, and assisted in contacting potential interviewees. All of the interviews that 
are reported in this study were conducted in English. 
2.6 Limitations 
One of the limitations of this research study is that there is no way of assessing the 
representativeness of my sample of investors. Ultimately, this is due to the problems 
mentioned earlier - of compiling a complete list of investors and their advisors. 
Without knowing the total number and composition of foreign investors in Moscow 
at that time, it is impossible to gauge the representativeness of the sample. This 
shortcoming is not particular to my study, but would be a feature of any study on 
foreign investors in Russia at the time. While the number of interviews conducted 
(forty-five) is not very large, it is important to bear in mind that towards the end of 
the research I reached a stage where it seemed that the pool was drying up: I was 
unable to identify suitable new interview candidates; in fact, I was often being 
referred to people whom I had already interviewed; and I was not gaining any 
greater understanding of the issues being researched. 
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Perhaps the most significant limitation of my research is that it cannot determine the 
proportion of investors who have turned away from Russia because of their 
perceptions of its legal climate. The question of whether potential investors turn 
away from Russia because of their perceptions of the legal was addressed in the 
interviews, especially with the lawyers, investment promoters and consultants who 
are often the first point of contact for potential investors. However, these 
respondents lack knowledge about firms which have not come into contact with. 
them. Therefore, we cannot know precisely the extent to which foreign firms in 
general are put off investing in Russia because, for example, they perceive it to be too 
corrupt. Interestingly, the only large scale survey of foreign firms, the FIAC survey of 
Russia, also does not present any data on the percentage of potential investors who 
have decided not to invest because of their perceptions of the legal climate. 
Inherent to any research of this type is the self-selecting nature of the respondents. A 
bias may be incurred from this, for example because those willing to talk to 
researchers have a particular type of view752 One should not expect complete 
honesty and frankness from respondents. 7m Also, it is possible that Russians may not 
wish to speak candidly about taboo topics, out of a desire to not present a negative 
picture of their country. Further, corruption and similar 'contra-normative' 
behaviour is generally underreported in surveys, 7m and so it may be hard to find 
candidates that are willing to talk openly about opaque practices. 
It may be possible, however, that with right approach these barriers can be 
overcome. ' Interviewees must trust the interviewer not to divulge the information 
and use it against them. They must also feel that the interview is for a legitimate 
purpose 7 Assurances of anonymity and academic credentials served this purpose. 
752 Rubin and Rubin 1995,67. 
753 Hammersley & Atkinson 1995,83. 
n4 Foddy 1993,118. 
755 Rubin and Rubin 1995,102 and 218-223. 
Foddy 1993,123. 
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Nevertheless, there is no way of guaranteeing a truthful response 757 Finally, the 
interviews cannot inform us about the perspective of firms that did not invest in 
Russia because they were concerned about its legal environment. While this 
information would be useful, it is very hard to access firms while they are in the 
process of investing. 758 
2.7 Processing the Interviews 
The research findings, presented in Chapter Four, were derived from the interviews 
in the following process: first, the interviews were transcribed; interview responses 
were grouped alongside the research question in a spreadsheet and coded according 
to the answer; this provided an overview of responses that facilitated the written 
work. 
3 Investigating the Dominant Theory's Accuracy 
The hypotheses and interview questions presented below are purposefully quite 
open ended. It appears that the Dominant Theory only presents a partial model of 
the relationship between foreign investors and host legal climates; it has been argued 
and shown that there are a number of further questions that need to be answered to 
develop a more accurate model. Thus our approach needs an exploratory tone. This 
is particularly true given the shortage of existing theory and evidence to build on. 
Also, this study has advocated a more nuanced, contingent approach. So, instead of 
arguing that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is or is not necessarily required to 
support foreign investors, it is more appropriate to ask when a particular form (e. g. 
formal, informal, corrupt) of legal system might be able to support which type of 
investor, and in what circumstances it is not able to support them. The hypotheses and 
questions are crafted to enable us to arrive at such insights. 
757 Foddy 1993,123. 
758 Perry-Kessaris also draws attention to the lack of feasibility in interviewing firms 
during the investment process, Perry 2001,7-8. 
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3.1 Hypothesis One: The Necessity of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
Hypothesis One is that "a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not always necessary 
to support foreign investors in Russia" The interview questions address the 
hypothesis by first looking at the role of law in the decision to invest, then at how 
foreign investors do business in the Russian legal climate. 
3.1.1 The Role of Law in the Decision to Invest 
One of the arguments of this thesis is that investors may not choose hosts based on 
accurate and detailed information about the legal climate. In fact, they may have 
quite a vague understanding of the host legal climate when they decide to make an 
investment in a particular host. Further, investors may not abandon a potential 
investment prospect because they perceive the absence of a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate. The questions in this subsection are all related to these suppositions. The 
following question was asked in the interviews to learn about pre-investment 
perceptions of the Russian legal climate: 
a. Do prospective and potential investors both have an accurate perception the 
Russia legal climate? 
The terms 'prospective' and 'potential' were prompted by the pilot phase of research, 
when a respondent made it clear that one needs to distinguish between the business 
public at large, who are 'potential' investors, and the firms who have taken the extra 
step of investigating Russia with a view to an investment, 'prospective' investors. 
The next series of questions are concerned with how foreign investors respond to 
more accurate information about the Russian legal climate once they have a specific 
investment in mind. This gets to the crux of the issue of law as a determinant of 
foreign investment. Through these interview questions we aim to understand the 
actual impact of the law on the decision to invest. Following on from the pilot phase, 
the following questions were devised: 
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b. What are the main legal issues that foreign firms need to address during the 
investment process? 
c. What role does their perception of the legal climate play in the actual 
investment decision? 
d. How do they respond, in their investment approach, to legal concerns? 
These questions aim to move beyond existing literature, which is limited in so far as 
it establishes that the legal climate is a concern to investors, but then fails to describe 
how it actually impacts the decision to invest. To respond to the Dominant Theory 
and the standard research approach, we need to understand why foreign investors 
may not avoid states that lack a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. There may be 
several reasons for this. The Russian market may simply be too strategically vital to 
their business. Perhaps for some investors, the Russian legal system is above their 
minimum quality threshold. Or foreigners may have strategies that enable to manage 
the legal risks of investing in Russia, for example by deferring responsibility for legal 
matters a local partner. Finally, substitutes may exist for a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate. The next subsection examines this final possibility in greater detail. 
3.1.2 Foreign Investors' Activities in the Russian Legal Climate 
It was argued that the Dominant Theory exaggerates the importance of a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate in so far as it implies that there are no substitutes 
for a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate in serving investors' needs. To find out 
whether alternatives to a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate in fact exist, we 
investigate the strategies that foreign investors use in the Russian legal climate. 
Based on the pilot research, the following questions were posed: 
e. What is meant by 'the Russian way' of doing business, and what does it 
imply for foreign investors? 
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f. To what extent are activities based on written law, as opposed to: unregulated 
areas; assumptions about bureaucratic behaviour; unwritten rules of 
behaviour; influence over the authorities? 
g. Which aspects of the Russian business climate are most challenging for 
foreigners? 
To test the hypothesis, it is necessary to learn whether foreign investors limit 
themselves to the formal legal system, or whether they also rely on informal 
practices, influence and bribery. 
The questions are deliberately broad and crafted for an open, semi-structured 
discussion. They possess an exploratory tone because they are delving into issues 
that have barely been addressed in existing literature on foreign investors. Finally, in 
addition to testing the Dominant Theory, the questions are merited in their own right 
as informality and corruption are current research interests in transitional law and 
development. 
3.2 Hypothesis Two: The Impact of Firm Characteristics on Perceptions of the 
Russian Legal Climate 
Hypothesis Two is that "foreign investors' perceptions of the Russian legal climate 
depend on their firm characteristics. The impact of firm characteristics is investigated 
both in the context of the decision to invest and that of foreign investors' activities in 
the Russian legal climate. Hence, the following questions are drawn up: 
h. How do the size, sector, experience and nationalities of potential and 
prospective investors affect their attitudes to the legal climate and their 
practical options? 
i. To what extent does the size, sector, experience and nationality of a potential 
investor affect its legal and regulatory activities? 
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4 The Challenge of Establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate: 
Implications for the Dominant Theory 
Research on foreign investors and the Russian legal climate is incomplete without an 
analysis of the challenge of the Dominant Theory's prescription for attracting foreign 
investment, namely, establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. This is 
presented in Chapter Eight. The merit of the Dominant Theory's prescription rests on 
the ability of reformers to actually establish a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. The 
more distant a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate appears to a country like Russia, the 
less credible a theory becomes which preaches it as the primary answer to the 
country's foreign investment deficit. Advocates of the Dominant Theory, however, 
do not take the challenges of establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate into 
consideration. Chapter Eight explains that establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate is a complex and long-term challenge in Russia. The sheer difficulty of 
establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate clearly undermines the merit of 
preaching it as a solution to foreign investment and further undermines the general 
credibility of the Dominant Theory. 
Chapter Eight draws mainly from existing research. However, naturally, the 
opinions of interviewees about the general rule of law and reform climate in Russia 
were also sought. For example, they were asked: 
j. Which legal developments have improved the investment climate? 
k. Will current reforms substantially change the Russian legal climate, or are 
there more profound factors, such as the relationship between the firm/state, 
bureaucracy, attitudes to law, that mean that change will be limited for the 
foreseeable future? 
The next Chapter presents the interview findings themselves. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Impact of the Russian Legal Climate on Foreign Investors 
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1 Introduction 
Having familiarised the reader with the characteristics of the Russian legal climate 
and the challenges that foreign investors can expect to face, this Chapter moves on to 
relate how the foreign investors and foreign investment advisors interviewed in the 
present study have approached and responded to the legal climate. The interviews 
are presented in two sections, relating to the two hypotheses: 
- Hypothesis One is that "a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not always 
necessary to support foreign investors in Russia. " 
- Hypothesis Two is that "foreign investors' perceptions of the Russian legal 
climate depend on their firm characteristics. " 
Definitions & Focus of Fieldwork 
To reiterate how legal systems are being defined in this study: legal systems include 
both the laws and regulations according to which economic actors operate, and the 
manner in which these laws and regulations are applied. Thus our definition 
encompasses state institutions such as the judiciary, and bureaucracy, as well as 
politicians in their roles as law-makers and law-enforcers. Further, we are only 
cconcerned with laws that seek to regulate economic behaviour. This study is also 
interested in the role of informal institutions, which differ from formal ones by 
degree. 59 Informal institutions are particularly prevalent in Russia. They are 
important to this study because they can substitute for formal state institutions and 
therefore compensate for their weaknesses. 
The vast majority of studies on the subject of law and foreign investment limit 
themselves to enumerating legal obstacles. In this study, both the general difficulties 
posed by the climate and their solutions are of interest. Further, both the formal legal 
system and the informal sphere are taken into consideration. The attitudes of foreign 
759 North 1990,46. 
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investors' to central issues such as contract enforcement, the courts, corruption and 
the bureaucracy are examined in this study. It is left to other researchers to study 
attitudes towards specific bodies of law. 
For the reader's convenience, the interview references include the professional 
background of the respondent, followed by their nationality, coded as follows: 
Table 5: Respondent's Professional Classifications 
Respondent Type Classification Count 
Foreign Investor FDI 10 
Investment Promoter PRO 6 
Lawyer LAW 6 
Finance FIN 6 
Business Associations BUS 5 
Consultants CON 5 
Government GOV 4 
journalist JOU 1 
Non-Gov't Org NGO 1 
Academic ACA 1 
Table 6: Respondent's National and Regional Origin 
National/Regional origin Code Count 
Russia RU 15 
Britain UK 16 
North America US 9 
Western Europe WE 3 
Eastern Europe/Central Asia EE 2 
The foreign investors operated in a range of sectors: insurance, education, 
construction, manufacturing, retail, consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, transport and 
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communications. Four of the investors were small-medium sized, three were 
medium-large sized, and three large. 
Where it is stated that respondents 'said' such and such, or that they made a 
particular point, this will referenced in the footnotes with citations for all the 
interviewees who made such a point. 
2 Is a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate Necessary to Foreign Investors? 
In Chapter Four, three groups of evidence were presented to show that the Dominant 
Theory may overstate the importance of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate to 
foreign investors. Interview findings relating to these explanations are discussed in 
this Section. In subsection 2.1, the accuracy of foreign investors' pre-investment 
perceptions of the Russian legal climate is explored. In subsection 2.2, attention turns 
to the impact of the legal climate on their decision to invest, in particular, how and 
why foreigners may invest in spite of the perceived absence of a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate. Finally, in subsection 2.3, we examine how foreign investors do 
business in the Russian legal climate. Each of the subsections demonstrates in some 
way that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not always necessary to support 
foreign investors. 
2.1 The Accuracy of Pre-Investment Perceptions of the Russian Legal Climate 
First, we need to distinguish between potential investors, that is, the broad mass of 
businesses for whom Russia could at some point provide an investment opportunity; 
and prospective investors, firms that are actually planning an investment in Russia. 
The latter's approach will be discussed in subsection 2.2 
The most consistent and resounding point established in the interviews relates to the 
issue of foreigners' perceptions of Russia and its legal environment. There was a 
consensus that perceptions of Russia and its investment climate, outside the country, 
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are significantly inaccurate. 760 Respondents explained emphatically that perceptions 
are "misguided"761, "ranging from complete ignorance"762. Hence it is this perception 
of the Russian legal climate, which can differ tremendously from the reality, 763 that 
informs the business community outside of Russia. 
This point is borne out especially on the question of stereotypes of Russia. Russia 
suffers heavily from stereotyping: to many the country conjures images of 
Communism and the Cold War, the mafia, or more recently, football tycoons. A 
senior UK government official involved in investment promotion related that: 
"One company which we dealt with recently, a fairly major company, came through 
and said: 
'I know if I present to my board and say it's country X, give the economic figures of 
country X, they'll say 'well, why aren't we there? ' And as soon as you say country X 
is Russia, they say'Aah... Well, may be. "" 
Another senior Briton in the Moscow investment promotion community explains 
that : 
"The thing that we bang our heads against is the perception itself, and that mainly 
comes from the media. The history of Russia as a sort of very bland and stagnant, 
totalitarian regime, doing what they're told when they're told. When they moved into 
capitalism, as it was called, in the early 90's, it became - it was just a nuclear bomb of 
corruption, bribes, drive-by shootings and mafia. " 
760 For example, but not confined to Interviews: PRO 1 (UK), CON 2 (US), PRO 3 (UK), 
GOV 2 (UK), CON 3 (WE), LAW 6 (UK) & BUS 5 (UK). 
761 Interview LAW 6 (UK). 
762 Interview PRO 3 (UK). 
763 Interview CON 3 (WE). 
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This stereotype includes a fear of Russia. 7" One lawyer explained how, much to his 
astonishment, prior to visiting Russia with a view to a possible investment, a client 
requested 24 hour armed security for his entire stay. 765 
It is noteworthy that these points are made by professionals, mainly investment 
promoters and lawyers. They are speaking, not only about the western business 
community in general, but about business people with whom they interact-people 
who are serious enough about investing in Russia that they have attended an 
investment conference, spoken to an investment promoter or lawyer, and have or are 
planning to, as the man above, visit Russia for the purposes of investment. 
It is also noteworthy that potential investors have very general impressions about 
Russia. This means that, rather than standing out as a distinct feature, the legal 
system is subsumed into the overall image that investors have of the investment 
climate. So, from where they are standing, they see the general trends such as 
political risk.? Hence, 'big picture' changes, such as macroeconomic progress or 
warmer relations between Presidents Putin and Bush are important, as they cause 
more people to notice Russia 767 Thus, for Russia to generate an impression amenable 
to foreign investment, it needs to be seen to be moving broadly in the right 
direction. 7 This echoes the findings of the FIAC study presented in Chapter Three. 
By the same token, however, negative headlines have a strong effect on potential 
investors. One development that unravelled during the course of this research that 
produced quite calamitous headlines was the Yukos affair. This chain of events has, 
in the words of the interviewees, "shattered"769 investor confidence in Russia, and the 
perception of predictability that was slowly building since the 1998 financial collapse 
of the country. Commentators argue that it has raised questions about state power, 
764 Interviews LAW 5 (US), CON 3 (WE) & LAW 6 (UK) 
765 Interview LAW 5 (US). 
766 Interviews GOV 2 (UK), FIN 6 (US). 
767 Interview BUS 3 (US). 
768 Interviews BUS 1 (RU), FIN 5 (RU). 
769 Interviews PRO 4 (UK) & LAW 4 (EE). 
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the extent of economic freedom and the rule of law in Putin's Russia? '° In particular, 
according to one interviewee, it reemphasised to foreigners the perception that 
Russia is still truly Soviet. "' The Russian Finance Minister has admitted that the 
dismemberment of Yukos and the prosecution of Khodorkovsky has damaged the 
country's reputation, especially since the company and its owner symbolised to 
many foreign investors, rightly or wrongly, a modem Russia? 72 
The media is held partly responsible for how Russia is (mis)represented abroad. 
Respondents blamed the western media for highlighting only the negative 
developments in Russia? " The media was blamed for "bringing out the bad in every 
good situation"74 and giving greater coverage to trivial disputes in Russia than to 
major deals? 'S They felt that even the more sober outlets such as The Economist, The 
Wall Street Journal, The BBC or CNN, which inform the western business 
community, had a tendency to spotlight negative stories776 A Moscow partner at a 
major international legal practice explained that he regularly met with visiting CEOs 
and spent much time trying to convince them that Russia "is in fact a little different 
than what he hears on CNN. "717Media coverage, it was argued, had the effect of 
exaggerating the risks in Russia778 Thus, it was widely felt that Russia required a 
concerted image building and PR effort abroad, 779 an effort which a Russian 
economic minister confirmed was being undertaken. 780 Indeed, policy initiatives with 
T° Financial Times 2003. 
771 Interview PRO 1 (UK). 
772 The Times 2005. 
n3 Interviews GOV 2 (UK), LAW 6 (UK), BUS 4 (RU), BUS 5 (UK). 
774 Interview BUS 5 (UK). 
T7 Interview LAW 6 (UK). 
776 Interviews CON 2 (US) (CNN and BBC mentioned), BUS 5 (UK) (The Economist 
mentioned), LAW 6 (UK) (The Wall Street journal mentioned). 
Tn Interview LAW 6 (UK). 
718 Interviews FIN 3 (RU), LAW 4 (EE), LAW 6 (UK). 
779 Interviews CON 2 (US), BUS 1 (RU) & LAW 6 (UK). 
780 Interview GOV 4 (RU). 
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the goal of improving Russia's image abroad have frequently been the talking point 
in foreign investment circles, often at the initiation of President Putin. 781 
Thus bad press compounds existing stereotypes782 The cumulative effect of this on 
potential foreign investors is to prevent them from taking a deeper look at Russia. 783 
This means that to some extent, potential investors are held back from researching 
the business case for an investment on account of their misguided general 
perceptions of the country. Thus the 'image barrier' is an instrumental factor in 
deterring FDI. In fact, one of the tasks of investment promoters is to assist 
prospective investors in overcoming stigmatised public impressions of Russia. 784 
It is significant that the image barrier hinders investors from further engagement, 
such as investigating thoroughly the opportunities and risks, and visiting the 
country785 In the terminology used in this study, the image barrier can discourage 
potential investors from becoming prospective investors. As an experienced British 
lawyer involved in investment promotion explains, transition to this latter stage of 
'prospective' investor can be critical: 
"Generally we find that people who get some information, some will still say that the 
not-so-good bits put me off. I can honestly say that anyone who goes on a trade 
mission comes back saying: 'it's nothing like I thought it would be. ' Then they're hooked. 
Very few people come back saying: 'it's not for Me. ' "186 
781 For further details of policy initiatives aimed at improving Russia's 'face', see Chapter 
Nine, Section 5.1 
782 Interview GOV 2 (UK). 
3 Interview PRO 4 (UK). 
7M Interview PRO 3 (UK). 
785 Interviews BUS 5 (UK). 
7 Interview PRO 1 (UK). 
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Conclusions 
In order to assert that law is a determinant of foreing investment, one must show 
that, when choosing the host, foreign investors refer to accurate information about 
the legal climate. Critically, it is evident that many potential foreign investors do not 
base their decision, if it can be even called one, to reject Russia on the basis of 
accurate and detailed information about the Russian legal system. It is not a decision 
as such, because inaccurate, stereotypical and sketchy impressions of Russia, 
according to the interviewees, act as an immediate deterrent to foreign investors into 
Russia, preventing them from actually looking at the country, its opportunities and 
risks in greater depth. Further, perceptions of the legal climate are not discernable 
from the blur of sweeping and often misguided overall impressions of the country 
and political risk there. 
These conclusions are supported by some of the literature presented in Chapter 
Four. 787 Within the FDI literature, both Perry-Kessaris and Hewko strongly question 
the importance of legal systems to FDI choices. The findings also corroborate the 
literature on behavioural decision making. For instance, media coverage of Russia is 
distorting, giving rise to an situation in which, "people are likely to think, 
mistakenly, that salient events are more common than equally prevalent but more 
subtle ones. "788 In this way negative headlines generated, for example by the Yukos 
affair, or the shooting of a prominent journalist, will have a greater impact on 
investors' perceptions than gradual improvements caused by the country's recent 
administrative and regulatory reforms. Bounded rationality also asserts that we use 
rules of thumb in our decisions: observing the quality of relations between heads of 
states would seem to fit this category. The point that newsworthy events have an 
appreciable impact of foreign investors was made in the analysis of the survey 
conducted by the Foreign Investment Advisory Council of Russia. The FIAC study 
seemed to show that the appearance of steps being made in the right direction 
787 Chapter Four, Section 2. 
M Jolls et al. 2000,50-51. 
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matter more to investors than the current quality of the legal climate789 Finally, the 
findings reassert the point that the image of Russia abroad is a pressing foreign 
investment issue. 
2.2 The Impact of Law on the Investment Decision 
The interviewees pointed out that one must distinguish between so-called 'potential' 
investors and 'prospective' investors. The previous subsection examined the 
perceptions of potential investors, those who are at the preliminary stage of an 
merely contemplating Russia as a possible investment destination. This subsection 
turns to the impact of the legal climate on prospective investors, those who are 
considering a specific investment opportunity. The interviews showed that to judge 
how important a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is to investors, it is necessary to 
first understand at what point 'the law' actually becomes a factor in the decision to 
invest in Russia; and then, what effect it has on the decision. 
The Russian legal climate becomes a salient issue once a firm has become a 
prospective investor, that is, once they are involved in a process of planning an 
investment. According to the interviewees, the first step in the investment decision 
process is establishing the 'business case' for an investment. m* Critically, legal 
analysis follows if and when a business case has been established, and a decision, in 
principle, has been taken to invest. 91 As a lawyer explained: 
"I think it's a question of timing. By the time they come here and start talking, and are 
paying overpaid legal counsel to give them advice, they've already crossed that 
hurdle of : 'will we do this or not, do we want to do this or not? "'792 
It is logical that analysis of the relevant laws and legal institutions would come after 
the business opportunities have has been considered. First, the business case is 
paramount, without a tangible investment opportunity, legal analysis is redundant. 
Chapter Three, Section 2. 
° Interview PRO 4 (UK). 
791 Interview PRO 4 (UK). 
792 Interview LAW 5 (US). 
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Second, legal consultation imposes transaction costs in terms of lawyers' fees and 
investors' time; this is why the market decision, in principle, should precede the legal 
investigation. Finally, legal consultation is only effective once the details of an 
investment have emerged. For example, due diligence is conducted once a potential 
partner has been identified. ' 
The next question is: how do investors react to information about the legal climate? 
Do they abandon a potential investment because they perceive the legal climate as 
theoretically weak? One lawyer couldn't recall a single investor who had abandoned 
a "solid business case" because of what they were told about the Russian legal 
climate. 794 A risk advisor said that clients "very rarely" walk away from Russia as a 
result of the advisor's work. 795 These responses may be tainted by the hubris of the 
advisors. On the other hand, the findings presented in the previous subsection 
suggest that investors might even be relieved by what their advisors tell them about 
the legal climate, given their initially exaggerated concerns. Indeed one respondent 
made a similar point, arguing that prospective investors are not turned off by the 
legal climate because they come in knowing that the legal system is poor. m 
It is fair to assume that whatever concerns are raised during the legal consultation 
process, lawyers would strive to offer adequate solutions. While risks cannot be 
eliminated, they can be dealt with. One lawyer advises that the risks "are not as 
great as you might otherwise think, they're more manageable than you might 
otherwise think, here's what you can do to manage those risks. "797 
The existence of legal challenges does not mean that foreign firms will abandon 
Russia. They can respond to the challenges, legal or otherwise, of operating in Russia 
via the timing of their approach and their market entry strategy. For example, they 
793 Interview CON 1 (RU). 
7% Interview LAW 5 (US), LAW 6 (UK). 
795 Interview CON 1 (RU). 
7% Interview LAW 2 (US). 
797 Interview LAW 6 (UK). 
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may defer the decision, whilst not abandoning Russia altogether. 798 Or they may 
spend longer researching and entering. For example, a major British industrial 
investor related that his firm spent two years considering an acquisition, before 
deciding to enter the market greenfield? " 
Gradual approaches to entering Russia may be available to some potential investors. 
Investors who are looking to sell their products on the Russian market, but are 
unsure about the opportunities or challenges may open a 'representative office: 800 
This is a relatively cheap and low exposure method of entering into Russia. Over a 
period of time, the foreign firm starts to trade and is in a better position to decide 
whether the opportunities and risks support an investment. A lawyer with 15 years 
experience in Moscow stated that many firms may not get beyond this first step, but 
very few leave altogether. 801 
A well established means of alleviating legal challenges is to take a Russian partner 
and to employ local staff, especially accountants and lawyers. In this way the 
incoming investor can pass on responsibility for dealing with issues that they find 
more difficult, whether they relate to legal or business operations. For example, 
Russian lawyers and accountants are useful for their familiarity with local 
bureaucratic processes, such as tax or licensing regulations, and the contacts they 
have in government agencies. 802 Perry-Kessaris found the same principle in action 
among foreign investors in India 803 
By using various techniques to enter the market, foreign investors aim to attain a 
level of comfort regarding the risks involved. As risk contains a strong element of 
perception, 604 the decision may turn on what level risk the individual decision 
798 Interview BUS 1 (RU). 
T" Interview FDI 2 (UK). 
Soo Interview CON 2 (US). 
801 Interview LAW 6 (UK). 
802 Interview PRO 1 (UK). 
803 Perry-Kessaris 2005,176. 
804 Interview CON 1 (RU). 
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makers are comfortable with. What is good enough for one investor may not be good 
enough for another in a similar situation. Hence, as argued in Chapter Four, much 
depends on the investor in question 805 
Conclusions 
To assess the alleged necessity of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate, one must 
examine as closely as possible the impact of the law on the decision to invest. The 
role of the legal climate in the investment decision is quite nuanced. First of all, 
investors only examine the legal climate thoroughly after the decision, in principle, 
has already been made to invest. This implies that investors choose between hosts on 
the basis of the strength of the business opportunity, not according to whether the 
host legal climate resembles the theoretical ideal. Further, it is rare, according to 
these interviewees, that investors abandon an opportunity because of what they 
learn about the legal climate or the legal advice given. Instead, investors can adapt 
their approach in order to be comfortable with the risks that they perceive. Thus, the 
issue of the legal climate is neither paramount in the minds of investors, nor is its 
impact absolute. Rather, legal issues can be secondary; investors have flexibility in 
their approach to the legal climate; and the impact of the climate is 'subjective' - it 
will depend on the investor in question. 
It could be argued that the legal climate deters potential and prospective investors at 
three stages. First, when the legal climate forms part of potential investors' overall 
perceptions of Russia, for instance, of political risk there. Second, as investors gain 
familiarity with the business environment and are establishing the business case, 
they will become informed, accurately or inaccurately, from various sources about 
the legal environment in Russia; what they learn may deter them from pursuing the 
opportunity further. The final point at which the legal climate may deter the 
805 See Chapter Four, Section 4. 
806 Further evidence of `subjectivity' will be presented in the context of the second 
hypothesis, in Section 3. 
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prospective foreign investor is when they seek legal advice in the run-up to embarking 
on a specific project. 
The evidence here suggests that inaccurate and stereotypical perceptions of Russia in 
general have a strong deterrent effect on potential investors, preventing many of 
them from actually examining the opportunities and risks of Russia and then 
arriving at a decision. Thus the quality of the legal climate is an important 
determinant of foreign investment to the extent that elements of the legal climate 
contribute to this negative general impression. There is little evidence to confirm or 
refute the supposition that potential foreign investors are put off by what they learn 
about the legal climate during the later, investigation stage, when information 
becomes more accurate. Unfortunately, methodological constraints make it hard to 
measure accurately which foreign investors 'ran away' from Russia. Based on the 
interviews, it is suggested that information about Russia, especially about the 
opportunities there, has a positive effect on investors. For example, a leading British 
lawyer/investment promoter states that "the ferst step, then, is getting them informed. 
And the second is getting them into Russia, once they're in, they're pretty much sold. "807 
This is consistent with the point that initial concerns about Russia are generally 
exaggerated. Finally, the evidence here refutes the claim that in-depth legal advice 
given to prospective investors changes their minds about a planned investment. 
There is little evidence in this subsection to persuade us that a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate is 'necessary' to attract foreign investors to Russia. Based on the 
opinions of the interviewees, it appears that foreign investors do not choose the host 
on the basis of its quality of its legal climate; nor, in turn, do they abandon an 
investment prospect because they perceive the absence of a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate. The finding is consistent with a number of points made by previous 
research and outlined in Chapter Four. 
807 Interview PRO 1 (UK). This is supported by the UK government official who says "It's 
surprising how many people come in and say, 'it's not what I expected, it's far more like a 
western market. "' Interview GOV 2 (UK). 
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Three studies presented in Chapter Three demonstrate that foreigners may not be 
dissuaded from investing, even though they acknowledge the shortcomings of its 
legal climate. For instance, Perry-Kessaris finds that foreign investors' assessments of 
the Sri Lankan legal climate class it as a theoretically unattractive (inefficient and 
unpredictable) one. Nevertheless, 83% would still have invested there if they had 
known prior to investing what they learned during operations about the Sri Lankan 
legal system. Elteto and Sass study foreign investors in Hungary. Their study shows 
that the Hungarian legal climate was a "very important" motive for foreign 
investors, but at the same time they labelled it as "inadequate, "808 which begs the 
question of why foreigners invest nonetheless. Similarly, the 2005 FIAC study of 
foreign investors in Russia was also remarkable for its contrasting findings: while the 
legal and regulatory climate stood out as the most significant obstacle to business, 
and appeared overwhelming, the vast majority of current investors were planning on 
increasing their investments, while most potential investors had plans to invest in 
Russia. 801 
The findings here show that foreigners may invest in spite of the legal climate if their 
motivation for investing overshadows the deterrent effect of the legal climate. 
Further, the findings demonstrate various ways in which legal risks can be managed. 
This corroborates existing literature, which demonstrates that risks can be mitigated 
by outsourcing legal responsibilities to joint venture partners810 and locals. 81' 
Unfortunately, the Dominant Theory does not take into account these important 
aspects. The final reason why the absence of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate may 
not prevent foreigners from investing is that a non Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
can still support foreign investors. The next subsection explores this possibility. 
sw Elteto & Sass 1998,10-11. 
SM See Chapter Three, Section 2. 
810 Chapter Four, Section 4.2.1. See, for example: Lankes & Venables 1997,560; Perry 2001, 
93; Thornton & Mikheeva 1997,105. 
811 Perry-Kessaris 2005,176. 
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2.3 Doing Business in the Russian Legal Climate 
In this subsection we continue to consider why a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
may not always be necessary to support foreign investors in Russia. However, the 
discussion now proceeds from the role of law in the investment decision to foreign 
investors' engagement with the legal climate, once they have actually invested in the 
country. Is the Dominant Theory justified in asserting that a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate is required to support foreign investors? Or can foreign investors can 
get by in Russia's non-theoretically ideal legal environment? 
This subsection is also relevant outside of the ambit of the hypothesis 612 It provides 
something there is scarcely any of in the literature -a detailed and first hand account 
of how foreign investors actually engage with and cope in the Russian legal climate. 
This is remarkable given the amount of literature devoted to listing the obstacles in 
its legal climate. It is particularly important because, as Chapter Eight shows, a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate may take a very long time to establish in Russia. 
Finally, this subsection extends topical issues in transitional law and development, 
such as the role of corruption, influence and informal institutions to the study of 
foreign investors. 
Both the assessments of the Russian legal climate in Chapter Five and the interview 
findings make it clear that the Russian legal climate does not resemble the 
Theoretical Ideal. The interviews support Hypothesis One, ("a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate is not always necessary to support foreign investors in Russia") in so 
far as they demonstrate that foreign investors can operate successfully in spite of this. 
The subsections that follow look in greater depth at how foreigners adapt to the 
Russian legal climate. The interviews show that a twin approach is required to 
effectively interact in the Russian legal climate. Foreign investors need to engage 
fully in the formal legal system, but at the same time support that approach with a 
strategy that takes advantage of the informal practices that are pervasive in the 
812 Hypothesis One is that "a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not always necessary to 
support foreign investors in Russia. " 
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environment. What this means is that it appears that while a polished formal legal 
climate may well be desirable, it may not be a precondition to attracting investment. 
The reason being that foreign investors can be pragmatic and adapt to the climate, 
protecting their rights by resorting to informal practices, influence and bribery where 
the official legal system is inadequate. 
Four legal spheres were highlighted in the interviews as being of concern to foreign 
investors: the bureaucratic environment, contracting and disputes, due diligence, and 
to a lesser extent, intellectual property rights. 
2.3.1 Bureaucracy 
In Chapter Five, it was shown that according to the BEEPS survey and other 
assessments, the most troubling aspects of the legal climate for domestic and foreign 
firms were the bureaucracy and bureaucratic interference. The interviewees 
reiterated the point that the biggest operational problem for foreign investors in 
Russia is the bureaucracy 813 First of all, "Russia is a great country for rubber 
stamps"814 - bureaucracy is pervasive and extensive. Second, laws and regulations are 
often senseless, vague, contradictory and overly demanding. 815 Third, bureaucrats 
have too much discretion in applying the rules, 816 which inevitably fosters corruption 
and causes unpredictability. 
Informal, personalised approaches substitute for formal and impersonal bureaucratic 
procedures, and serve as solutions to problems stemming from the bureaucratic 
environment. Depending on the particular situation encountered, a foreign investor's 
interface with the bureaucracy can take three forms: they can either engage directly 
with government officials; employ intermediary agencies; or have recourse to a 
813 For example, interviewees who explicitly made this point: PRO 2 (UK), FIN 3 (RU), FDI 
1 (UK), CON 4 (RU). 
814 Interview GOV 2 (UK). 
815 Interviews FDI 1 (UK), FDI 4 (WE), CON 5 (US), LAW 4 (EE). 
816 Interviews LAW 4 (EE), CON 5 (US), LAW 6 (UK). 
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security structure or 'krysha'. In so far as these suffice for foreign investors, a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate may not always be necessary to support them. 
A central part of business operations in Russia revolves around acquiring 
permissions to conduct the chosen activity. Acquiring operating licences, permits, 
approvals and permissions in Russia is a highly bureaucratic process. However 
detailed the requirements, obtaining most licences is ultimately a question of the 
firm's relationship with the issuing agency. 817 So, part of their legal strategy must be 
to cultivate relationships with government officials 818 
Foreign investors therefore survive in Russia by engaging the authorities positively, 
in order to prove their fitness for the licence in question; bribery is not necessarily 
required, 819 although much will depend on the regulatory sphere and regulators in 
question 820 Fostering friendly relations821 and establishing goodwill by seeking the 
advice of officials, 822 inviting them to the premises and gift-giving823 or paying a 
bribe824 were considered to be useful strategies in licensing. In cases where obtaining 
permissions does not depend on an official's judgment, that is, where all applicants 
will receive the permit, but the length of the process is a hindrance, bribes are useful 
for expediting applications 825 
The development of cordial relations with the bureaucracy is best outsourced to 
locals. Foreigners themselves, according to a leading British investment promoter, 
cannot engage effectively with the lower levels of Russian bureaucracy, 826 whereas a 
817 Interview LAW 5 (US). 
818 Interview FDI 8 (EE), LAW 5 (US), LAW 6 (UK), CON 5 (US). 
819 Interview LAW 5 (US). 
820 Interview LAW 4 (EE), LAW 5 (US), CON 4 (RU). 
821 Interview LAW 5 (US), CON 5 (US). 
822 Interview LAW 5 (US). 
823 Interview PRO 4 (UK), BUS 5 (UK). 
824 Interview LAW 2 (US), CON 5 (US). 
825 Interview LAW 2 (US). 
826 Interview PRO 1 (UK). 
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Russian manager can. 827 One European Chamber of Commerce tells its members to 
not engage in bribery, but to leave it to Russians 828 Thus, part of the adaptation 
strategy of foreign investors is to 'go native' by means of well-connected Russian 
employees, 829 lawyers, 830 or partners83' who will administer day-to-day legal and 
bureaucratic matters. 
In some regulatory spheres, specialist agencies are hired to obtain the requisite 
approvals. These private agencies have close ties with the regulating government 
agency, for example, they may be run by former government officials or members of 
the security services. Respondents used these agencies for telecommunications 
licensing, 832 insurancem and the visas of foreign staff. 834 Foreign investors can also 
use these agencies to purchase 'off-the-shelf' companies that have already acquired 
the registrations and permissions needed to start operating in a given sector 
Customs is a sphere in which such agencies are particularly active 836 
The third and final part of a foreign investor's legal strategy is having a krysha (roof): 
"So, you have to understand and obey the law, but beyond that, there is also a 
practical way that things are done. For example, there may be no laws with regards to 
certain business activities, but it should be a well understood fact that before you 
engage in this activity, you find out who the competition is, how strong they are, 
meaning - not what is their market share, and what their management systems are, 
but who is their krysha? Who is sponsoring them and how much influence do they 
have? "837 
827 Interview CON 5 (US). 
828 Interview BUS 2 (WE). 
829 Interviews LAW 4 (EE), CON 3 (WE). 
830 Interviews PRO 3 (UK), FDI 7 (UK). 
831 Interviews PRO 1 (UK), PRO 3 (UK). 
832 Interview FDI 9 (UK). 
833 Interview FDI 10 (UK). 
Interview FDI 4 (WE). 
835 Interview FDI 7 (UK). 
836 Interviews FDI 3 (UK), BUS 2 (WE). See also Remmes 2002,4. 
837 Interview CON 5 (US). 
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A krysha is a connection to a person with influence who can protect the client's 
interests. The krysha is usually either a politician or a contact within influential 
government ministries such as the state security services. 838 The krysha could also be 
within the 'mafia' or a private security firm, though there was bare mention of this in 
this research 839 Influential ties are important both in assessing one's competition, as 
the previous quote indicated, but also in more routine legal operations. For example, 
one foreign investor described how their firm's 'security structure' worked to both 
pre-empt and respond to legal problems arising from government officials: 
"In our case we have a security division within the company, and it's linked to one of 
the government agencies, and if there's ever a problem, pur people call our contacts, 
and they make sure that the problems are limited or solved. We have an ex-MVD 
[Ministry of Internal Affairs] guy, and it just depends which organ within the 
government you want to have your assistance from. They help you with all sorts of 
issues - one of your employees is in a car accident, or you run someone over, or you 
have a fire inspection, or one of your employees has stolen something - from the little 
problems, to full blown tax inspections. " 
A point made by two respondents offer a final insight into the dynamic of the 
bureaucratic environment and the extent to which good connections are effective. 
One investor explained that, owing to the firm's 'security structure', bureaucrats 
"can't come up with hot air, there has to be a very specific situation. "841 Similarly, an 
American lawyer remarked that: 
"You cannot cause me problems in the 64th militia, unless I've really done something 
wrong, because their attitude is: 'we know those boys, one of our guys took some money 
from those boys, he was fired without a pension, so if it doesn't look real we're just not going 
to touch [sic]. "842 
Interview LAW 4 (EE), LAW 6 (UK), CON 5 (US). 
839 One Russian in corporate finance suggested this, Interview PRO 6 (RU). 
840 Interview FDI 6 (UK). 
841 Interview FDI 6 (UK). 
842 Interview LAW 2 (US). 
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In conclusion then, while good contacts will act as a buffer against groundless 
harassment, they do not provide foreign investors with a carte blanche to violate laws. 
A final caveat, however, is that while informal practices are not guaranteed to prevail 
over the application of rules and regulations, "in ten years here, I haven't yet come 
across one problem that can't be resolved with money. "843 
2.3.2 Contracting and Disputes 
Naturally, property rights protection is a key concern of economic actors in weak 
legal environments. As demonstrated by the BEEPS and other assessments in the 
previous Chapter, one of the weak links of the Russian legal system is the application 
and enforcement of laws by the courts. 844 As we will see, this can be due to three 
factors: the role of politics and influence; bribery; ineffective enforcement of 
judgements. The interviews show that foreign investors use a combination of formal 
and informal legal measures in order to reduce contractual risks and deal with 
disputes. Formal measures are common in contracting and structuring relations, 
while recourse to informal measures are often called for in disputes and the 
enforcement of property rights. 
It has already been demonstrated that the recommended legal strategy for foreign 
investors is to adopt the practices that are suited to Russia. In contracting, this 
principle remains true. Legal strategies can be used to minimise the risks of 
investing. For example, foreigners can manage contractual risks by taking advance 
payment; by making the standard terms and conditions of a contract governable by 
Russian law (instead of foreign law); and by using a contractual format that a 
Russian court will be familiar with. 845 
843 Interview FDI 1 (UK). Interviewee FDI 6 (UK) made a similar point, that "everything 
can be negotiated. " 
8" Chapter Six, subsection 2.2. 
845 Interview LAW 6 (UK). 
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To maximise their chances of prevailing in a dispute it is important that foreign 
investors structure their relationships with detailed agreements 8`6 Risks can be 
mitigated via the contractual provisions. For example, undesirable shareholders can 
be 'ring-fenced', stronger assurances for repayment of the investment by the Russian 
partner can be asserted, or provisions can be included to separate the new company 
from the Russian partner's existing businesses M7 
Foreign investors are perceived to have a poor success rate in legal disputes with 
local businesses such as their joint venture partners, "8 and there is a perception that 
Russian courts are biased against foreigners 849 This track record has improved of 
late, m especially in Moscow. 85' One lawyer laid out the set of circumstances in which 
recourse to the courts might be effective: 
"So, my feeling in a nutshell about Russian law is that if politics is not involved and 
the other side is not bribing, the system works. If it's you against the government, 
and politics are not involved, the system also works. For example, if you receive good 
tax advice, and you've implemented it well, you have an extremely high chance that 
you're going to win. 
If politics are involved, all bets are off. And the higher the politician involved, the less 
chance you're going to win. Nobody wins against President Putin, and nobody wins 
against [Moscow's] Mayor Luzhkov, and it doesn't really matter what the law says. 
And when you're in the regions, it's about the same with the regional governors. "852 
According to the formula above, the decisive question in a legal dispute is, 'who is 
the opposition', or, in the words of an interviewee already quoted, "who is their 
M Interview PRO 6 (RU). 
847 Interview CON 1 (RU). 
See, for example, Interview LAW 3 (UK), LAW 6 (UK), Black & Tarassova 2002,15; 
Dean 2002, Hertzfeld 2000,4; however, the only piece of research that surveys the 
success of foreign litigants, concludes that "the likelihood of a foreign party obtaining a 
fair outcome in the Russian court system is greater than generally believed", Hendrix 
2001,112. 
849 Hendrix 2001,94. 
0 Interviews CON 1 (RU), LAW 3 (UK), PRO 4 (UK) & LAW 6 (UK). 
851 Interviews CON 1 (RU), PRO 1 (UK). 
852 Interview LAW 2 (US). 
228 
krysha? Who is sponsoring them and how much influence do they have? "M Thus, when 
politics and influence are involved, the independence of the judiciary is swayed by 
the relative degrees of influence the rival parties can militate in their favour. 
Ledeneva also argues that resolving problems in Russia hinges on the power of the 
network that one can mobilise. 854 
Where politics are not involved, that is, when one party is not relying on an 
influential ally to interfere in the case, the playing field may still not be level, due to 
straight bribery. Opinions varied on the degree of corruption of the courts and the 
impact this has on foreign investors. Some felt that the entire system is corrupt m but 
more felt that the courts had improved notably. One lawyer felt that corruption 
only affects a minority of disputes, 857 another held that it was now the norm to go to 
the courts .m Other respondents took the position that the courts should 
be 
avoided 159 
The operative principle in judicial corruption is that the first party to pay the court, 
wins 860 What was thought to be the implication of judicial corruption on foreign 
investors? On the one hand, some respondents argued that foreign investors could 
not engage in the foul play that can be entailed in disputes; 861 in contrast, others 
noted that recruitment of Russian counsel by foreign investors is a euphemism for 
853 Interview CON 5 (US). 
MA Ledeneva 2001,30. 
855 Interviews FIN 2 (US), LAW 2 (US). 
8 Interviews PRO 1 (UK), GOV 2 (UK), LAW 3 (UK), LAW 6 (UK) & BUS 5 (UK). 
857 Interview LAW 3 (UK). 
858 Interview LAW 6 (UK). 
859 Interviews LAW 4 (EE), BUS 5 (UK). 
8W Interview LAW 2 (US). The following joke was recounted a number of times by the 
interviewees, albeit with different protagonists and sums of money involved: 
Abramovich and Khodorkovsky are suing each other. Abramovich offers $1m to the 
judge, while Khodorkovsky offers $1.5m. So the judge, in a dilemma, seeks the advice of 
his colleagues. 'What shall we do? ' he asks, to which, one of his colleagues replies: 'Why 
don't you get another half a million from Abramovich, and then we can try the case on 
its merits! ' 
861 Interview LAW 4 (EE). 'Foul play' is not limited to bribing the courts, but prompting 
various government agencies to investigate the opposing party and support false 
charges against them. Interviews LAW 2 (US), CON 5 (US). 
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bribing the courts 862 Therefore, it again depends on the attitudes and circumstances 
of the investor. 
The final reason why Russia's legal climate is described as weak and unpredictable is 
due to the often arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement of court judgements. 10 The 
example of intellectual property protection will be used to demonstrate how foreign 
investors must, again, rely on a combination of formal and informal procedures. First 
of all, foreign investors must register their brands with the various government 
bodies, such as Rospatent, which administer IP matters. In the case of a violation, 
foreign investors should bring evidence to them According to a senior official at a 
European Chamber of Commerce, most disputes are settled out of court 86SWhether 
the matter goes to court or not, foreign investors can come up against a lack of will 
and motivation, so it is necessary to motivate enforcement agencies e66Thus, foreign 
investors need to pay law enforcers to pursue the violators 867 
There is evidence in the literature that firms in Russia, owing to the weakness of the 
judicial system, rely more than usual on dispute resolution outside of the courts. m 
Similarly, in the present study, one interviewee explained that Russian businessmen 
may sign detailed agreements between themselves, in plain "non-legal' language, and 
then, in the case of a dispute, take these to a structure that "has real power", such as 
the mafia or security services 169 Foreign investors do indeed use private arbitration 
and other forms of out of court settlement, however, there is insufficient evidence to 
indicate the relative extent of reliance upon state and non-state dispute resolution 
approaches. 
862 Interview LAW 2 (US). 
M3 See, for example, Levin & Satarov 2000,6-7; OECD 2001,16-17; Economist Intelligence 
Unit 2003; Berglof et al. 2003,72,80-84. This point is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Six, Section 4, and also Chapter Two, Section 3.3; the point is verified by the 
fieldwork, for example Interviews LAW 6 (UK), BUS 3 (US). 
864 Interview CON 5 (US), BUS 5 (UK). 
Interview BUS 5 (UK). 
866 nterview CON 5 (US). 
867 Interview CON 1 (RU). 
8M Hendley et al. 1997,2000. 
869 Interview PRO 6 (RU). 
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As with any jurisdiction, in Russia it is preferable to settle out of court, where 
possible B70 In order to circumvent the Russian courts, foreign investors often specify 
foreign courts or arbitration venues in their agreements; in fact, one European 
Chamber of Commerce was at the time attempting to set up an international 
arbitration forum 871 However, the enforcement of foreign court judgements in 
Russia still faces signicant difficulties g'2 Instead disputes can often be successfully 
arbitrated through the local Chambers of Commerce. 873Also, tax disputes can often 
be settled through negotiation with the tax authorities S74 Finally, as one might 
expect, smaller businesses cannot afford the legal costs of going to court, and 
therefore rely more heavily on personal relations and private arbitration . 875 
2.3.3 Due Diligence 
Prior to entering into a substantial business relationship, for example with a joint 
venture partner or a key supplier, foreign investors will have to undertake due 
diligence. Lack of information about one's rights and the absence of clear rights can 
increase costs to investors. This is indeed a problem, given the lack of transparency in 
Russian business. 876 Thus formal due diligence can be insufficient. To compensate for 
this, foreign investors must also take account of various 'grey' issues in order to 
accurately assess the risk of a partnership. One practitioner explains: 
"Due diligence from a legal standpoint is to make sure all the i's have been dotted, 
the is crossed, everything was done legally, legitimately; from an accounting 
standpoint it's to go over the books. What I try to do is find that second set of books, 
to find out if the numbers are actually real. Look at those so-called debtors - who are 
they really? I don't know how many times I've found companies whose distributors 
870 Interviews PRO 1 (UK), LAW 4 (EE). 
871 Interview BUS 5 (UK). 
872 Remmes 2002,6; OECD 2001,18; Hertzfeld 2000,4-5. 
873 Interview PRO 1 (UK). 
874 Interview CON 4 (RU). 
875 Interview CON 3 (WE). 
876 Chapter Two, subsection 2.2.1. 
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owe them money, and in reality they're owned by friends or relatives of the 
directors... 
What I do is find out who really controls this company that you're about to invest in. 
What are their spheres of influence, political and criminal? Are they paying their 
customs duties, are they doing something to tilt the market in their favour? Some 
companies are wise enough to see areas that require investigation, law firms 
definitely wouldn't . "877 
It appears then, that for firms to succeed in the Russian legal climate, they must be 
prepared to investigate and tackle some slightly opaque issues. One of the keys to 
coping in the Russian legal climate is a readiness seek solutions that lie a step beyond 
the traditional boundaries of formal legal systems, though are not necessarily in 
unethical or illegal territories. 
2.3.4 Conclusions 
The findings clearly show that, to be successful, foreign investors must adapt their 
legal strategies to the Russian legal climate. They need, therefore, to invoke a blend 
of formal procedures and informal practices, sometimes in combination. The extent 
of their reliance on one or the other depends on the legal sphere in question and their 
own attitudes. Respondents all made the point that foreign investors must abide by 
the law, and be as thorough as possible, not so much for reasons of principle, but 
because Russia has a "very unforgiving legal climate. "88 Failure to follow regulations 
carefully and employ legal prudence will provide regulators and competitors with 
ammunition to cause problems. 1179 Legal diligence must also be supplemented with 
informal practices, such as making use of influential connections and contacts with 
government officials, paying-off bureaucrats and law-enforcers, often for legitimate 
ends, such as speeding up licensing applications or enforcing court judgements. 
Foreigners do not need to get their 'hands dirty' with such practices, but can leave 
877 Interview CON 5 (US). 
878 Interview LAW 5 (US). 
879 Interviews LAW 5 (US), CON 5 (US). 
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these to local staff and partners, who will be more adept at navigating the Russian 
legal system. 
The interviews support Hypothesis One to the extent that they demonstrate how 
foreign investors can be supported by a weak legal climate. For instance, as expected, 
informal practices and bribery compensate, to some extent, for the shortcomings of 
the formal legal system. This shows that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not as 
'necessary' as the Dominant Theory alleges. Here we must highlight the distinction 
between a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate and a workable one: while foreign 
investors should not predicate their business plans on being able to obtain effective 
redress from the legal system, 880 the legal system is 'do-able' 181 So, the host legal 
climate, while far from the Theoretical Ideal, may still be satisfactory in the eyes of 
certain foreign investors; Perry-Kessaris also suggests this explanation in her study of 
foreign investors in Sri Lanka 882 
The second crucial finding is that much of the impact of the legal climate depends on 
the investor and investment in question. Section 3 looks at this question in more 
depth, showing how the legal strategies of foreign investors depend on their 
characteristics. 
2.4 Conclusions: Assessing the Necessity of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
Hypothesis One is that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not always necessary to 
support foreign investors in Russia. The interviews supported this hypothesis in 
three ways. 
First, during the preliminary stages leading up to an investment, the interviews 
showed that investors do not even look at the legal climate carefully. Many potential 
foreign investors, do not consider investing in Russia, not because they have 
8W Interviews CON 2 (US), BUS 3 (US). 
881 Interviews PRO 3 (UK), LAW 4 (EE), CON 3 (WE) & LAW 6 (UK). 
882 Perry 2001,125-126. 
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examined the legal climate closely, but on account of the inaccurate and stereotypical 
impressions of Russia that they have. In the words of a British investment promoter: 
"British companies fall along a continuum, in terms of their attitude to Russia. 
Predominantly, complete ignorance and lack of interest, and that would apply to a 
very large proportion of British companies. It simply hasn't got on the radar. "883 
Sketchy impressions, which often derive from the media, deter them from looking at 
Russia' investment opportunities and legal risks at greater depth. Further, when 
potential investors look at Russia from afar, the legal climate does not stand out, but 
is subsumed within the blur of sweeping and often misguided overall impressions of 
the country and political risk there. At this stage, what Russia as a country requires is 
a generally more positive image abroad, rather than specific improvements in its 
legal climate, which may go unnoticed. As mentioned elsewhere, the Russian 
government has acknowledged the need to improve Russia's image abroad 884 
Second, the interviews suggest that investors neither choose nor reject Russia on the 
basis of their assessment of its legal climate. The business opportunity is the most 
decisive factor, and legal assessments are only conducted once a decision has been 
taken, in principle, to invest. The interviews suggest that investors rarely abandon a 
potential investment after examining the legal climate. Instead, investors can adapt 
their approach to the legal challenges in order to manage the risks they perceive, for 
example by recruiting local staff and partners. Thus, not only are legal issues 
secondary to the investment decision, but legal challenges can be responded to, and 
how this is done depends on the investor. 
Finally, just as the legal risks of investing in Russia can be managed, so too can the 
legal challenges of operating in the country, even if they appear daunting at first. As 
one might expect, informal procedures are relied upon to compensate for the 
883 PRO 3 (UK). 
884 Chapter Four, subection 2.2. 
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shortcomings of the formal legal system. According to the advocates of the Dominant 
Theory, an ideal legal climate is one with impersonal and automated regulatory 
procedures. Without a transparent framework in place in Russia at present, foreign 
investors can instead take advantage of the discretion available to government 
officials. To secure their rights, they need to foster good relations with bureaucrats, 
which may involve giving them gifts. Investors may also influence government 
officials and the courts either by way of bribes, or via personal connections. 
The findings do not completely refute the Dominant Theory, nor was the intention 
such. There is no suggestion that foreign investors would not welcome significant 
improvements in the legal climate, nor administrative and judicial improvements 
would not eventually contribute to greater investment in the future. But it would be 
a mistake to view the issue as black and white when it evidently contains numerous 
shades of grey. The interviews verify the hypothesis that a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate is not always necessary to support foreign investors in Russia, in two ways: 
first, the legal climate is not a paramount factor in the decision to invest; second, 
legal obstacles do not have the detrimental impact that the Dominant Theory 
predicts. We can conclude then, that the Dominant Theory only provides a partial 
explanation of the relationship between foreign investors and the Russian legal 
climate, and in doing so tends to exaggerate the importance of a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate. One way to interpret this finding is to read it as showing that there 
this a faction of foreign investors who do not conform to the Dominant Theory. The 
next Section extends this approach. 
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3 Are All Foreign Investors The Same? 
The second Hypothesis is that foreign investors' perceptions of the Russian legal 
climate depend on their firm characteristics. In this Section we examine how the 
impact of the Russian legal climate, both in the decision to invest, and during 
operations, depends on the attributes of foreign investors. Investigation of this issue 
has two merits: first, it enables one to discern whether a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate is of equal importance to all investors, or whether it depends on particular 
characteristics; second, the role of firm characteristics merit research in their own 
right, as they provide a more sophisticated understanding of foreign investors and 
the law. The interviews touched on a number of firm characteristics, for instance, 
size, nationality, firm sector and experience. 
3.1 Size 
3.1.1 Differences Between Small and Large Foreign Investors 
According to the interviewees, the firm attribute with the greatest impact on a firm's 
approach to the legal climate in Russia is its size. A foreign investors' size can affect 
their perceptions of law in the decision to invest. For example, small firms are more 
swayed by headlines and bad press, while larger firms can afford to conduct more 
thorough research, 885 and hire the best legal counsel. 886 Thus, while smaller firms may 
be put-off by their poor general perceptions and therefore not go on to assess the 
business climate any further, bigger firms can afford to both investigate the 
opportunities and risks more extensively, and also to persevere in spite of the legal 
challenges. Another implication of size is that, the bigger the firm, the more attention 
will be paid to the formal aspects of the legal climate 887 Finally, larger western 
investors into Russia attract attention, and so their entry is loaded with a political 
and public relations dimension. For example, one British investor interviewed was 
8 Interviews PRO 1 (UK), PRO 4 (UK) & BUS 2 (WE). 
886 Interview PRO 2 (UK). 
887 Interviews PRO 4 (UK), PRO 6 (RU). 
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personally assisted during the investment process by both the UK Ambassador to 
Russia and the Russian Minister for Economic Development 888 
Firm size also has a great impact on foreign investors' standing once they are 
operating in Russia. According to existing literature, the general principle by which 
small and large firms differ, and are advantaged or hamstrung is this: small firms are 
less visible and are therefore able to evade the formal legal and tax system to an 
extent, whereas larger firms are more visible, but at the same time have greater 
clout P9 The interviews verified these points. 
The extent of regulations in Russia, the start-up costs for business and the level of 
taxation together shape the strategies of small firms, including foreign investors. This 
overall burden has a bigger impact on small businesses, as they have fewer resources 
to deal with the financial and time transaction costs. As a consequence, operating 
legally can be "the least efficient way to go. "890 So, in order to maximise efficiency, 891 
firms need to go 'underground'892 meaning to avoid officialdom and the taxman as 
much as possible 893 In fact, one western consultant in Moscow advises foreign start- 
ups to do precisely that 894 
As already mentioned, one aspect of the regulatory environment that is particularly 
unwelcome is bureaucratic interference. Bureaucratic interference is somewhat 
correlated to the visibility of a firm, for example, a retailer will suffer more 
bureaucratic intrusion than a wholesaler, as in the case of one of the respondents 895 
Small firms are less prominent, and thus are less at risk of attracting attention from 
BBS Interview FDI 2 (UK). 
8 Hewko 2002,10; Perry 2001,148-151. 
8 Interview FDI 7 (UK). 
891 Interviews FDI 6 (UK), FDI 7 (UK). 
892 Interview CON 2 (US). 
893 Interview FDI 1 (UK), CON 2 (US), FDI 6 (UK) & FDI 7 (UK). 
8% Interview CON 2 (US). 
895 Interview FDI 1 (UK). 
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predatory bureaucrats. Moreover, it is less risky for them to bribe officials. Small 
firms also reported using 'fixers' to procure licences"7 Finally, local staff also assist 
small foreign investors in dealing with the legal and regulatory conditions .m 
According to interviewees, large firms are less likely to have a problem with 
predatory bureaucrats, $" as they are likely to have the appropriate contacts and 
structures in place to pre-empt harassment. They will also benefit from being able to 
afford better lawyers. " Their contacts are likely to be of a political nature, and the 
larger the firm, the better the contacts. One investment promoter provides a colourful 
example: 
if you're a major investment in Russia, the real way that you get everything to 
happen, is that you get a two minute meeting with Putin, or someone who can bend 
his ear in the presidential administration, or someone like [Moscow Mayor] Luzhkov 
- the'big man', that's how the law gets done in Russia. 
We could spend hours debating about the nuances of the Russian Federation - 
rubbish! Let's be frank here, what's really going to make a difference in Russia today, 
and the Khodorkovsky thing can only underline this, is you've got to know the right 
big man. I remember speaking to a very big guy at [a tobacco company], who led into 
Russia, and we were having enormous problems, people were stealing truckloads of 
his cigarettes, and he got his CEO to meet Putin, and say, 'look Vladimir, if this carries 
on, we u ill take away our ]multimillion dollar] investment in Russia', and I'm sure that's 
an empty threat, but the point is that once Putin made it known to all those people 
who worked in the regional ministry of economic development, goodbye to stealing 
cigarettes"*" 
8% Interviews FDI 1(UK), FDI 6 (UK). 
so Interviews FDI 9 (UK), FDI I (UK). 
gap Interview FDI 6 (UK), CON 3 (WE). 
M Interview CON 5 (US). 
+ºV Interview CON 4 (RU). 
w' Interview PRO3 (UK). 
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3.1.2 The Visibility of Large Foreign Investors 
The visibility of western investors in Russia, especially large, publicly traded ones, is 
a significant issue. It can bring both advantages and disadvantages to firms' legal 
activities. According to the interviewees, the advantage that it brings is that such 
firms can and have used their status for attracting publicity and attention to instances 
in which their rights are being violated. 902 Large foreign investors, owing to their 
visibility and their stature, carry significant influence and lout 90 As the last quote 
made clear, the largest foreign investors may well be able to get assurances from the 
highest political authorities. ' " This is considered a quite effective form of redress, ° 
as it prompts a political intervention aimed at avoiding the undesirable negative 
publicity that such violations can generate. In fact, for exactly this reason, the 
investment strategy of the most high profile and vocal foreign portfolio investor 
relies on the principle of only investing in a Russian company if there is a public 
interest at stake. " 
The disadvantage that large western foreign investors face in Russia is that, as they 
are expected to be "clean", °07 they cannot be seen to behave in particular ways. The 
need to preserve their international reputations may prevent them from engaging in 
"foul play techniques", in particular, in disputes with Russian counterparts? In 
contrast, Russian firms are less likely to be constrained by this image factor. 
Before proceeding, we need to be clearer about what is meant by "foul play 
techniques. " Practices exist on a continuum, let's say, from mild to nasty. Using 
influential connections, gift giving or paying off government officials and judges, lie 
at the more palatable end of the scale; there is evidence, presented here as well as in 
90 Interviews FIN 2 (US), FIN 3 (RU), LAW 4 (EE) & BUS 5 (UK). 
+o' Interview LAW 2 (US). 
IN Interview LAW 5 (US). 
*n Interviews FIN 2 (US), LAW 4 (EE). 
wº Interview FIN 2 (US). 
Interview PRO I (UK). 
Interviews FIN 2 (US), LAW 2 (US) & LAW 4 (EE). 
239 
Chapter Four, 909 that foreign investors use such tactics. However, there are other 
tactics that are known to occur in Russia that are much less palatable, though I have 
no indication of how commonplace they are today. For example, business rivals can 
militate numerous government bodies against one another, send death threats or 
occupy business premises by force. There was no evidence from the interviews in 
this study that foreign investors employed such practices, and we would have to 
consider it exceptional if foreign investors did resort to such extreme measures. 
The preceding analyses refer therefore to the milder forms of dubious activity. I use 
the term 'dubious', because of the difficulty in drawing the line between legitimate 
and illegitimate forms of influence. For example, even western advisors questioned 
the impropriety of giving gifts, 910 and argued that fixing a value at which a licit gift 
becomes an illicit bribe was arbitrary 91' 
The point is that there are a range of informal activities that we can consider as 
feasible legal strategies for foreign investors, but which may be perceived as 
unacceptable by their shareholders and customers. The two following examples will 
suffice to make this point. 
There is no evidence available that foreign investors have higher ethical standards 
and are constrained by these 912 The issue is one of pragmatism, of putting a distance 
between themselves and practices that might be perceived as unacceptable. Thus 
Russia is replete with intermediaries that act as buffers between the investor and the 
proscribed act. For example, in regulatory spheres such as customs or licensing 
specialised agencies are employed to fulfil the requisite tasks. A part of their fee goes 
towards paying off the relevant officials. 913 In legal disputes, local lawyers are often 
909 See Chapter Four, subsection 3.1. 
910 Interviews CON 2 (US), BUS 5 (UK) 
911 Interview BUS 5 (UK) 
912 In Chapter Four, subsection 4.1 World Bank evidence was presented that showed that 
foreign investors "were among the greatest beneficiaries of corruption in the region 
during the period. " 
913 Interviews FDI 3 (UK), FDI 9, FDI 10 (UK), BUS 2 (WE) & CON 5 (US). 
240 
brought in by western law firms, not for some legal expertise that they might 
possess, but because they are able to bribe judges914 Foreigners do not necessarily 
engage in such practices, but the point is that, concern for their reputation - which is 
the issue at stake here - need not prevent them from operating in the legal climate in 
a similar fashion to Russian firms. 
This is only true up to a point, however. Respondents explained that foreign 
investors may have a lower tolerance for certain types of legal risks - either because 
of the need to uphold their international and domestic profiles, or because "mistakes 
come back to haunt you. "915 Such mistakes open the door for predatory bureaucrats 
and competitors to cause problems. Risks that may jeopardise an entire project 
include, for example, a "cockamamie tax scheme" or regulatory shortcut 9'6 
Therefore, it is in foreigners' long term interests, according to one lawyer, to opt to 
establish a good reputation in Russia and stick to that reputation, even if legal 
processes will take longer as a result. 917 
3.1.3 Medium Sized Firms 
The literature shows that medium sized firms are caught somewhere between the 
two extremes 918 They may neither be able to benefit from the inconspicuousness of 
small firms, nor from the influence of larger ones. Medium sized foreign firms face a 
dilemma - if they are growing and wish to raise further capital and expand, they 
must'clean' their businesses, especially their tax affairs. This is what one British firm 
did 919 It has also been the case that Russian entrepreneurs choose to diversify rather 
than continue to expand their businesses, as they do not wish to attract undesirable 
attention-921 
914 Interviews PRO 2 (UK), LAW 2 (US). 
915 Interview LAW 5 (US). 
916 Interview LAW 2 (US). 
917 Interview PRO 1 (UK). 
918 Batra et al. 2002,49; Hewko 2002,10; Perry 2001,148-151. 
919 Interview FDI 6 (UK). 
° Interview CON 5 (US). 
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3.2 Nationality Culture and Mentality 
There was no consensus about the impact of firm nationality. The greater share of 
respondents denied any trend 921 for example, saying they had seen equal measures 
of success and failure 922 Other respondents were sure that nationality mattered, but 
did not give specific examples 9u Some respondents provide specific examples of 
how they expected national culture to affect perceptions of the legal climate: 
Americans were deemed to have a keener eye for the fine points of the law, 924 Asians, 
Italians, Germans, Turks and Indians were more comfortable in the Russian legal 
climate, 925 British investors were often characterised as being be particularly 
conservative 926 
In suggesting that differences exist in foreign investors' attitudes to the legal climate 
according to their nationalities, one is really getting at whether investors can be 
classed according to their attitudinal differences towards the law, which may in turn 
be associated with nationality, as "our thinking is partly conditioned by national 
cultural factors. "927 In the words of one interviewee, "there are different orthodoxies of 
doing things in different countries. " 921 In fact, a number of respondents argued that 
the true difference that set companies apart was not their nationalities so much but 
their company culture and management attitudes, which did in fact have an impact 
on their choice of legal strategies 929 For instance, managers differ in the level of 
'comfort' they require in a particular investment context, and the amount of risk they 
are prepared to take? 3° It was commonly felt that the best strategy for foreign 
921 Interviews CON 2 (US), LAW 2 (US), BUS 1 (RU), LAW 4 (EE), LAW 5 (US), LAW 6 
(UK). 
9n Interview LAW 4 (EE). 
923 Interviews CON 1 (RU). 
924 Interviews CON 2 (US), PRO 6 (RU). 
925 Interviews CON 1 (RU) (Germans & Italians), PRO 6 (RU) (Asians & Germans), FDI 7 
(UK) (Indians & Turks), PRO 1 (UK) (Italians & Germans). 
9M Interviews FDI 2 (UK), PRO 3 (UK), FDI 8 (EE). 
927 Hofstede 1983,76. 
M Interview LAW 5 (US). 
; Interviews CON 1 (RU), BUS 1 (RU), LAW 4 (EE), LAW 5 (US). 
930 Interview LAW 4 (EE). 
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investors was to adapt culturally, and 'go native'931 such that even some large 
multinationals such as Kraft or Nestle are perceived as domestic firms. 932 
Interestingly, Perry-Kessaris also found this to be true in India 933 
A related firm characteristic which affects the impact of the law in the decision to 
invest is the previous experience of the potential foreign investor. One respondent 
puts the point across clearly: 
"It [their response to the Russian legal climate] depends on the company's 
philosophy, it depends to a large extent on how much business they're ready to do in 
emerging markets. If they're familiar with emerging markets, then there's nothing in 
Russia that will come as a surprise to them. For companies that have done business in 
China, in Bulgaria or Romania, for companies that are familiar with those markets, 
with Asia-Pacific markets, they're not going to be phased. Companies who have less 
familiarity dealing with emerging markets will of course have a greater problem. "934 
Other respondents agreed on this principle. 935 This echoes Wang's argument that 
foreign investors with previous experience of countries that lack the rule of law will 
fair better in China . 936 
Foreign investors that lack the requisite experience and approach will suffer. 
Respondents, both Russian and western, explained that foreign investors often do 
not grasp the flexibilities of the Russian legal climate. According to a Russian 
investment promoter, in Russia "the law is - you can use it in different ways"937 Or, in 
the words of a senior British lawyer: 
931 Interviews CON 1 (RU), LAW 4 (EE), CON 3 (WE) & CON 5 (US). 
932 Interview CON 1 (RU). 
9m Perry-Kessaris 2005,196. 
934 Interview LAW 6 (UK). 
9m Interviews FDI 2 (UK), PRO 3 (UK). 
936 Wang 2001,542-543. 
937 Interview BUS 4 (RU). 
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"someone once told me you could summarise all Russian law in one sentence 'You 
can do this unless a bureaucrat tells you, you can't; and you can't do this unless some 
bureaucrat tells you, you can. ' That's still true to a certain extent "938 
These quotes capture the degree of flexibility contained within the Russian legal 
climate, and reflect the point that a particular 'insight', especially of the "unwritten 
rules"939 are indispensable to navigating it. Hence, even a Russian Minister 
responsible for investment policy complained that foreigners do not know how to do 
business and deal with the law in Russia 940 So, some foreigners can be prejudiced by 
their own mentality94' or lack of savvy 9`2 A frustrated Russian investment promoter 
went further, arguing that legal problems are perceived, and with the right 
mentality, investors will realise that the legal challenges in Russia are "not really 
problems. "943 
3.3 Other Factors 
3.3.1 External Standards 
Foreign investors may also be constrained by the need to conform to express 
standards in their home countries. For example, the board of one German firm 
interviewed had signed up to a strict corporate governance code in the wake of the 
Enron scandal 9' A lawyer cited a case where ambiguities in the legal situation were 
particularly uncomfortable for a major European investor, which, being publicly 
traded and audited, would have difficulty in reassuring its own institutional 
shareholders over its Russia plans 945 
938 Interview LAW 6 (UK). 
939 Ledeneva 2001,6. 
940 Interview GOV 1 (RU). 
941 Interviews CON 4 (RU), BUS 4 (RU). 
942 Interview LAW 2 (US). 
943 Interview BUS 4 (RU). 
9" Interview FDI 4 (WE). 
945 Interview LAW 5 (US). 
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3.3.2 The Role of Lawyers 
The role of lawyers in larger firms with internal lawyers is also of note. In companies 
where lawyers are not integrated with the business development team, their 
concerns may be ignored. A lawyer explains: 
"You will often find the business guys saying, 'don't talk to the lawyers yet, they'll only 
make it too complicated. ' They want to flush out the entire opportunity. Lawyers 
complain that they are the last to know, and that they can't be that helpful if they 
only come in at the tail end. It depends on who is making the decision, and how that 
all plays out. "946 
3.3.3 Business Sector 
In so far as the cost imposed by the legal climate and the gains available depend on 
the business sector, the impact of the legal climate will depend on the sector. 
Exposure to the legal climate and the regulatory burden varies between sectors, 947 as 
does politicisationM and corruption. 949 For example, as mentioned earlier, the very 
visibility of retail business compared to wholesale business brings with it an added 
degree of bureaucratic interference and corruption 9-10 Equally, incentives to invest 
will also depend on the sector in question, with some sectors being more lucrative 
than others. 951 Thus the impact of the legal climate will depend on the sector in 
question, as the costs imposed by the legal climate must be weighed against the 
rewards of investing. 
3.3.4 New Entrants vs. Established Investors 
Finally, the interests of established foreign investors also differ from those of 
potential newcomers. Respondents agreed that regulatory obstacles serve as a barrier 
W Interview LAW 5 (US). 
947 Interviews PRO 3 (UK), LAW 4 (EE) & BUS 5 (UK). 
Interview LAW 4 (EE), CON 4 (RU). 
949 Interview LAW 4 (EE). 
950 Interview FDI 1 (UK). 
951 Interviews FIN 2 (US), PRO 3 (UK) & BUS 5 (UK). 
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to competition, and therefore, once a foreign investor has learned to manage these 
obstacles, they can serve as a competitive advantage as they hinder the entry of 
further competition. 952 
3.4 Conclusions 
The interviews show that when talking about foreign investors and host legal 
climates, we must be careful not to over-generalise. Where they expressed an opinion 
on the matter, the majority of interviewees held that the perceptions and attitudes of 
incoming foreign investors towards the legal climate were not homogenous. Rather, 
it was felt that the impact of the Russian legal climate was contingent on a number of 
firm attributes. Size was the most widely held as important; sector was also verified 
by the interviewees; nationality received mixed opinions; the culture and experience 
of firms and their managers were also deemed to affect their attitudes to legal 
challenges. The law and development field has acknowledged the role of firm size in 
relation to domestic firms. It appears that the principle of firm characteristics has a 
wider application though, as this research shows that 'softer' characteristics such as 
company culture and experience, can variegate the impact of the host legal 
environment. 
Interviewees confirmed Hypothesis Two, that "the impact of the Russian legal 
climate on foreign investors depends on their firms' characteristics. " The findings 
suggest that it is not'objective' assessments of the legal climate that inform and affect 
the decision to invest, but the subjective perceptions of the individual investor. The 
interviews also show that when considering the role of law in providing an attractive 
legal environment we should be aware that the nature of the legal climate and the 
institutions, laws and policies within it will have an uneven impact across the types 
of potential foreign investors; and so policies need to be more targeted towards 
particular types of firms. 
952 Interviews FDI 1 (UK), FDI 6 (UK), FDI 8 (EE). 
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It is possible to cautiously suggest some of the principles in action. The foreign 
investors' size, much like its domestic counterparts, affects the impact of the cost 
imposed by the legal climate and the nature of its relationship with the authorities. 
Larger firms can not only more comfortably afford the costs imposed by the legal 
climate, but their relationship with the state can be more positive than that 
experienced by small firms. The burden of regulations and taxation weighs more 
heavily on smaller firms. Moreover, they will not have the connections required to 
fend off predatory government officials, while large foreign investors will. Medium 
sized firms are caught in between these two poles. These findings echo the principles 
identified by existing literature about the differences between small and large 
firms 953 As far as the question of culture is concerned, these interviews did not allow 
us to draw conclusions about which national cultures, if any, were more or less at 
ease with the Russian legal climate. Instead, the interviews showed that ways of 
thinking, expressed either at the national, corporate or management level, do make a 
difference to the perceptions of and approaches to the Russian legal climate. 
Further research is required before one can assert more robustly how these 
characteristics may be expected to variegate the impact of the legal climate. 
Nevertheless, the very fact that foreign investors can differ substantially in their 
attitudes towards host legal climates, owing to these factors, is an important 
academic point. It shows that the sensitivity towards the quality of the host legal 
climate varies notably between foreign investors. 
This Chapter has shown that the shortcomings of the Dominant Theory shortcomings 
lie in the fact that it only provides a partial explanation of the role of law, and 
thereby oversimplifying and the impact of the country's legal climate. Arguably the 
most useful way of interpreting this is simply by asserting that the relationship 
between foreign investors and host legal climates differs widely, and that there is 
strong evidence that a faction of investors do not conform to the Dominant Theory. 





1 Summary of Research Approach 
This study has examine and build on the Dominant Theory, that is, the importance of 
a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate to the attraction and support of foreign 
investment into Russia around 2004. While this study accepts that the quality of the 
legal climate is relevant to a certain extent to foreign investors, it has argued that its 
importance has been overstated in the law and development field. This 
overemphasis on the importance of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate has led to a 
model of law and foreign investment which is incomplete, overlooking a range of 
factors. This study aimed to contribute to a more complete understanding of the 
impact of the quality of Russia's legal climate on foreign investment determination. 
Russia is an ideal testing ground for the Dominant Theory: it both lacks a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate and has not received nearly enough foreign 
investment. In fact, many of the claims about the importance of a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate to foreign investment have been made specifically about Russia. 
1.1 The Dominant Theory and Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate 
The Dominant Theory is the belief that a host country needs a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate in order to attract and support foreign investors. Rather than the 
product of a few policy papers, the view is deeply rooted, widely held, and to the 
envy of many other theories, vigorously acted upon. 
The Dominant Theory is built predominately on traditional law and economics. 
According to development institutions like the World Bank, the needs of the private 
sector must be addressed in order to encourage investment and economic growth. To 
support investors' needs, the legal system should provide a climate of predictability 
and low transaction costs. This entails, inter alia, an independent judiciary which 
efficiently and effectively enforces market-friendly laws, and a regulatory climate 
that is light-handed, transparent, stable and free from corruption. A Theoretically 
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Ideal Legal Climate is expected to provide investors with an unspecified yet 
satisfactory degree of certainty and efficiency in which to do business. A host 
country, like Russia, that generally lacks these features is considered to deter foreign 
investors. 
The Dominant Theory derives from one of the central concepts in law and 
development, namely the importance of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate to 
economic development. While built around the principles of law and economics, this 
belief has also been influenced by the work of Max Weber, the scholarship of the law 
and development movement of the 1960's and 1970's, and further, the ancient 
heritage of the political rule of law, which runs back as far as the Magna Carta and 
Aristotle. 
The Dominant Theory is labelled as such because it is propagated by multilateral 
institutions, such as the members of the World Bank Group and the OECD, foreign 
investment associations, such as FIAS and FIAC, as well as range of academic and 
commercial research bodies and politicians. Finally, the Dominant Theory is put into 
practise. The principle that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is critical to economic 
development and foreign investment has motivated the expenditure of a great deal 
of time and hundreds of millions of dollars of public money on rule of law reform in 
the transition region. Moreover, foreign investors and their representatives have 
played a significant part in these reforms. 
1.2 Limitations of the Dominant Theory 
Given its theoretical bases, the support which it enjoys and its apparent logic, we 
must be careful and precise in our criticisms. It is clear that foreign investors should 
be attracted to high quality host legal climates, and conversely, that they should be 
deterred from hosts with poor legal climates. Further, it is clear that improvements in 
the quality of host legal climates would tend to have a positive effect on foreign 
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investment. But for a more complete understanding of law and foreign investment, 
we need to go further than tidy platitudes allow. 
First of all, the Dominant Theory assumes that foreign investors are well informed 
about the quality of host legal climates, and further, that without a Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate, foreign investors are unable to operate successfully. In order to 
build on the Dominant Theory, it is necessary to test these assumptions. Second, the 
Dominant Theory does not make room for differences between investors. A more 
developed theory of law and foreign investment would incorporate systematic 
differences in attitudes towards the host legal climate. Third, there is little research 
on how foreign investors actually do business in host countries that they are meant 
to be deterred from. Again, an understanding of the impact of the host legal climate 
on their actual activities would contribute to a more complete model. The final 
shortcoming of the Dominant Theory is that those that propagate it almost never take 
into account the immense challenge of their prescription for foreign investment 
attraction - that of establishing a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. But one must at 
least acknowledge the challenge posed, and better yet, to make recommendations for 
foreign investment attraction that take this challenge into account. 
2 The Evidence 
2.1 Existing Research 
Despite the common sense appeal of the Dominant Theory, there is a notable lack of 
robust direct evidence in support of it. The evidence that is available is of two types: 
the cross-country regression studies, and surveys of foreign investors. Both methods 
suffer from methodological limitations as well as inconsistent findings. Above all, 
neither actually directly address the question of the role of law in the decision to 
invest, but attempt to infer it indirectly. First, the regression studies on law as a 
determinant of FDI. 
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The application of the regression technique is not an appropriate tool for 
understanding the role of law in the foreign investment decision. To reiterate, it is 
indirect and so it cannot tell us about the actual role of the law in the decision to 
invest. Further, its use was shown to suffer from up to ten methodological problems. 
For instance, there are problems associated with estimating the quality of legal 
climates. Also, the regression technique cannot prove that the quality of host legal 
climates affected foreign investment, and moreover, may not even indicate such as 
the explanatory variables included in the model, such as the quality of the legal 
system, political stability, economic growth and so on, are not independent from one 
another. 
At best, the results of the studies provide lukewarm support for a link between law 
and foreign investment, although not a direct causal one. What the studies indicate is 
that countries with certain better features of legal climates sometimes, though not 
always, enjoy more foreign investment. But, there is no way of telling whether that 
link is because another factor, such as economic growth, which is connected to both 
FDI and the quality of the legal climate, is at cause. Further, the results are often 
inconsistent. Thus, the regression evidence suggests that law may affect foreign 
investment decisions, though it certainly falls short of proving that the quality of host 
legal climates is of critical importance to foreign investment decision making. 
The second body of research on law and foreign investment also comes with 
methodological flaws and confusing findings. Most of the surveys follow the same 
format: they ask current investors whether particular issues, especially legal ones, are 
perceived as obstacles to investment. Foreign investor surveys do indeed show that 
foreign investors prefer that host states possess features of a Theoretically Ideal Legal 
Climate. They also clearly show that foreign investors in Russia will complain about 
the lack of transparency of the regulatory climate, corruption, the effectiveness of the 
courts, problems with enforcing intellectual property rights, and so on. However, 
most of studies are, like the regression ones, too indirect - they do not even try to 
show that the perceived quality of host legal climates is actually a decisive factor in 
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the investment process. However, two of the three studies9M that do address the role 
of law in the decision to invest provide evidence against the Dominant Theory. 
Though they do not justify the extent and stridency of support for the Dominant 
Theory, the regression studies and surveys provide lukewarm, indirect support it. 
The evidence available suggests that the quality of legal climates may matter. Even if 
we believe that the quality of the host legal climate is very important, we cannot 
make a stronger assertion without verifying two assumptions about foreign investor 
behaviour: first, about how well informed they are about host legal climates; and 
second, about how potential foreign investors react to information that a host legal 
climate is weak. It is perhaps the questions that the evidence does not answer that 
can glean the most insight: 
1. How do foreign firms perceive host legal climates prior to investment? 
2. Why do foreign investors invest in spite of an apparently critical view of the 
legal climate? 
3. What firm characteristics make legal issues more or less of a barrier to 
investment? 
This research study has attempted to address these within the parameters of the two 
hypotheses. 
2.2 Building on The Dominant Theory 
Hypothesis One was that "a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not always 
necessary to support foreign investors in Russia. " Three reasons in support of 
Hypothesis One were identified by the interviewees; these were consistent with the 
findings of the literature reviewed in Chapter Four. The first two reasons are that, to 
the knowledge of the interviewees during the period under study, perceptions of the 
954 Hewko 2002, Perry 2001; the other is Klavens & Zamparutti 1995 
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legal climate were not a decisive factor in the decision to invest in Russia. In other 
words, foreign investors neither chose nor rejected Russia on the basis of their 
perceptions of its legal climate. 
The Dominant Theory presumes that foreign investors have accurate information 
about host legal climates. But according to the interviewees, at the preliminary stage 
when they are considering Russia as a possible host, potential foreign investors do 
not have accurate information about the legal climate. Fuelled by the media and 
public perceptions, inaccurate, generalised and stereotyped opinions deter many 
foreign firms from even considering a potential investment in Russia. Even 
companies that have gone as far as talking to investment promoters and lawyers can 
be quite ignorant about Russia and hold exaggerated fears. Further, potential 
investors at this stage, do not view the legal climate as a discernable issue. Instead, 
their impressions of Russia's investment climate are formed by broader economic 
and political trends, and news making events. 
A range of evidence corroborates and adds credibility to these findings. Within the 
FDI literature, the works of Perry-Kessaris and Hewko also show that, when 
choosing a host, foreign investors do not refer to accurate information about legal 
climates. The findings are also consistent with those of behavioural decision analysis, 
which explains why economic actors may not be able to acquire and process accurate 
information about host legal systems and legal risk in the rational manner supposed. 
One salient example is that major news making events can distort perceptions of 
what is important. Bounded rationality also predicts that foreign investors might use 
rules of thumb to simplify in their decisions: both the present study and the one 
conducted by the Foreign Investment Advisory Council of Russia (FIAC) show that 
general trends in Russia, and the appearance of the right policies being taken, had a 
greater impact on investors' decisions than the perceived weakness of its legal 
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climate 9ss Finally, the findings reassert the point that the image of Russia abroad is a 
pressing foreign investment issue. 
The Dominant Theory also presumes that foreign investors will be deterred by a host 
that lacks a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate. But the interviewees showed, in 
support of Hypothesis One, that the accurate information which foreign investors 
gather about the Russian legal climate once they have started to consider an 
investment opportunity there, does not put them off. This is because foreign 
investors only examine the legal climate in depth once they have already decided 
that a business case exists for an investment. According to the interviews, it is rare 
that they will abandon the opportunity because of what they then learn about the 
legal climate. Further, foreign investors already come into Russia knowing that the 
legal climate is poor; in fact, they may even be relieved by what their advisors tell 
them about the legal climate.. Thus perceptions of the host legal climate do not 
appear to have a decisive role in investment process. This is consistent with the 
Eclectic Paradigm, the prevailing theory of foreign investment determination, which 
shows that the legal climate is not a decisive factor in the choice to invest abroad. 
The final reason why the absence of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate may not 
prevent foreigners from investing is that a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate is not 
always required to support them. Interviews described ways in which the legal risks 
of entering and operating in Russia can be managed. Prior to actually investing, 
foreigners can open a low-cost 'representative office' to assess the opportunities and 
risks of investing more thoroughly. Foreign investors also tend to defer responsibility 
for day to day legal issues to joint venture partners, local employees, accountants and 
lawyers. Perry-Kessaris also found that foreign investors in India rely on locals for 
day-to-day bureaucratic and legal affairs 9-16Finally, their lawyers will offer ways in 
which specific legal risks can be managed. For example, contract enforcement risk 
can be reduced by the detail and manner in which contract provisions are made. 
955 See Chapter Three, Section 2. 
956 Perry-Kessaris 2005,176. 
255 
The interviews showed that the key to success in Russia was adaptation to the legal 
strategies that were known to work there. This means that success rests upon making 
use of both formal procedures and informal tactics, often in conjunction. Foreign 
investors must abide by the law, and be as thorough as possible, not so much for 
reasons of principle, but because Russia has a "very unforgiving legal climate. "957 At 
the same time, however, they must be prepared to seek solutions by relying on 
influential connections (the 'krysha' or roof), fostering cordial relations with 
government officials, and also bribery, which may in some cases involve payment to 
law enforcers to actually carry out their jobs effectively! 
As far as I am aware, this is the first study to look closely at the legal strategies that 
foreign investors use to cope in Russia's legal climate. The interview findings 
corroborate existing research, reviewed in Chapter Four, about how alternatives to a 
Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate enable foreign investors to do business 
successfully. Wang and Hewko also argue that informal system were used by foreign 
investors to compensate for the inadequacies of the state legal system in China and 
transition countries, respectively. The World Bank found that foreign investors in 
transition countries benefited from corrupt practices? -18 
By demonstrating how foreign investors cope in Russia's weak legal climate, this 
study shows that the surveys which enumerate and bemoan legal obstacles to 
business can exaggerate the importance of the law to investors, and present a one- 
sided picture of the relationship between foreign investors and host legal climates. 
The interview findings help us to understand some of the paradoxes in existing 
research. A good example is the 2005 FIAC survey of 107 foreign investors in Russia, 
and 51 potential investors. The study found that the legal and regulatory climate 
stood out as the most significant obstacle to business. This is precisely the type of 
evidence the Dominant Theory relies upon. However, the vast majority of current 
957 Interview LAW 5 (US). 
958 See Chapter Four, Section 3.1. 
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investors surveyed were planning on increasing their investments, while most 
potential investors had plans to invest in Russia 959 Foreign investors, we conclude, 
must be finding ways of doing business successfully in spite of these legal 
shortcomings. 
A similar example can be found in the contrasting findings of the BEEPS. In the 
analysis of the BEEPS in Chapter Five, foreign investors described the Russian legal 
climate as very poor, but they did not perceive its actual impact on their businesses 
to be nearly as bad. To illustrate, while over 80% of foreign investors held negative 
views about the honesty of the courts, 73% felt that the courts were either no obstacle 
or a minor obstacle to their business. This study explains these discrepancies by 
showing how foreign investors can either take advantage of the dishonesty of the 
courts or at least work around them. 
The Dominant Theory assumes that all foreign investors are alike in their sensitivity 
towards the quality of host legal climates. The second Hypothesis was that "foreign 
investors' perceptions of the Russian legal climate depend on their firm 
characteristics. " Confirming the hypothesis, a strong current throughout the 
interviews was that foreign investors' perceptions of the Russian legal climate and 
their ways of dealing with it depended significantly on the circumstances of the 
investor and investment. 
In the context of the decision to invest, it was found that smaller firms were more put 
off than larger firms by public perceptions of Russia as well as the costs of 
investigating and entering the country. On the other hand, larger firms with more 
resources could afford to research and consult on the Russian investment climate 
more thoroughly. Moreover, large foreign investors, including some of the 
interviewees, can get assistance from senior government officials such as the Moscow 
Mayor, the Minister for Economic Development or even the President. 
959 See Chapter Three, Section 2. 
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The notion that small firms are more prejudiced by challenging legal climates is a 
common one in law and development literature. m Research on foreign investors 
demonstrates differences according to size, but owing the shortage of research, no 
clear trends can be identified as yet. The findings here support the ideas of 
Vandevelde, who argues that states seeking to attract more risk averse investors, 
such as small firms with limited resources, would benefit the most from reducing the 
investment risk. 961 
Once inside Russia, firm characteristics also have a great effect on a foreign investors' 
relationship with the legal climate. As expected, firm size is a crucial variable. The 
constructiveness of their relationship with the state, and their capacity to shoulder 
the costs of the legal and regulatory environment sets small and large foreign 
investors apart. Smaller ones are advised to avoid the legal system as much as 
possible, while larger firms should rely on good lawyers and even better connections 
with the authorities. These findings are supported by existing work on how firm size 
affects the impact of legal climates. For example, studies have reported that smaller 
domestic firms are more harmed by corruption, and benefit more judicial efficiency 
and property rights protection. %2 
In addition to firm size, firm sector was identified as an influential variable. This is 
because sector which a firm operates is important in determining the rewards 
available to investors and the scale of regulation and corruption that they face. Little 
was said about the impact of joint ventures. 
Wang and Hewko argue that investors who are used to dealing with unpredictable 
and weak legal climates in their own countries would be advantaged in host 
countries with similar features 963 The interviewees did not provide a consensus on 
how national culture played a part, but they were united in asserting that experience 
Chapter Two, Section 4.1. 
%1 Vandevelde 1998,526. 
%2 See Chapter Four, Section 4.1. 
Hewko 2002,6; Wang 2001,542-543. 
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and management attitudes significantly affected how well foreigners fare in the legal 
environment. The reason for this was that these factors affect the ability of foreign 
investors to adapt to the Russian legal climate. And the quicker they learn that in 
Russia "the law is - you can use it in different ways"9M, the better they will fare. 
2.3 Conclusions 
Both Hypotheses were confirmed. The findings relating to Hypothesis One 
contribute to the argument that the Dominant Theory only provides a partial 
explanation of the relationship between foreign investors and host legal climates. 
This limitation results in a tendency to overstate the impact of legal obstacles on 
businesses and generally oversimplify the role of the legal climate, as perceived by 
foreign investors in Russia. A legal climate that is not ideal may still be workable. 
Thus, while a legal climate bearing a greater resemblance to a Theoretically Ideal 
Legal Climate is no doubt preferable for foreign investors in Russia, we cannot assert 
with confidence how important it really is, and certainly stop short of claiming it is 
'necessary'. Perhaps one gains the most mileage in this debate by emphasising that 
the importance attached to the legal climate depends on the type of investor. This is 
the issue discussed in greater detail under the second Hypothesis. 
The Dominant Theory does not account for differences in attitudes towards legal 
climates. But a major conclusion of this research is that the impact of the Russian 
legal climate depends on the foreign investor's own characteristics. Further research 
is required to claim more confidently exactly how firm characteristics affect foreign 
investors' relationships with host legal climates. Nevertheless, the very fact that 
foreign investors differ substantially in their attitudes towards host legal climates is a 
notable point. This stems from the principle that risks are perceived and subjective, 
and so we should expect differences between firms. 
Interview BUS 4 (RU). 
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To conclude, the evidence shows that a notable faction of foreign investors in Russia 
circa 2004 do not conform to the Dominant Theory, although we have no information 
about what proportion of foreign investors this faction represents, including those 
that 'got away'. What is clear, however, is that foreign investors' attitudes and 
responses to host legal climates contain subjective element that should not be 
overlooked. 
3 Discussion 
The research study started with the question of law as a determinant of FDI, which is 
an important and current issue in law and development, particularly in the case of 
Russia. One issue that arose was that of Russia's image abroad, which is a key 
challenge for foreign investment promotion. But beyond that, to generate a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between foreign investors and host legal climates, 
this study has addressed emerging issues, namely: the legal activities of foreign 
investors in Russia, including informal institutions and bribery, and also the role of 
firm characteristics. To provide a more rounded analysis of the Dominant Theory, 
one must also address the issue of the feasibility of legal reform. Having raised the 
issue of the role of law in development, we see similarities in the Dominant Theory 
and the prevailing approach to legal reform. And so finally, this study touches 
briefly on the importance of interdisciplinarity and context in research and practise 
in these fields. These issues will be addressed in turn in the subsections that follow. 
3.1 Law as a Determinant of Foreign Investment 
The Eclectic Paradigm demonstrates that the decision to invest depends on 
numerous factors. The key ones amongst them, and this is supported by research in 
the transition region, are economic incentives. The interviewees also made the point 
that the business decision comes first. The extent to which the legal climate acts, in 
the long term, to create attractive economic opportunities is an central question in 
law and development, but beyond the scope of the present study. 
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Within the scope of the investment decision, what role does the quality of the legal 
climate play? In countries like Russia, essentially, it acts as fence, or a barrier, which 
may or may not deter investors from pursuing an investment opportunity further. 
The legal climate, is not, however, the incentive itself. When may the legal climate act 
as a barrier? When, the quality is perceived on the part of the potential investor to be 
below what they consider to be an acceptable minimum standard; or in other words, 
when they perceive the risks to outweigh the benefits. 
Looking at the investment as a risk-reward calculation provides simplicity and 
clarity. As the economic incentives increase, the relative weight of legal risk, in 
principle, decreases. Equally, as the legal climate improves, it becomes more widely 
acceptable to potential investors, and therefore deters fewer potential foreign 
investors. How foreign investors come to learn that the legal climate has improved is 
an important question that shall be addressed in next subsection. Though a legal 
climate may not be Theoretically Ideal, at some point, it may no longer serve as an 
effective barrier to investment. This will depend on the economic incentives for 
investment, other barriers, and also competition from host states. 
Michalet studies the attitudes of multinational investors in the transition region and 
competition between host states. m He holds that international investors viewed 
countries as either being on a priority short-list of investment destinations or in the 
bracket of 'potential' hosts. According to Michalet, there is little trade-off between 
966 short-list countries, as firms want to have a presence in all of the core countries, 
while 'potential' hosts did not yet meet the necessary conditions to attract investment 
from the firms surveyed. To illustrate: if Russia and Poland are both on the short-list, 
then Russia competes with Poland. In that case, one reason why it does not receive as 
much FDI may be because the Polish legal climate is better than the Russian one. 
However, if Russia is not yet on the short-list, while Poland is, then the difference in 
the quality of their legal climates is immaterial. Hence the role of law is 'relative' in 
965 Section 4.4.2. 
Michalet 1997,3. 
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the sense that within the context of the investment decision, ceteris paribus, law 
matters only in so far as how one country's legal climate measures against its FDI 
rivals. 
3.2 The Importance of Image 
One major implication of this study concerns foreign investment attraction and the 
importance of improving Russia's image abroad. The idea of 'changing Russia's face' 
has in fact frequently been tabled in foreign investment policy circles. For example, 
in 2003, the President commissioned the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and 
Minister for Economic Development, to take measures to improve Russia's image 
abroad for the sake of attracting foreign investment; '7 in 2004, he instructed Russian 
ambassadors to do the same 968 The Foreign Investment Advisory Council has a 
Working Group dedicated to the investment image of Russia. 969 
According to members of the Foreign Investment Advisory Council of Russia, myths 
about Russia need to be dispelled and awareness spread that economic and political 
risk is diminishing. This partly requires an informational and media campaign, but 
more importantly, it depends on foreign businessmen actually seeing first hand how 
business is done there. '° An effective way of spending resources, according to the 
chairman of the European Business Club, would be to renovate Moscow's main 
airport, Sheremetyevo, which is allegedly "the main source of the negative image of 
Russia for people coming to Moscow. "97 In fact, the country recently embarked on 
an overseas public relations which includes trips for foreign journalists and 
politicians, an English-language television channel, and an annual winter festival in 
London. m However, while public relations strategies may help to gradually improve 
%7 The Russia Journal 2003. 
968 The Moscow Times 2004b. 
969 FIAC Internet Site. 
970 The Moscow Times 2004c. 
971 Remmes 2002,6. 
972 The Economist 2006. 
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foreigners' perceptions of the investment environment, setbacks such as the Yukos 
affair and the Beslan tragedy can quickly nullify the effect of progress, especially as 
Russia already carries a burden of stereotyping. Some argue that image building can 
only achieve so much, for "even if image makers make wonders", without true 
reform, "the illusions will disappear, sooner or later. "973 
3.3 A Broader Model of Law and Foreign Investors 
Future research on law and foreign investors should take a broader perspective than 
it has in the past. To improve the Dominant Theory as a theory of law and foreign 
investment, it should take into account what has been learned about the actual 
impact of the Russian legal climate on foreign investors. 
First, instead of presuming that foreign investors make objectively rational decisions 
based on full information, the Dominant Theory can benefit from the field of 
behavioural law and economics. The field lends a theoretical framework for 
understanding the limitations in foreign investors' ability to acquire and process 
accurate information about host legal climates. This is particularly important for a 
country like Russia which suffers from stereotypes. 
Secondly, researchers in the field of law and development should place legal factors 
in wider context. A law-centred focus inevitably overemphasises the role of law. On 
the question of foreign investment determination, a contextualised approach would 
attempt to assess the impact of law on foreign investors alongside the numerous 
other factors that affect firms' decisions. 
Third, instead of assuming that only a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate can provide 
investors with their desired level of efficiency and predictability, researchers should 
pay greater attention to alternatives to Theoretically Ideal Legal Climates. Further 
9n The Russia Journal 2003. 
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research on how foreign investors do business in Russia's legal climate would tell us 
more about the 'necessity' of a Theoretically Ideal Legal Climate and also extend core 
issues in transitional law and development, such as the relationship between the firm 
and state, informality, corruption, and firm characteristics, to the study of foreign 
investors. Research on how firms cope would also help to distinguish between legal 
sectors that are satisfactory and those which, in the eyes of foreign investors, are 
priorities for reform. 
Fourth, instead of presuming the impact of the law to be uniform, the Dominant 
Theory should recognise that the impact of the law, both in the decision to invest, 
and during operations, depends on the investor and investment in question. The 
importance of firm characteristics has relevance for future research as well as for 
policy-making. The results presented in this study are preliminary, and it would 
useful to repeat them on a broader scale in order to ascertain trends. Statistical 
analysis of surveys such as the BEEPS would add robustness to the qualitative 
findings here. Ideally, policy-makers would be able to target strategies for the 
attraction and support of foreign investors according to their needs. For example, 
smaller investors may receive greater assistance with regulatory and taxation issues. 
Finally, legal climates should not be treated as a single homogenous entity. Surveys 
that assess perceptions of the legal climate distinguish between the numerous aspects 
of the legal climate, from tax administration, to customs, to the courts, to corruption, 
to inspections and licensing. In Russia's case, according to the literature reviewed in 
Chapter Five, the most important challenges are not the courts, and not so much 
corruption, but above all the (un)predictability and (in)efficiency of the regulatory 
environment and the arbitrary behaviour of government officials. In the past, 
advocates of the Dominant Theory have tended to overemphasise the role of the 
courts. 
264 
3.4 The Role of Law in Development 
The perennial question in law and development is whether there is a single legal 
climate best suited to economic development. As far as foreign investment in Russia 
in the period under study is concerned, the evidence suggests 'not necessarily'. 
Foreign investors can adapt, cope and prosper in Russia. Naturally, improvements in 
the legal climate would bring benefits and increase foreign investment flows; this is 
undeniable, and so legal reform must continue. At the same time, however, 
establishing the rule of law in Russia, as Chapter Six showed, is an immensely 
difficult challenge that may take a generation or longer. So, while a Theoretically 
Ideal Legal Climate may be theoretically and ideally desirable, in practise, one has to 
accept the real world challenges of implementation, and in the near term, aim for a 
workable legal climate that meets an acceptable minimum standard instead. 
3.5 Parallels Between The Dominant Theory and The Rule of Law Orthodox 
The Dominant Theory and the rule of law orthodoxy are two expressions of a single 
belief: one in the importance of formal legal systems in the determination of 
economic behaviour, and further, in the efficacy of legal reforms in spurring 
economic development, including domestic and foreign investment. This subsection 
analyses the interesting parallels between the Dominant Theory and the rule of law 
orthodoxy. These views tend to aggrandize the role of law in development, whilst 
much of the evidence in the literature and fieldwork stresses the limitations of the 
role for formal legal systems in the present context. There are five parallels. 
First and foremost, the importance attached to the quality of formal legal by both the 
Dominant Theory and the rule of law orthodoxy. Both approaches assume that law is 
a vital determinant of economic behaviour. The transition reform approach held law 
as an instrumental force that can be manipulated to govern behaviour, 974 and so it 
was assumed that the right laws would be automatically enforced and produce the 
anticipated changes. This belief in the impact of legislative change on the behaviour 
974 Burg 1977,505; Campbell and Piccioto 1998,250 
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of economic actors is mirrored by the central position the legal system in general is 
given in the decision to invest in a foreign country. But legal reforms in transition 
lacked effectiveness and produced unintended consequences. Similarly, the 
interviews showed that the role of law in the decision to invest may sometimes be 
very limited. So, perhaps law is not as crucial in directing economic behaviour as it is 
sometimes believed to be. 
The efficacy ascribed to law derives from viewing law in the abstract rather than in 
practice. To some, the collapse of Communism was an opportunity to design 
"intricate models of theoretical perfectionism. "m This was part of a mechanical view 
of cause and effect which was divorced from any empirical investigation of how laws 
were being used976 -Similarly, the Dominant Theory is partly built on abstract 
presumptions about the' investment decision process; it also suffers from a lack of 
direct empirical foundation. When one examines economic actors' perceptions of the 
law directly, it becomes clear that sometimes, foreign investors may overlook legal 
systems in the decision to invest, while foreign and domestic firms in transition 
often avoid and abuse legal systems. 
Not only does the prevailing view not refer to how laws are actually perceived and 
responded to, but moreover, it does not view law in its wider context. For example, 
Upham claims that the rule of law orthodoxy overlooks the "truth" that law is 
"deeply contextual. "977 According to the World Bank itself, country conditions were 
not adequately reviewed before loans, stipulated on legal reform, were made in the 
region. 978 In law-and-FDI, the context referred to is the decision to invest and the 
various factors that influence it. Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm, which is a 
comprehensive framework, gives law a minor role in the choice of host. In this 
research, it was learned that business opportunities take precedence in the minds of 
investors, and perceived legal challenges can be responded to. Therefore, the role of 
975 Waelde and Gunderson 1994,376 
976 Hendley 2004,608-611 
977 Upham 2002,7 
978 Gupta et al. 2002,7-8 
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law diminishes considerably when one actually integrates it into the wider context in 
which it exists. 
The fourth parallel in Dominant Theory and rule of law orthodoxy is the view of 
economic actors as homo-economicus. For instance, in the context of privatisation, 
western economists argued that "there was no 'Soviet man, ' only 'economic man, "' 
who, once given property rights, would create an "irresistible" lobby for the rule of 
law. 979 History tells another story. In the law-and-FDI sphere the presumed classical 
'rationality' of economic actors is put to question by behavioural decision theories, 
which this research corroborates. For instance, investors were often found to be 
swayed by superficial information about Russia and analyse the country by utilising 
heuristics. This is inline with other work in the FDI field. 980 Moreover, far from being 
homogenous, foreign investors and economic actors differ sharply in their attitudes 
and approach to legal climates. In summary, the impact of the law is not absolute. 
Instead, the perceptions of economic actors are subjective in principle and can 
deviate from what classical law and economics considers 'rational'. 
The final similarity in the two dominant views is the overemphasis on the role of 
formal institutions with the corresponding neglect of informal ones. As already 
mentioned, transition legal reforms have been characterised as technocratic and 
ungrounded. Once informal institutions are taken into consideration, however, one 
learns that they constrain the effectiveness of reforms. For instance, informal 
institutions are resistant to change, and policy levers cannot generally penetrate 
them. Informal institutions also affect the demand for reform. 981 Similarly, the 
Dominant Theory does not account for the role of informal institutions in transition 
economies. In so far as they pervade such climates and serve as a substitute for 
formal systems, informal institutions explain why the existence of high quality 
formal legal systems may not always be necessary to foreign investors. This research 
979 Hoff & Stiglitz 2004,15 
980 Hewko 2002 and Perry-Kessaris 2001 
981 See Chapter Five, Section 3.3 
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showed that foreign investors do indeed rely on informal practices in Russia; 
similarly, Wang's work demonstrates the importance of Chinese informal networks 
in supporting foreign investors there. 912 
3.6 The Importance of Context and Interdisciplinary Knowledge 
It is not being argued that traditional law and economics has nothing to offer, or that 
its principles are mistaken. On the contrary, it provides ideal theoretical starting 
point, instructing us about how economic actors should behave. But it cannot fully 
account for how legal climates are perceived, used, abused and avoided by foreign 
investors in countries like Russia. This is why the Dominant Theory has been found 
to lack some accuracy. 
Scholars such as Robert Ellickson, David Campbell and Sol Piccioto have also argued 
that law and economics has been held back by the assumptions of economics, and 
that progress requires understanding the broader social context of economic 
activity. 983 North and Coase also took issue with the behavioural assumptions of 
classical economics 9&' In the future, work and policy on law in transition must be 
more grounded in the empirical realities of legal practices, and also be more 
interdisciplinary, giving recognition to the variety of influences that shape economic 
behaviour. 
Transition legal reforms did not work out the way intended as they did not 
adequately account for how law functioned in society, as well as the numerous legal, 
social, political and historical influences on rule of law reform. To avoid the mistakes 
of the past, research and reforms must be both interdisciplinary and grounded in an 
understanding of how law is actually used and misused. A leading researcher of law 
in Russia, Kathryn Hendley is firmly of the view that societal attitudes to law and the 
982 Wang 2000 
M See Campbell and Piccioto 1998, Ellickson 1998. 
984 See Chapter Two, subsection 2.1 
268 
way in which laws are used, including the role of informal practices, are essential to 
legal study and legal reform 915 
According to Garth the study of 'law in context' was in part a response to the 
criticism of the law and development movement 916One of the advocates of law in 
context is William Twining. Twining is firmly in favour of an interdisciplinary 
understanding of law. His conception of law in context involves the breaking down 
of the "rigid barriers" between fields of study. 987 His book, "Law in Context" is 
subtitled, "Enlarging a Discipline". While legal reforms have been dominated by 
traditional law and economics, Twining's approach is more pluralistic. Context and 
breadth, he says, "involve multiple lenses, historical, geographical, ethical, logical, 
sociological and so on. The basic commitment is... to advancing and disseminating 
understanding. "988 In short, Twining believes that "breadth of vision" is required to 
understand the role of law. 989 This research study shares his belief. 
985 Hendley 2004,608-611 and 615-616. 
Garth 2000,6. 
987 Twining 1997,24. 
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